Using the case of France, this paper seeks to expand Gary Jacobsohn’s concept of “dual constitutional identity” by examining the tensions between the democratic component and the religious component of dual constitutional identities. I argue that constitutional identities are protected by a common set of mechanisms derived from militant democracy: bans/dissolution of political parties, eternity clauses and states of emergency. In the case of dual constitutional identities, militant democracy is used as a tool to protect the state religion from real or imagined threats from religious minorities – doing so in the name of democracy rather than in the name of religion. The democratic trajectory of France illuminates how constitutional identities tying a religious (or secular) identity to democratic principles and giving their courts the tools of militant democracy to police constitutional faith may in fact threaten the very foundations of democracy.

A new era of universalism and constitutional systems sets in after the fall of the Berlin Wall. With a worldwide demise of most traditional communist systems, liberal democracies seem to be the last system standing: The End of history, as Francis Fukuyama dubbed it. A lot of nations change in their old constitutional system for a new one: a liberal democracy, set in stone by a constitution that lays down individual fundamental freedom protection, division of government power, popular sovereignty and democracy. The bulk of nations has or adopts a liberal democratic constitution by the end of the twentieth century (at least they do so on paper). Communist and theocratic (Islamic) constitutions still exist but they represent a minority part of the constitutions in existence. The first part of the twenty-first century shows slide backs in the form of illiberal democracies, democratic downfalls and an increase of autocratic systems. None state (or supra state) constitutions spring up.

In a short Conclusion, I provide a final review of the book’s argument. Although much of the book is concerned with making the case for certain forms of competition, at the end I reflect with some trepidation on the current fraught state of domesticated competition and liberal society, and their possible futures.

The aims of the chapter are twofold. First, to understand the nature and characteristics of new forms of populist government, and in particular the emergence of “illiberal democracy,” the modern intellectual origins of which can be found in the writings of Carl Schmitt. Second, to examine the consequences of illiberal democracy for trade unions both politically and industrially. The concern is not just that illiberal democracy continues to redefine and diminish the role of trade unions, but that it does so at a time when trade unions have been weakened by decades of economic liberalism. Although these are questions of emerging global significance, recent political developments in the United Kingdom provide the main focus of this chapter.

This chapter looks at the changes in Polish public administration which have occurred as a result of liberal democratic backsliding since the 2015 elections. It begins with an outline of the theoretical perspective applied and the characteristics of Polish public administration. This is followed by a discussion of policies in this area pursued by the United Right ruling coalition and attempts to anticipate the possible consequences of erosion of the liberal democratic law-governed state. Next, specific dimensions featuring the implemented public administration policies are analysed, including the attitudes of officials and clerical staff toward change and the effects of external factors on public administration reforms. It ends with the conclusion that the scale and intensity of the policies implemented in Poland may lead to the decline and dismantling of democratic governance and to the emergence of a politicized oligarchic administration.

This chapter develops a new theoretical framework that explains the role played by state agents in the constitution of organized criminal groups (OCGs) and why electoral politics can become a decisive factor for peace and violence in the criminal underworld. The gray zone of criminality is introduced as the ecological space where the state and crime intersect and corrupt members of state security forces and criminals give rise to OCGs.The gray zone often emerges in authoritarian regimes, where autocrats allow state specialists in violence to regulate, protect, and profit from the criminal underworld in exchange for their loyalty. When countries transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, and postauthoritarian elites fail to reform the military and the police and to dismantle state–criminal networks, democratic mechanisms become intertwined with criminal violence. Electoral competition, party alternation, and the decentralization and fragmentation of political power introduce uncertainty in the gray zone, stimulating criminal rivalry, wars, and large-scale violence. We use these definitions and propositions to explain the outbreak and escalation of inter-cartel wars in Mexico.

An epilogue first notes that the only notable recent development not covered in the book is the slippage of democratic standards in Hungary, and less so Poland, albeit signs this may spread exist. However, this would not appear to be a transition-related dynamic, as it parallels the same trend of nationalist-populism in Europe and elsewhere. Speculating on possible future developments, it is concluded that little change is likely in the near-term. Those that have completed transition (and now EU members or candidates) are like other market democracies and their problems will be the same. The authoritarian reversal farther East that began in 2000 is unlikely to be infected by democratic inclinations of entrenched leaders, nor for that matter efforts to complete the economic transition – the status quo suits those in power very well and opposition is completely marginalized. Only Ukraine and Moldova are in a middle ground, with potential for moving closer to the EU, to more democracy, and fuller markets – but, at the same time, domestic vested interests continue to slow any movement in this direction, muddling through would seem a likely outcome.

This chapter explores the mutually constitutive relationship between the emergence of “penal populism” in fledgling democracies such as the Philippines, on one hand, and the erosion of democratic values and institutional protection of as well as societal respect for human rights, on the other. It contextualizes this phenomenon within the broader landscape of democratic retreat across “emerging market democracies” – namely rapidly growing economies with a relatively robust democratic tradition and, at least, more than a decade of competitive electoral practice – where growing dissatisfaction with unresponsive democratic institutions due to bureaucratic paralysis has gone hand in hand with the resurgence of so-called Asian values. The chapter argues that the rise of Filipino strongman Rodrigo Duterte is not only reflective of a systemic deadlock within Philippine democracy, but also the upshot of a worldwide backlash against enlightenment values. The way forward requires structural reforms in the penal system, not only to ensure the proper dispensation of justice, but also to revive public confidence in and support for due process and human rights.