Constitution-making acts of persons and institutions are the primary objects of constitutional interpretation. The primary result of constitutional interpretation is an account of the meaning of those acts. This chapter offers an explanation of the prodigious creativity of constitutional courts that involves two elements. First, we all equivocate concerning the meaning of a constitution, treating it variously (or at the same time) as the signification of constitution-making acts, and/or as the significance of the constitution as a framework of governance. Secondly, creativity results from interpreters’ ways of resolving the tension between the rule of constitutional law (that is, adherence to a rule-governed framework of governance) and the demands of constitutional justice (that is, the array of principles of justice in governance that the constitution ought to secure). The boundaries of constitutional interpretation are put in question by the equivocation between meaning as significance and meaning as signification, and by the tension between the rule of constitutional law and the demands of constitutional justice.

My work has been primarily located in two fields, both characterized by heated disagreements when I entered them. In child language research the nativist view was the default position in the late 1960s and through the next couple of decades. But in 1967 I studied adult input to children, in service of understanding its contributions to language acquisition. By the 2020s the notion that certain features of adult-child interaction are instrumental in language development has been robustly supported by multiple lines of work. I first got involved in thinking about literacy development in the mid-1990s during a time of conflict between what was then framed as “phonics” versus “whole language.” That conflict resurfaces with depressing regularity and is currently characterized as a struggle to implement the “science of reading.” The complexities in the reading domain are far greater than in language acquisition because of the larger role of educational publishers and school administrators in determining a course of action.

Oscar Barbarin has served on the faculties of the Universities of Michigan, Maryland, and North Carolina as well as Tulane University. His scholarship examines social context, ethnicity and child development, particularly the impact of racism and material hardship on socioemotional development. He has studied the development of children with life-threatening illness, urbanization in South Africa, and quality of early childhood settings. His research has centered on boys of color and the identified auspicious conditions that promote their mental health, social competence and emotional resilience. These conditions include (a) systems of caring, (b) structures supporting their self-regulation of behavior and emotions, and (c) interpretive frameworks by which affirming familial relations, culture and spiritual values provide boys of color a sense of connection, purpose, and an understanding of their place in the world. He has proposed that paradoxical attributions are a key cognitive strategy in maintaining emotional balance by affirming personal agency.

This paper presents the main topics, arguments, and positions in the philosophy of AI at present (excluding ethics). Apart from the basic concepts of intelligence and computation, the main topics of artificial cognition are perception, action, meaning, rational choice, free will, consciousness, and normativity. Through a better understanding of these topics, the philosophy of AI contributes to our understanding of the nature, prospects, and value of AI. Furthermore, these topics can be understood more deeply through the discussion of AI; so we suggest that “AI philosophy” provides a new method for philosophy.

This chapter returns to the question: What can we learn from history? Drawing not only on C. Vann Woodward but also on insights of Reinhold Niebuhr, Garry Wills, and Abraham Lincoln, among others, suggests that the irony of history alerts us to the folly of ignoring inconvenient history. History, at its best, should give us a keen awareness of the irony embedded in the human experience, and, as it does, it should temper our pride even when showing mercy and our zeal even when seeking justice.

I begin by considering the connection between Collingwood’s Essay on Metaphysics and A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic. Knox and Donagan believe that “between 1936 and 1938 Collingwood radically changed his mind about the relation of philosophy to history.” Donagan contends that this break stemmed from Collingwood’s having “come to endorse Ayer’s view that the propositions of traditional metaphysics are unverifiable.” Recently, Vanheeswijck and Beaney have claimed that Collingwood in effect endorsed Ayer’s verificationism. There is a considerable gulf between their claims and my own view of what Collingwood thought about logical positivism. In my view, Collingwood denied logical positivism flat-out. My chapter lays out and assesses the main points Vanheeswijck and Beaney use to support their view. I develop a viable alternative, one that takes account of Collingwood’s treatment of absolute presuppositions (in particular, on the vexed question of whether they can be determined to be true or false) and at the same time avoids the conclusion that Collingwood had, mistakenly, bought into logical positivism in his discussion of absolute presuppositions.

A bitch, as most people already know, is a female dog. As a trendy word we hear (and say) all the time, it might be tempting to guess that it isn’t very old. But if we look up its etymology, that is, the origins of the word, we discover that bitch meaning “a female dog” has a far longer pedigree that goes back over one thousand years. Over the course of a millennium, bitch became stigmatized by its association with social taboos such as prostitution, promiscuity, “bad” women, and “unmanly” men. This led to its offensive senses pushing out the inoffensive one. Bitch – which was once just the literal word for a female dog – eventually became what it is today, arguably one of the most insulting words in the English language. But on the other hand, bitch has developed positive uses in slang and has even been reclaimed in some ways.

The search for purpose and meaning is common to the work of many twentieth-century psychologists. It seems to operate as an overarching motivation or metamotivation for a career rather than as a specific motivation for a transition. Purpose tends to emerge and be discovered, whereas meaning is a constructed system of beliefs that is built over time around the search for purpose. Choices that lead to the discovery and construction of one’s “true nature” or “authentic self” or “essential identity” can give purpose and meaning to one’s life. The search for purpose and meaning in work is discussed in light of the retrospective interviews with twenty-four elite performers in three domains (business, sports, and music) who successfully and repeatedly transitioned to higher positions within their field.

Using both the Petcoff and Palaganas studies as a point of departure, this chapter looks at the more general educational implications of bringing emoji into pedagogical practices. The underlying premise is that emoji not only are highly understandable images, aiding learning but also can create a positive environment, making teaching and interaction congenial and open to all learners, no matter their backgrounds or learning capacities, since emoji give them an equal voice. Emoji allow for a destigmatized approach, especially for disadvantaged learners who might not be able to adequately speak for themselves. Emoji are a psychological conduit that can easily open up lines of interaction to virtually everyone. Once this is achieved, any subject matter, from English to mathematics, can be imparted broadly through any type of learning style.

In this chapter there is a focus on the expectations or Requirements that sustain an addictive lifestyle. It highlights that in addition to fueling resentments, Requirements also affect how one relates to potential high-risk situations, triggers, and stressful events in general. Chapter 1 of this workbook highlighted that oftentimes it is not the situation or event itself that creates emotional distress, but the Requirements individuals have (often automatically and out of awareness) for the situation or event that activate their I-Systems. Thus, a Recovery Resilience Practice does not focus on changing any given situation (crucial insofar as many distressful situations or triggers may be unavoidable) but focuses instead on changing the “who” one brings to that situation – the Natural Functioning self or I-System Functioning self.

In the last chapter the authors provide an overview of all aspects of a Recovery Resilience Practice that will contribute towards a sustainable recovery-oriented lifestyle. In this chapter the reader will consolidate their Recovery Resilience Practice and see how to use it to support any recovery program or pathway. As highlighted throughout the workbook, the central aim of a Recovery Resilience Practice is to remove the hindrance that obstructs one’s capacity to access Recovery Capital and apply recovery skills as well as provide a practice that can help one deal moment by moment with stress, high-risk situation, triggers, or any troubling situations. In short, a Recovery Resilience Practice removes the hindrance to one’s innate resilience and capacity for flourishing and assists in achieving recovery and life goals. The last chapter provides an overview of how the workbook assists individuals in recovery to have greater self-awareness of their unhealthy and healthy coping styles and prompts them to evolve to a place of greater self-awareness so that they can make more informed decisions about their lives and efficaciously deal with life’s challenges.

The rules of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties have a special status in international law, dominating the vocabularies and minds of international lawyers. They are ubiquitous – they are always visible, regardless of where one stands in the international legal arena, and they also provide for a sense of community amongst scholars and practitioners, who are constantly reassured by their presence. This chapter argues that it is illusory to believe that the function of the rules of treaty interpretation is to directly bridge the gap between the signifier (treaty provision to be interpreted) and the signified (the meaning of the treaty provision). In fact, ‘rules’ are not determinative of meaning. They only aim to impose a ‘common discipline’ with respect to the admissible ‘sources of interpretive data’ that can be used in treaty interpretation. Furthermore, as there is no unmediated access to any signifier, the rules of interpretation are themselves subject to interpretation. The chapter concludes by shifting the attention from the rules of treaty interpretation to the notion of interpretive authority as a useful complement to understanding the process of treaty interpretation.