Norm-based accounts of social behavior in economics typically reflect tradeoffs between maximization of own consumption utility and conformity to social norms. Theories of norm-following tend to assume that there exists a single, stable, commonly known injunctive social norm for a given choice setting and that each person has a stable propensity to follow social norms. We collect panel data on 1468 participants aged 11–15 years in Belfast, Northern Ireland and Bogotá, Colombia in which we measure norms for the dictator game and norm-following propensity twice at 10 weeks apart. We test these basic assumptions and find that norm-following propensity is stable, on average, but reported norms show evidence of change. We find that individual-level variation in reported norms between people and within people across time has interpretable structure using a series of latent transition analyses (LTA) which extend latent class models to a panel setting. The best fitting model includes five latent classes corresponding to five sets of normative beliefs that can be interpreted in terms of what respondents view as “appropriate” (e.g. equality vs. generosity) and how they view deviations (e.g. deontological vs. consequentialist). We also show that a major predictor of changing latent classes over time comes from dissimilarity to others in one’s network. Our application of LTA demonstrates how researchers can engage with heterogeneity in normative perceptions by identifying latent classes of beliefs and deepening understanding of the extent to which norms are shared, stable, and can be predicted to change. Finally, we contribute to the nascent experimental literature on the economic behavior of children and adolescents.

A recent experimental literature shows that truth-telling is not always motivated by pecuniary motives, and several alternative motivations have been proposed. However, their relative importance in any given context is still not totally clear. This paper investigates the relevance of pure lie aversion, that is, a dislike for lies independent of their consequences. We propose a very simple design where other motives considered in the literature predict zero truth-telling, whereas pure lie aversion predicts a non-zero rate. Thus we interpret the finding that more than a third of the subjects tell the truth as evidence for pure lie aversion. Our design also prevents confounds with another motivation (a desire to act as others expect us to act) not frequently considered but consistent with much existing evidence. We also observe that subjects who tell the truth are more likely to believe that others will tell the truth as well.

Taking Global Constitutionalism as an agora, a platform for international interdisciplinary discussions this article asks a question about the state we are in with regard to the international order as an order that is not just a ‘rule-based order’ but also more substantially, a ‘legal order’ based on the rule of law. The topic is illustrated with reference to examples of ‘contested compliance’ i.e. objections to implementing international law and/or international rulings by international actors on behalf of signatories of states parties of a treaty. Three questions guide this discussion. The first is a question of normative change: are we facing a change regarding United Nations member states’ respect for and handling of the rule of law, or is a larger change of international law itself imminent? The second is a question about the effects of the shift from ‘normal’ contestations of norms to ‘deep’ contestations of the international order itself. And the third is a question about pluralism and diversity: are the UN Charter Order’s institutions, conventions and organisations sufficiently equipped to respond to an ever more diverse range of internationally, transnationally, and sub-nationally raised justice-claims? The article elaborates on each of the three themes in light of the current situation of contested compliance with obligations under international law.

Most scholars agree that candidates’ use of negative campaigning is based on rational considerations, i.e., weighing likely benefits against potential costs. We argue that this perspective is far too narrow and outline the elements of a comprehensive model on the use of negative campaign communication that builds on personality traits, values, social norms, and attitudes toward negative campaigning as complementary mechanisms to classical rational choice theory. We test our theoretical assumptions using candidate surveys for twelve state elections in Germany with more than 3,100 candidates. Our results strongly suggest that negative campaigning goes beyond rational considerations. Although benefit–cost calculations are the primary driver of the decision to attack the opponent, other factors are also important and enhance our understanding of why candidates choose to engage in negative campaign communication. Our findings have important implications for research on candidate attack behavior.

Although expressivism has been studied in relation to criminal justice since the emergence of modern international criminal law, an expressivist perspective in norms and criminal justice research resurfaced in the past decades, inviting a new viewpoint on the dynamic interplay between norms and symbolic action in International Relations (IR). Situated as an account of punishment, expressivism has been criticised for being too abstract and lacking an immanent meaning or for its dialectic position in relation to punishment. Addressing this theoretical shortcoming, this article remediates our understanding of expressivism, establishing new knowledge of the meaning of norm expressivism in IR and clarifying the relationship between expressivism and notions of punishment in criminal justice and norm research. To this end, it hermeneutically deconstructs the rhetoric of country delegates at the United Nations in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It examines crucial examples of expressivism: disagreement pronouncements, denunciation of norm violation, postulation of guilt, and penal analogies. While criminal justice research posits expressivism as a distinct account of punishment, the novelty of this article consists in illustrating how, even in the absence of prosecution in the courtroom, expressivist rationales can have a reinforcing effect on the international legal order.

Recent years have seen increasing calls by a few scientists, largely from the Global North, to explore “solar geoengineering,” a set of speculative technologies that would reflect parts of incoming sunlight back into space and, if deployed at planetary scale, have an average cooling effect. Numerous concerns about the development of such speculative technologies include the many ecological risks and uncertainties as well as unresolved questions of global governance and global justice. This essay starts with the premise that solar geoengineering at planetary scale is unlikely to be governable in a globally inclusive and just manner. Thus, the ethically sound approach is to pursue governance that leads to the nonuse of planetary solar geoengineering. Yet is such a prohibitory agreement feasible, in the face of possible opposition by a few powerful states and other interests? Drawing on social science research and a host of existing transnational and international governance arrangements, this essay offers three illustrative pathways through which a nonuse norm for solar geoengineering could emerge and become diffused and institutionalized in global politics: (1) civil society-led transnational approaches; (2) regionally led state and civil society hybrid approaches; and (3) like-minded or “Schengen-style” club initiatives led by states.

Since the end of the Cold War, democracies have sought to create a range of normative and international legal standards intended to reduce the frequency, and legitimacy, of coups. The rise of the anti-coup norm has led to the isolation and punishment of numerous coup-created governments, and evidence suggests it has helped reduce the frequency of coup attempts. However, the norm is contested, and coup leaders often find that the international condemnation they face is countered by quiet acquiescence or active support by international allies. This paper examines the politics of norm contestation around the anti-coup norm by considering the international response to the 2021 coup in Myanmar. It introduces the concept of ‘norm waverers’ and illustrates how committed norm promoters and norm resisters often try to persuade norm waverers – in this case exemplified by ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) – to join their respective camps. International pressure after the Myanmar coup induced ASEAN to take steps to enforce the anti-coup norm. But these ultimately reflected a concern with its own reputation and credibility, rather than any underlying institutional commitment to the norm itself. The result was a shallow institutionalisation of the anti-coup norm.

The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire-Short Form (ERQ-S) is a brief 6-item self-report measure of two emotion regulation strategies, cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. It is a short form of the most widely used emotion regulation measure in the field, but currently there are limited data on the performance of the ERQ-S. The aim of this study was to introduce a Polish version of the ERQ-S, examine its psychometric properties and provide Polish norms to aid score interpretation. Our sample was 574 Polish-speaking adults aged 18–69 from the general community in Poland. We examined the ERQ-S’s factor structure and measurement invariance with confirmatory factor analysis. We assessed the concurrent validity of the questionnaire via relationships with psychopathology symptoms and well-being. As expected, the Polish version of the ERQ-S demonstrated strong factorial validity with a theoretically congruent 2-factor structure (cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression factors), which was invariant across gender, age and education categories. The ERQ-S’s concurrent validity and internal consistency reliability were good. As expected, cognitive reappraisal was significantly associated with lower psychopathology symptoms and higher well-being, whereas the opposite pattern was present for expressive suppression. Overall, the Polish version of the ERQ-S has strong psychometric properties and good clinical relevance.

The status of the phoneme /s/ as the only sibilant of Finnish makes its pronunciation relatively free. This enables /s/ variants to gain social meaning, a tendency typical in many societies. In Finnish society, studies so far have documented how variation in /s/ pronunciation has faced concerns, originating from late-nineteenth-century nation building and Finnish language norm construction processes. Against the norm of the voiceless alveolar /s/, fronted variants first represented Swedish influence and a threat to norms of ‘good Finnish’, later meeting more global indexes. The historical development of the /s/ ideology is still echoed in the contemporary social meaning potentials of /s/ variation. By focusing on learning materials used in the Finnish education system during the period from the 1900s to the 1970s, this article investigates how formal education has contributed to the ideology of the (im)proper Finnish /s/, manifested in the ideological construct of ‘Helsinki s’.

Based on a linguistic ethnographic study of student–teacher classroom interactions, this article sheds light on language norms in a contemporary Danish STX school (upper secondary education, also known as gymnasiums). The analysis reveals that neither classrooms with the explicit teaching of an ‘academic register’ nor classrooms where teachers orient towards a youth norm constitute spaces where students have equal access to perform as good students. Even when students can decode and reproduce the language preferred by the teachers, they do not experience an equal opportunity to conform to this. It is argued that performing linguistically as good and competent students is more complex than just adapting to a specific school norm, as the students have to navigate different teacher’s norms as well as peer norms emphasising authenticity.

Hypocrisy, when addressed at all, is typically considered a functional, even valuable, aspect of international political practice within international relations theory. It is alternatively seen as necessary to the exercise of sovereignty and a rhetorical device used to seek pragmatic political change. Utilising insights from feminist, queer, and postcolonial theory, this article challenges this understanding of hypocrisy. The article demonstrates that hypocrisy is animated and elided by an investment in a particularly liberal vision of politics and international order (and concomitant obfuscation of the racialised, sexual, gendered, and colonial underpinnings of those same assumptions). The notion of hypocrisy relies upon a unitary and stable subject whose moral consistency is to be expected across time and space – a luxury less afforded to those disadvantaged within intersectional international hierarchies. Consequently, although the charge of hypocrisy appears to be about holding power to account, the article finds that it serves less to uphold normative principles than to re-centre the privileged and powerful subject – typically, the sovereign state of liberal international order – and its consistency with itself, as the unit and basis of moral concern. The article concludes by outlining the limitations of hypocrisy as a strategy of critique.

This article identifies a sub-category of norm contestation I've termed ‘norm weaving’, where actors contest the constitution of norm clusters, instead of the validity of individual norms. This occurs through processes of stretching or reproducing individual strands of existing norm clusters before weaving them together to create behaviour guides in undergoverned issue areas that are greater than the sum of their individual parts. I identify two examples of weaving in the world-leading actions of Fiji and Vanuatu around domestic climate mobilities. Using these two cases, we can see that existing models of norm dynamics need to be developed to better explain and understand weaving-like processes of norm contestation. There are two areas where norm weaving extends our understanding – in how clusters of norms emerge and change, and in how contestation applies to groupings of norms. Clarifying what norm weaving looks like in these cases could open the door to further examples being identified in other contexts and a more complete understanding of how norms operate in global politics.