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Équilibres de sous-emploi, défauts de coordination des activités décentralisées et externalités d'échange

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Ludovic A. Julien
Ludovic A. Julien*
Affiliation:
EconomiX, Université Paris X-Nanterre
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Résumé

Les modèles de défauts de coordination ont pour objet le fonctionnement effectif des économies lorsque la fonction de coordination est laissée aux agents. Néanmoins, la réalisation des transactions à l'équilibre général et ses conséquences sur la détermination du niveau de l'activité et de l'emploi sont généralement passées sous silence. Dans ce texte, nous précisons le rôle joué par les externalités d'échange en étudiant la réalisation des transactions décentralisées. Nous explorons à cet effet un modèle de prospection monétaire dans lequel les externalités de participation dans les transactions conditionnent la détermination du niveau de l'activité et d'emploi d'équilibre. Les défauts de coordination sont ici liés à des prophéties auto-réalisatrices portant sur la réalisation des transactions. La technologie d'échange engendre trois équilibres inefficaces ordonnés en termes de bien-être. Nous montrons que l'utilisation de la monnaie comme intermédiaire facilite la décision de production et permet de surmonter les problèmes de coordination dans les transactions. Nous analysons l'effet d'un accroissement de la quantité de monnaie sur le niveau de l'activité. Nous discutons enfin de l'intérêt de l'approche retenue au sein de la littérature.

Summary

Summary

General equilibrium models of coordination failures capture the rationale of decentralised private activities. Nevertheless, the modelling of decentralized transactions and their influence at the macro-level are often eluded. In this paper, we explore a search theoretic monetary model without auctioneer and with trade-frictions, in which macro-underemployment is caused by a lack of coordination in decentralized trades. The equilibrium concept is a steady state with self-fulfilling expectations concerning the trade sector. There are multiple Pareto-ranked inefficient equilibria. Externalities arise from the transaction technology and money plays a critical role in coordinating transactions. We show that the acceptability of money yields a Pareto improvement because its use in trade makes production decisions easier. Moreover, when the degree of specialisation in consumption is low, more money enhances welfare and increases production. We finally discuss the model through the literature.

Keywords

équilibres multiplestransactionsdécentralisationexternalités de participation au marchéD40E10E24multiple equilibriatransactionsdecentralizationmarket participation externalitiesD40E10E24
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 72 , Issue 1 , 2006 , pp. 75 - 99
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2006 

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Footnotes

*

[email protected]. Ce texte a été discuté dans le séminaire COFAIL du groupe de recherche sur les défauts de coordination de l'Université Paris X-Nanterre. Je remercie ses participants C. Bidard, F. Larbre, N. Sanz et F. Tricou pour leurs commentaires. Je remercie également les deux rapporteurs anonymes pour leurs conseils et suggestions et demeure responsable des erreurs qui subsistent.

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