We don't yet have adequate theories of what the human mind is representing when it represents a social group. Worse still, many people think we do. This mistaken belief is a consequence of the state of play: Until now, researchers have relied on their own intuitions to link up the concept social group on the one hand and the results of particular studies or models on the other. While necessary, this reliance on intuition has been purchased at a considerable cost. When looked at soberly, existing theories of social groups are either (i) literal, but not remotely adequate (such as models built atop economic games), or (ii) simply metaphorical (typically a subsumption or containment metaphor). Intuition is filling in the gaps of an explicit theory. This paper presents a computational theory of what, literally, a group representation is in the context of conflict: It is the assignment of agents to specific roles within a small number of triadic interaction types. This “mental definition” of a group paves the way for a computational theory of social groups – in that it provides a theory of what exactly the information-processing problem of representing and reasoning about a group is. For psychologists, this paper offers a different way to conceptualize and study groups, and suggests that a non-tautological definition of a social group is possible. For cognitive scientists, this paper provides a computational benchmark against which natural and artificial intelligences can be held.

Background: Research suggests that aggressive children are prone to over-attribute hostile intentions to peers. Aims: The current study investigated whether this attributional style can be altered using a Cognitive Bias Modification of Interpretations (CBM-I) procedure. Method: A sample of 10–12-year-olds selected for displaying aggressive behaviours was trained over three sessions to endorse benign rather than hostile attributions in response to ambiguous social scenarios. Results: Compared to a test-retest control group (n = 18), children receiving CBM-I (n = 16) were less likely to endorse hostile attributions and more likely to endorse benign attributions in response to a new set of ambiguous social situations. Furthermore, aggressive behaviour scores reduced more in the trained group than in the untrained controls. Children who received attribution training also reported less perceived anger and showed a trend to report more self-control than those in the control group. Conclusions: Implications of these findings are discussed.

To understand the endogenous components of the event-related brain potential (ERP), we must use data about the components' antecedent conditions to form hypotheses about the information-processing function of the underlying brain activity. These hypotheses, in turn, generate testable predictions about the consequences of the component. We review the application of this approach to the analysis of the P300 component. The amplitude of the P300 is controlled multiplicatively by the subjective probability and the task relevance of the eliciting events, whereas its latency depends on the duration of stimulus evaluation. These and other factors suggest that the P300 is a manifestation of activity occurring whenever one's model of the environment must be revised. Tests of three predictions based on this “context updating” model are reviewed. Verleger's critique is based on a misconstrual of the model as well as a partial and misleading reading of the relevant literature.

Intrusive thoughts, flashbacks, panic attacks and sudden physiological arousal are each experienced as involuntary, are difficult to control, and lead to considerable distress. Such observations have led to the suggestion that anxiety disorders are associated with the operation of automatic information-processing biases. Clinical and experimental evidence for this proposal is reviewed and three different classes of routes to the development and modification of these automatic processes are described: an innate route, repetition/habituation, and conscious appraisal. The review focuses in particular on the third route, proposing that automatic processing biases can be altered by accessing and modifying conscious appraisals of internal and external events. Indirect evidence is provided by selective attention paradigms in anxiety, treatment studies and clinical observations, although further research will be necessary for a direct test of the pathway. The implications for the theory and practice of psychological therapy for anxiety disorders are described.