Ancient historians regularly argue that the classical Athenians held sailors in much lower esteem than hoplites. They cite in support of this the extant funeral speech of Pericles. Certainly, this famous speech said a lot about courageous hoplites but next to nothing about sailors. Yet, it is also clear that this was not a typical example of the genre. Funeral speeches usually gave a fulsome account of Athenian military history. In rehearsing military history, funeral speeches always mentioned naval battles and recognised sailors as courageous. Old comedy and the other genres of public oratory depicted sailors in the same positive terms. All these non-elite genres assumed that a citizen fulfilled his martial duty by serving as either a sailor or a hoplite. They used a new definition of courage that both groups of combatants could easily meet. In tragedy, by contrast, characters and choruses used the hoplite extensively as a norm. In spite of this, tragedy still recognised Athens as a major seapower and could depict sailors as courageous. In Athenian democracy, speakers and playwrights had to articulate the viewpoint of non-elite citizens. Their works put beyond doubt that the Athenian people esteemed sailors as highly as hoplites.

This chapter provides a brief overview of China’s engagement with international humanitarian law (IHL) since the late nineteenth century. It first looks back to the late Qing dynasty and follows it through to the early decades of the People’s Republic of China. It then examines China’s contemporary IHL practices, including China’s participation in IHL treaties, its domestic legislations, its approach to IHL training and education, as well as its participation in international rule-making processes. The chapter then focusses on developments of new technologies that have called into question the applicability, relevance and sufficiency of IHL. As IHL is in the process of being adapted, (re)interpreted and expanded, China is seeking to play a more active role in these processes. The chapter concludes with a reflection on China’s changing role and perspectives of its future engagements with IHL.

This chapter analyses the treatment of animals in sea warfare under extant international law and it assesses the adequacy of these norms for the protection of animal welfare. The welfare of marine animals is threatened by warfare in various ways. Individual marine mammals, such as dolphins or sea lions, are trained to take part in hostilities. Other sea life suffers, whether directly or indirectly, the repercussions of hostilities. In the context of prize law, animals could in some cases qualify as contraband goods, susceptible to seizure when on board neutral vessels heading toward enemy ports. It is concluded that the law as it stands today provides neither optimal protection for animals considered as a constitutive part of the marine environment nor for animals in themselves considered as sentient beings. The chapter formulates recommendations for the progressive development of the law, including the creation of a sui generis status for sentient animals, the regulation of military sonars and the establishment of protected marine zones where no combat activities whatsoever should take place.

Advances in long-range precision strike missiles, such as cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons, threaten the survivability of surface warships. In response, states are deploying submarines in the water column and expanding military activities on the seabed. Concepts such as “upward falling payloads” and networked “hydra” seabed installations envision prepositioned sensors and weapons emplaced on the continental shelf along an adversary’s coast. This chapter explores the legality of military operations on the continental shelf of a coastal state. The coastal state has sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the living and nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Foreign military activities are generally permissible on the continental shelf of a coastal state so long as they observe due regard for the resource rights of the coastal state. Coastal states enjoy the exclusive right to construct artificial islands on their continental shelf but they lack competence to regulate military seabed installations and structures on the continental shelf.

Section E seeks to show how the law on the conduct of hostilities that would apply in relation to the use of conventional weapons also applies in respect of nuclear weapon operations. The Rules and Commentaries deal with persons participating in the hostilities, who are distinguished from protected civilians, and with specific issues of naval and air warfare. The Rules and Commentaries on nuclear targeting address the notion of ‘attack’, the principle of distinction, prohibited nuclear attacks, the definition of military objectives, proportionality and active and passive precautions. As to methods of nuclear warfare, the Section addresses perfidy and ruses, the improper use of protective indicators and emblems, as well as the concept of zones. The Section further includes Rules and Commentaries on persons and objects entitled to specific protection and on the protection of the natural environment in times of armed conflict.

The history of war in the Scandinavian world is inseparable from the history of the Vikings. The stereotype of Norse violence, still prevalent today, was fostered by contemporary writers such as Alcuin, who lamented the strike on Lindisfarne in his native Northumbria (793 ce) as a pagan contamination of Christian society. ‘The heathens’, he wrote to the monks there, ‘have stained the sanctuaries of God, poured forth the blood of the saints all around the altar, laid waste to the house of our hope, and trodden upon the bodies of the saints in the temple of God as if they were dung in the street. What can I say except to lament in spirit with you before the altar of Christ and say “spare your people, Lord, spare your people, and do not give your inheritance to the pagans lest they might say where is the God of the Christians”?’ A century later, a horrified Abbo of St Germain-des-Près recounted how so many Viking longships went down the Seine to Paris that the river itself seemed to have disappeared. According to the view presented in medieval sources from the British Isles and France and replicated in modern textbooks and popular histories, Scandinavians were decidedly ‘other’ to the Europe they plundered.

The defining feature of Western warfare in this period was knighthood. This was not because horseback warfare was in any way new in the Frankish lands, or even because the technology of the equipment and use of cavalry had changed in any radical sense, though it is generally assumed that the stirrup appeared as a feature of cavalry equipment at some time in the ninth or tenth century, thus allowing the saddle to become a more effective fighting platform. But the stirrup did not by any means create the knight. What the knight represented was a new social phenomenon which grew progressively more important as generations passed and read new meanings into the status and potential of knighthood.