Using a detailed case study of house eviction in peri-urban China as well as original data from an online survey experiment, this article explores the opportunistic bargaining phenomenon in China in which citizens leverage the policy priorities of authorities with tactics that are not approved by the state to bargain for goals beyond those promised by the state. We find that opportunistic bargaining is widely accepted by Chinese citizens and that such an inclination is encouraged by successful precedents and clear signals of an opening through which to leverage government policy priorities; however, it is dampened by unclear signals and failed precedents. We also find that opportunistic bargainers tend to hold more negative perceptions of the current regime and are less likely to abide by state rules or social norms. The characteristics of opportunistic bargaining appear to be the opposite of the dominant “rightful resistance” framework.

Land expropriation, where peasants’ property rights are encroached by the state, has been recognized as a primary source of social dissension in rural China. Since the end of the last century, the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) has provided people with a legal weapon to defend themselves against violations by state power. Drawing on the theory of relative deprivation, this paper proposes that peasants are more likely to sue the state when they feel deprived. To examine this hypothesis, we first present a case study to depict the causal process and then use quantitative research to improve the external validity of our findings. We created a novel and unique database of prefecture-level administrative litigations and relative deprivation for Poisson regression analysis. The quantitative results prove that the more peasants feel relatively deprived, the more likely they are to sue the state. Furthermore, the positive effect of relative deprivation on administrative litigations has become more significant over time, implying peasants’ growing awareness of legal resistance. This paper concludes that a critical step towards eliminating social inequity and maintaining social stability in rural China is to reduce the relative deprivation of peasants by, for example, allowing them to share in land value appreciation in the process of urbanization.

Expropriation of private land rights involves two contradictory interests: there is a public need for land; and landholders expect security of tenure and protection of their private property rights. A satisfactory expropriation policy must strike a balance between these interests. Legislation must therefore only authorize the government to expropriate land rights for a clear and limited public purpose under the supervision of an independent body. The author argues that Ethiopia's rural land laws have defined the public purpose for the expropriation of rural land rights in different ways depending on the nature of the landholders. For peasants and pastoralists the public purpose requirement is defined vaguely and broadly, whereas for investors the concept is limited to projects implemented by government. The author argues that the protection of private property rights and security of tenure are further undermined by a legislative failure to authorize affected people to appeal to an independent body on the basis that the public purpose requirement has not been satisfied.

A major challenge for China is the frequency of so-called ‘mass incidents’ or protests that have been on the rise in recent years. Many such incidents are the result of forced expropriation of farmland by local government authorities for a wide variety of purposes, including the goal of industrialization of the economy. This article examines the challenges faced by rural citizens to access formal systems of justice while seeking a legal remedy. Why are formal systems of justice not effective in settling disputes on land expropriation in China? What are the obstacles faced by landless farmers in accessing justice, and how can such obstacles be overcome? We examine existing regulations for settling compensation disputes in China and discuss several concrete examples from the field in order to identify numerous institutional challenges. These include a very demanding applicant requirement, ambiguous provisions such as no time limit for compulsory mediation, and the inability of the petitions system to address land dispute cases. We argue that the adjudication system itself is an obstacle for farmers who wish to seek an administrative or legal remedy. The political, administrative and judicial authorities in China prefer the maintenance of strict and specific norms rather than facilitating more adaptable and feasible alternatives. Without a major overhaul of current dispute settlement mechanisms, the number and frequency of severe social conflicts between farmers and local governments will continue to increase. Major reforms are required to better protect the rights of landless farmers and other citizens whose properties have been expropriated.