We present two models that shed light on two issues in the political economy of populism: incumbents who refuse to give up office following a democratic election; and politicians gambling with major policy shifts when their consequences are uncertain. In the democratic transition of power, common knowledge about the veracity of the election process enables citizens to threaten incumbents with protests if they attempt to retain their seats in power. If doubt over electoral integrity prevails, office-seeking incumbents sometimes reject electoral rules. In considering policy gambles, politicians supply policy shifts in response to voters and elites vying for a greater share of economic output. When the mapping from policy to outcomes is uncertain, voters opt for policy gambles, even though these are detrimental to their ex ante welfare, to redress the division of output. These models underscore the importance of institutions that address the source of each coordination failure.

In the discrete-time new-Keynesian model with public debt, Ramsey optimal policy eliminates the indeterminacy of simple-rules multiple equilibria between the fiscal theory of the price level versus new-Keynesian versus an unpleasant equilibrium. If public debt volatility is taken into account into the loss function, the interest rate responds to public debt besides inflation and output gap. Else, the Taylor rule is identical to Ramsey optimal policy when there is zero public debt. The optimal fiscal-rule parameter implies the local stability of public-debt dynamics (“passive” fiscal policy).

Does wage setting exhibit strategic complementarity and produce multiple equilibria? This study constructs a discrete-time New Keynesian model in which households choose the timing of their wage adjustments endogenously subject to fixed wage-setting costs. I explore steady-state equilibrium of the state-dependent wage-setting model both analytically and numerically. For reasonable parameter values, complementarity in wage setting is weak and the steady-state equilibrium is unique.

In familiar models, a decrease in the friction facing mobile factors (e.g., lowering their adjustment costs) increases a coordination problem, leading to more circumstances where there are multiple equilibria. We show that a decrease in friction can decrease coordination problems when a production externality arises from a changing stock, e.g. of pollution or knowledge. In general, the relation between the amount of friction that mobile factors face and the likelihood of multiple equilibria is non-monotonic.

In an overlapping generations model with multiple steady states, we analyse the impact of endogenous environmental policies on the relevance of history and expectations for the equilibrium selection. In a polluting regime, environmental preferences cause an increasing energy tax which raises the risk that the economy transitions to the inferior equilibrium under pessimistic expectations. However, higher environmental preferences imply an earlier switch to the clean energy regime. Then, the conflict between production and environmental preferences is resolved and the prospects of selecting the superior equilibrium improve, since positive expectations become more relevant. In an empirical analysis we find that people with environmental preferences tend to have more optimistic expectations about economic development. Using these findings to analyse the steady-state dynamics implies that agents with environmental preferences support higher energy taxes and switch to clean production more quickly. Due to their optimism, the likelihood of reaching the superior stable steady state increases.

This study provides an infinite-horizon model of rational bubbles in a production economy. A bubble can arise when the pursuit of status is modeled explicitly, capturing the notion of “the spirit of capitalism.” Using a parameterized model, I demonstrate the specific conditions for the existence of bubbles and their implications. Bubbles crowd out investment, stimulate consumption, and slow economic growth. I also discuss a stochastic bubble that bursts with an exogenous probability. I show that there could be multiple stochastic bubbly equilibria. Moreover, I suggest that taxing wealth properly can eliminate bubbles and achieve the social optimum.

Much empirical evidence finds that governments react to fiscal imbalances in a nonlinear way, through an increasing marginal response of primary surpluses to changes in debt. This paper shows that nonlinear fiscal regimes alter equilibria under active and passive monetary–fiscal policies. The Fisher equation combined with nonlinear fiscal policies leads to multiple steady states. Under passive interest rate rules, even if the steady state in which fiscal policy is active is locally saddlepath stable, there exist infinite equilibrium paths originating in the neighborhood of that steady state that converge into a high-debt trap. Under active interest rate rules, even if the steady state at which fiscal policy is active is locally unstable, there exists a saddle connection with the high-debt equilibrium along which inflation is uniquely determined.

We propose a novel mechanism giving rise to poverty traps and multiple equilibria in economic performance. It is a potentially important source of persistent underdevelopment across countries and regions. At the core of this mechanism, bridging social capital and social trust feed back on each other, interdependently affecting individuals' earnings and subjective well-being. High trust and abundant bridging social capital reinforce each other, leading to a “high” equilibrium where both these variables take persistently high values, and earnings and well-being are high as well, whereas low trust and lack of bridging social capital create a vicious circle, leading to a “low trust trap” where all these variables are persistently low. The workings of our theoretical model are in agreement with a wide range of findings from the contemporary literature in sociology and social psychology.

This paper investigates the effects of a binding minimum wage in an economy which exhibits multiple unemployment equilibria. For this purpose, we develop a theoretical model based on the simple imperfectly competitive model of Manning [In Conference Papers, Economic Journal 100, 151–162 (1990)], in which we introduce labor heterogeneity and knowledge spillovers in the individual production technology. Then, using numerical simulations, we show that a binding minimum wage rules out the occurrence of an inefficient equilibrium. Last, we analyze the effects of a minimum wage increase on the labor market's outcomes.

In this paper, we study the stationary and non-stationary equilibria of a deterministic, pure exchange, two-period overlapping generations model with habit persistence. We show that preferences with multiplicative habits can lead to quite different equilibrium outcomes compared to subtractive ones. The two most commonly adopted habit specifications can differ in terms of homotheticity, gross substitutability, and uniqueness of equilibria. We illustrate these differences in terms of steady-state equilibria, as well as local dynamics.

This paper constructs an endogenous growth model with productive government spending. In this model, the government can finance its costs through income tax and government debt and has a target level of government debt relative to the size of the economy. We show that there are two steady states. One is associated with high growth and the other with low growth. It is also shown that whether the government uses income taxes or government bonds makes the results differ significantly. In particular, an increase in government bonds reduces the growth rate in the high-growth steady state and raises the growth rate in the low-growth steady state. Conversely, an increase in the income tax rate reduces the growth rate in the low-growth steady state and there exists some tax rate that maximizes the growth rate in the high-growth steady state. Finally, the level of welfare in the low-growth steady state is lower than that in the high-growth steady state.

We consider a dynamic stochastic model of currency attacks, characterized by imperfect information about a fundamental. Agents not only decide whether to attack the peg but also formulate expectations concerning the probability of future devaluation. The subjective devaluation probabilities influence the inflation expectations, which, in turn, affect the next-period wage level and unemployment. Hence, expectations affect the following-period fundamental and the policymaker's ability to resist an attack. Agents decide upon next-period wage having observed whether the current-period currency attack has been successful or not: this publicly available information is sufficient to allow for a coordination effect among agents, leading to multiple equilibria. Our results imply that a ‘transparent policy’ during a currency crisis is in the policymaker's interest.

We develop a growth model with unemployment due to imperfections in the labor market. In this model, wage inertia and balanced budget rules cause a complementarity between capital and employment capable of explaining the existence of multiple equilibrium paths. Hysteresis is viewed as the result of a selection between these different paths. We use this model to arguea that, in contrast to the United States, those fiscal policies followed by most of the European countries after the shocks of the 1970s may have played a central role in generating hysteresis.

Les modèles de défauts de coordination ont pour objet le fonctionnement effectif des économies lorsque la fonction de coordination est laissée aux agents. Néanmoins, la réalisation des transactions à l'équilibre général et ses conséquences sur la détermination du niveau de l'activité et de l'emploi sont généralement passées sous silence. Dans ce texte, nous précisons le rôle joué par les externalités d'échange en étudiant la réalisation des transactions décentralisées. Nous explorons à cet effet un modèle de prospection monétaire dans lequel les externalités de participation dans les transactions conditionnent la détermination du niveau de l'activité et d'emploi d'équilibre. Les défauts de coordination sont ici liés à des prophéties auto-réalisatrices portant sur la réalisation des transactions. La technologie d'échange engendre trois équilibres inefficaces ordonnés en termes de bien-être. Nous montrons que l'utilisation de la monnaie comme intermédiaire facilite la décision de production et permet de surmonter les problèmes de coordination dans les transactions. Nous analysons l'effet d'un accroissement de la quantité de monnaie sur le niveau de l'activité. Nous discutons enfin de l'intérêt de l'approche retenue au sein de la littérature.

Multiple-equilibria macroeconomic models suggest that consumers' and investors' perceptions about the state of the economy may be important independent factors for business cycles. In this paper, we verify empirically the interrelations between waves of optimism and pessimism and subsequent economic fluctuations. We focus on the behavior of nonfundamental movements in the consumer sentiment index, as a proxy for consumers' sunspots, and in the business formation index, representing investors' animal spirits, around economic turning points. We find that bearish consumers and entrepreneurs were present before the onset of some U.S. economic downturns, sometimes even when the fundamentals were all very strong. In particular, our analysis shows that self-fulfilling pessimism may have played a nontrivial role in the 1969–1970, the 1973–1975, and the 1981–1982 recessions. The results are robust to a range of alternative linear and nonlinear specifications. Our evidence provides some empirical support for the role of nonfundamental rational expectations in economic fluctuations.

We investigate the optimal path of the primary surplus that a government will choose to minimize costs that derive from exceeding the Maastricht criteria and generally of a “stability pact,” where we assume three components of costs that are related to (1) the debt-to-GDP ratio, (2) the overall deficit-to-GDP ratio, and (3) the acceptance level of savings in the economy. We show that various political-economic settings can result in completely different equilibrium strategies of the debt-to-GDP ratio and the primary deficit. The spectrum of possible optimal strategies ranges from no stationary solutions to multiple equilibrium and cyclical solutions and from positive to negative levels of the optimal debt-to-GDP ratio. Our results emphasize the importance of macroeconomic and behavioral (acceptance rate of a policy) variables in order to explain complex economic time series.