This chapter explores the possibilities and dilemmas that civil society actors face in resisting and reversing democratic backsliding through examples from around the world. It examines the conditions that shape civil society activism under backsliding and the roles it has played in containing or reversing autocratization. As it shows, in a number of cases civil society resistance has been critical in restraining and reversing backsliding. But it has been better able to counter backsliding when popular support for the backsliding leader has eroded and the opposition is able to work through institutions rather than having to work against them. As backsliding proceeds, institutional channels for influence deteriorate. As a result, there is a critical window during which civil society resistance stands a better chance of containing backsliding: before electoral processes and institutional constraints on executives are fully captured. Once capture occurs, civil society resistance moves to the much more dangerous and difficult task of confronting rather than preventing dictatorship.

The chapter introduces in a unified manner all ferroic materials including the three main ferroic systems, namely ferromagnetic, ferroelectric and ferroelastic, in addition to the case of materials that can display ferrotoroidic order. General physical aspects of magnetism, electricity and elasticity are used in order to introduce the order parameters that conveniently describe all these classes of ferroic phase transitions. It is shown that while the order parameter has a vectorial nature for ferromagnetic (axial vector), ferroelectric (polar vector) and magnetic ferrotoroidal (axial vector) systems, it is a rank-2 polar tensor in ferroelastic materials. The resulting physical differences arising from the different nature of the order parameter are then analysed in detail. Next, it is shown how to construct a convenient Ginszburg–Landau free energy functional in terms of these order parameters and their coupling for the different ferroic systems besides how to obtain the corresponding phase diagrams and microstructural features.

This chapter presents the tools for the comparative institutional analysis of amendments. It defines the core of a constitution as the provisions that cannot be altered given the amendment rules and the preferences of the relevant actors. The larger the core, the fewer and less significant the amendments. This simple rule is used to calculate an institutional index of rigidity of each constitution. Given that the preferences of the actors are not known, the index is based only on the amendment provisions and provides a necessary but not sufficient condition for amendments: When the constitution has high rigidity, amendments will be rare and/or insignificant, but when the constitution has low rigidity, there may or may not be frequent and/or significant amendments.

Four ways of considering partisanship and factionalism dominated the political landscape of the nineteenth-century United States: the residual anti-party views of classical republicans, who were often drawn to a traditional politics of deference involving voluntary allegiance to leaders of a higher class who would advance the “common good”; James Madison’s view that multiple factions, in shifting configurations extending across a large geographic expanse, could prevent majorities from dominating minorities; the stance of those like Andrew Jackson who believed that parties harnessed the power of the people, whose interests would otherwise suffer neglect or worse from elite leaders; and finally, the fear of a polarizing, two-party system expressed by John Adams evolved in the views of a Mugwump like Henry Adams, who held himself apart from partisan corruption without aspiring to restore the elite politics of deference. This chapter explores the presence of these varied approaches to partisanship and factionalism in literary works by Henry Adams, Hugh Henry Brackenridge, James Fenimore Cooper, William Ellery Channing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Albion Tourgée, Sarah Orne Jewett, Mark Twain, and Simon Pokagon.

This chapter of the handbook discusses the moral dimensions of political attitudes and behavior. The authors argue that a person’s political views – both at the level of political ideology as a whole and views on specific matters of economic and social policy – are profoundly shaped by their beliefs about right and wrong. These political views in turn drive people’s political behavior, not just at the ballot box or on the campaign trail, but in the community more generally. One downside of the way in which moral convictions fuel political attitudes and behavior is that they tend to interfere with productive communication across partisan divides, fueling a kind of animosity that stifles cooperation and compromise. Divergence in people’s moral convictions, then, leads inexorably to political polarization and gridlock. To address this problem, the authors discuss a number of potentially promising interventions, some of which target individuals’ attitudes (e.g., promoting empathy, reducing negative stereotypes), and others that aim at improving the quality of interpersonal relationships (e.g., increasing contact, fostering dialogue across political divides).

The conclusion summarizes the book’s arguments concerning the influence of polarization and the fracturing of norms on the judicial process, and also its remedial suggestions.

How can groups best coordinate to solve problems? The answer touches on cultural innovation, including the trajectory of science, technology, and art. If everyone acts independently, different people will explore different solutions, but there is no way to leverage good solutions across the community. If everyone acts in consort, early successes can lead the group down dead ends and stifle exploration. The challenge is one of maintaining innovation but also communicating effective solutions once they are found. When solutions spaces are smooth – that is, easy – communication is good. But when solution spaces are rugged – that is, hard – the balance should tilt toward exploration. How can we best achieve this? One answer is to place people in social structures that reduce communication, but maintain connectivity. But there are other solutions that might work better. Algorithms, like simulated annealing, are designed to deal with such problems by adjusting collective focus over time, allowing systems to “cool off” slowly as they home in on solutions. Network science allows us to explore the performance of such solutions on smooth and rugged landscapes, and provides numerous avenues for innovation of its own.

This chapter uses data from the Dataset of Parties, Elections, and Ideology in Latin America (DPEILA) to understand the recent rightward move being seen in many party systems within the region, as well as the subsequent process of party-system polarization. The authors argue that major economic downturns favor radical, antisystem alternatives, thereby creating an opportunity for newly created parties to campaign on extreme policy platforms. They also demonstrate that polarization increases when leftist incumbents are associated with progressive policy change, as right-wing parties have become more ideologically extreme. This indicates that the left turn of the 2000s has at times favored the radicalization of important sectors of the right.

In the conclusion, we review the book’s chapters and argue that Latin America has experienced a resurgence of conservative forces in recent years. We analyze the supply and demand of a broad set of conservative alternatives, paying special attention to the processes of party-building, adaptation, and rebranding. We find that new right-wing forces often have weak organizations, but have been able to mobilize voters along noneconomic cleavages, including security, gender politics, and reproductive rights. The adoption of a highly conservative profile has allowed parties to access lower-class constituencies and mobilize mass support among them. The politicization of cultural issues, such as LGBT rights and religious identities, has contributed to polarization and the rise of populist radical right parties. These parties have flourished within the context of political and economic shocks and benefited from cultural backlashes and the crises of traditional right-wing parties. In these situations, politics becomes a zero-sum game and the stakes get higher. Democratic stability in the region is arguably at its most tenuous state since the age of military dictatorships. Interrupted presidencies have become realities in many countries over the past fifteen years, raising concerns about democratic stability and potential threats to democratic institutions.