On 5 November 2015, the Fundão Dam collapsed, causing the most devastating tailings dam disaster to date. The dam was operated by Samarco S.A., a joint venture by Vale, Brazil’s biggest mining company, and BHP Billiton, the world’s largest mining company.1 Its tailings travelled down the Doce River for ca 700 kilometres until they reached the ocean, affecting 42 municipalities, two states, and thousands of communities along the way. The disaster caused myriad social, environmental and economic impacts: nineteen individuals were killed, and thousands endured physical or psychological harm; water resources and the soil were polluted; habitats were irreversibly destroyed; and the local economy suffered long-lasting damage. Traditional and indigenous communities were especially harmed, as their historical, social, religious and cultural relationships with their land led to even more profound harms.2

In this paper, I take George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's thesis that metaphors shape our reality to approach the judicial imagery of the new criminal justice system in Mexico (in effect since 2016). Based on twenty-nine in-depth interviews with judges and other members of the judiciary, I study what I call the ‘dirty minds’ metaphor, showing its presence in everyday judicial practice and analysing both its cognitive basis as well as its effects in how criminal judges understand their job. I argue that the such a metaphor, together with the ‘fear of contamination’ it raises as a result, is misleading and goes to the detriment of the judicial virtues that should populate the new system. The conclusions I offer are relevant beyond the national context, inter alia, because they concern a far-reaching paradigm of judgment.

This article addresses the issues attending common law collegiate courts' engagements with allegations of bias within their own ranks. It will be argued that, in such cases, it would be inappropriate to involve the collegiate panel or any member thereof in the decision, since such involvement inevitably encounters difficulties. The common law's dilemmas require drastic solutions, but the common law arguably is ill-equipped to implement the required change. The answer, it will be argued, is legislation.

This note evaluates the application of rules on judicial independence and impartiality in two international decisions issued in 2004 – the ICJ Order on Composition in the Wall Advisory Proceedings and the disqualification decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Sesay – and compares them with a code of judicial conduct recently prepared by an ILA study group (the Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary). We assert that the approach taken by the ICJ in Wall is excessively restrictive and is out of step with contemporary tendencies to embrace stricter standards of judicial independence and impartiality.