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Adolescence marks a critical transition period, with significant mental health challenges including anxiety and depression symptoms that affect long-term happiness. There has been a lack of research exploring the factors mediating adolescent happiness.
Aims
To investigate the mediating effects of anxiety and depression on adolescent happiness, as well as the contributions of sociodemographic factors.
Methods
We recruited 392 adolescents. Anxiety symptoms, depression symptoms and happiness were assessed by the seven-item Generalized Anxiety Disorder scale, nine-item Patient Health Questionnaire and single-item happiness scale, respectively. Self-administered questionnaires were used to collect sociodemographic information.
Results
Spearman correlation analysis showed significant negative correlations of happiness with anxiety (r = −0.37, P < 0.0001) and depression (r = −0.47, P < 0.0001). Positive predictors of happiness included quality of parents’ marriage (β = 0.12, P = 0.006), regular physical exercise (β = 0.13, P = 0.006) and regular diet (β = 0.10, P = 0.03). Mediation analysis indicated that depressive symptoms (estimate = 0.50, 95% CI: 0.25 to 0.80) and anxiety symptoms (estimate = 0.32, 95% CI: 0.12 to 0.57) partially mediated the relationship between regular exercise and happiness, whereas depressive symptoms completely mediated the relationship between anxiety symptoms and happiness (estimate = −0.14, 95% CI: −0.20 to −0.08).
Conclusion
The findings of this study highlight the intricate interplay of mental health issues, lifestyle factors and adolescent happiness and emphasise the need for comprehensive interventions focusing on enhancing physical activity and addressing psychological health to foster happiness among adolescents.
High rates of divorce in western society have prompted much research on the repercussions for well-being and the economy. Yet little is known about the important topic of whether parental divorce has deleterious consequences upon adult children. By combining experimental and econometric survey-based evidence, this study attempts to provide an answer. Under controlled conditions, it measures university students’ subjective well-being and productivity (in a standardized laboratory task). It finds no evidence that either of these is negatively associated with recent parental divorce. If anything, happiness and productivity appear to be slightly greater, particularly among males, if their parents have divorced. Using longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey—to control for so-called fixed effects—we then cross-check this result, and confirm the same finding, on various random samples of young British adults.
Buying lottery tickets is not a rational investment from a financial point of view. Yet, the majority of people participate at least once a year in a lottery. We conducted a field experiment to increase understanding of lottery participation. Using representative data for the Netherlands, we find that lottery participation increased the happiness of participants before the draw. Winning a small prize had no effect on happiness. Our results indicate that people may not only care about the outcomes of the lottery, but also enjoy the game. Accordingly, we conclude that lottery participation has a utility value in itself and part of the utility of a lottery ticket is consumed before the draw.
John Stuart Mill claimed that “men do not desire merely to be rich, but richer than other men.” Are people made happy by being richer than others? Or are people made happy by favorable comparisons to others more generally, and being richer is merely a proxy for this ineffable relativity? We conduct an online experiment absent choice in which we measure subjective well-being (SWB) before and after an exogenous shock that reveals to subjects how many experimental points they and another subject receive, and whether or not points are worth money. We find that subjects are made significantly happier when they receive monetized rather than non-monetized points, suggesting money is valued more than the points it represents. In contrast, subjects are made equally unhappy when they receive fewer monetized points as when they receive fewer non-monetized points than others, suggesting relative money is not valued more than the relative points it represents. We find no evidence that subjects are made happier by being “richer” than others (i.e., by receiving more points—either monetized or non-monetized—than others). Subgroup analyses reveal women are made unhappier (than men) by being “richer” and “poorer” than others, and conservatives are made unhappier (than progressives) by being “poorer” than others. Our experimental-SWB approach is easy to administer and may complement choice-based tasks in future experiments to better estimate preference parameters.
There is now a Happiness Revolution to go along with the earlier Industrial and Demographic Revolutions. The Happiness Revolution is captured using people's happiness scores, as reported in public surveys, whereas the earlier revolutions are reflected by economic production (such as GDP) and life expectancy. Increases in happiness are chiefly due to social-science welfare policies that alleviate people's foremost concerns – those centering on family life, health, and jobs. This Element traces the course of the Happiness Revolution throughout Europe since the 1980s when comprehensive and comparable data on people's happiness first become available. Which countries lead and which lag? How is happiness distributed – are the rich happier than the poor, men than women, old than young, native than foreign born, city than countryfolk? How has the COVID-19 pandemic impacted happiness? These are among the questions addressed in this Element. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Chapter 8 focuses on how the strand of legal argument traced in Chapter 7 was deployed by a number of pro-imperialist writers in England in reply to Price, Paine and the American colonists in 1776. The first to take up the claim that liberty is nothing other than absence of restraint were the lawyers John Lind and Richard Hey, and they were soon followed by a large number of other critics of Price, among whom the most prominent were Adam Ferguson, John Welsey and later William Paley. The chapter focuses in particular on three objections generally raised against Price’s account of liberty. The first was that his definition confuses the state of being unfree with that of merely lacking security for the liberty you possess. The second was that he connects liberty with an unviable concept of inalienable natural rights. The third was that, by defining liberty as absence of dependence, and then equating dependence with slavery, he commits himself to a morally indefensible definition of slavery. He forgets that slaves are not merely subject to the will of their masters, but that the chief horror of slavery is that they are also regarded as being their master’s property.
Chapter 4 examines the body of Whig propaganda in which the government was congratulated for having succeeded in establishing a free civil society within a free state. A large number of Anglican writers joined the spokesmen for the government in arguing that Britain had by now established a constitution that made her the envy of Europe. Everyone was now equally subject to the law; the law alone ruled, with no incursions of arbitrary power; and the law was at last being expertly administered, without any corruption or incompetence. As a result, the life, liberty and property of every subject was now fully secure, including the property that (as Locke had said) everyone may be said to possess in their own person. No one is any longer condemned to live in a state of subjection to the mere will and power of anyone else. The consequence is said to be a civil society in which everyone can hope to find their own pathway to prosperity and happiness. The chapter concludes with an examination of Whig celebrations of urban life as the best setting in which to lead a flourishing and happy life.
Kant did not initially intend to write the Critique of Practical Reason, let alone three Critiques. It was primarily the reactions to the Critique of Pure Reason and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that encouraged Kant to develop his moral philosophy in the second Critique. This volume presents both new and first-time English translations of texts written by Kant's predecessors and contemporaries that he read and responded to in the Critique of Practical Reason. It also includes several subsequent reactions to the second Critique. Together, the translations in this volume present the Critique of Practical Reason in its full historical context, offering scholars and students new insight into Kant's moral philosophy. The detailed editorial material appended to each of the eleven chapters helps introduce readers to the life and works of the authors, outlines the texts translated, and points to relevant passages across Kant's works.
The last major chapter of the book reflects on the question of ‘happiness’ as discussed by Popper, Hayek, and Neurath, but also presents a case study of how Neurath not only theorized on such matters but also sought to make a practical difference by collaboration in planning projects. He became a consultant for the redevelopment of Bilston, a small town blighted by the legacy of the Industrial Revolution. In discussion with town councillors and architects, he steered plans by taking into account the needs of residents, seeking to represent those whose voice was generally not heard. This finally led to Neurath being interviewed in the mainstream media, marking acceptance and respect for Neurath in British culture. He did not want to use his broad learning to set himself apart as an intellectual but instead to articulate the needs of ordinary people.
This essay situates Mary Astell’s understanding of women’s moral freedom in the context of her under-studied vocabulary of “Epicurism.” It foregrounds Astell’s engagement with two contemporaneous accounts of the will, both of which can be broadly characterized as hedonistic. On the first, developed by John Norris (1688, 1693), God ensures conformity between his will and the human will by endowing agents with a love of pleasure that moves them in his direction. On the second, delineated by John Locke (1690), human wills are motivated by a morally neutral desire for pleasure, which acquires moral significance only when agents exercise their power of freedom or bring their reason to evaluate the goods that give them pleasure. In her writings of the 1690s, Astell develops a feminist ethics that is far closer to Locke’s than has been recognized. Like Locke, and unlike Norris, she suggests that agents are themselves responsible for aligning their wills with God’s, and they must do so by cultivating reason and a taste for virtuous pleasures. In a distinctively feminist move, she maps how patriarchal society corrupts women’s wills by directing their desires to sense-based goods only, preventing them from achieving the happiness due to them as rational beings. While Astell is routinely characterized as a rationalist philosopher, she is a rationalist who, like Locke, is highly aware of the limits of reason, and deeply interested in the potential of agents to transform their likes and dislikes so that they find pleasure in the exercise of virtue.
Ostensibly, Hume’s Essays do not have much to say about religion. ‘Of Superstition and Enthusiasm’ (1741) may contain an incisive treatment of the psychological origins of religious error and its ecclesiastical and political consequences, but it was the one Essay dedicated to religion published in Hume’s lifetime. But when the topic of religion does come up in the Essays, as it frequently does in examples, asides and footnotes, we find Hume doing two things: outlining the character and dangers of institutional religion on individual happiness and social stability and doing so in a neutral manner characteristic of his wider ‘science of man’. He brought religious belief and priestly power down to the level of another aspect of human life, comparable to the other themes discussed in this guide, and which could subject to ‘scientific’ observation that led to identification of general principles. Piecing together the various discussions of religion, we find Hume articulating a strong anticlericalism in which religion is understood to be a natural propensity of human nature, exploited by priesthoods claiming power over others, but which could be managed through increased scepticism about clerical claims amongst the citizenry and the subordination of church to state.
Is there a connection between pro-social behavior and well-being? This question has long been of interest, with Aristotle famously suggesting a nexus between virtues and well-being. To delve into this relationship, I conducted an extensive study encompassing multiple classical economic games and nearly 100 well-being questions. My findings confirm that different patterns of pro-sociality are robustly correlated with each other. On top, I find reliable correlations between well-being and pro-social behavior, as well as certain forms of punishment. In terms of underlying explanations, I observe that pro-sociality is particularly associated with a form of long-term well-being known as eudaimonia, suggesting that pro-social behavior plays a fundamental role in people perceiving their life as meaningful.
This Element concerns the civic value of contemplation in Plato and Aristotle: how does intellectual contemplation contribute to the happiness of the ideal state? The texts discussed include the Republic, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, works in which contemplation is viewed from a political angle. The Element concludes that in the Republic contemplation has purely instrumental value, whereas in the Politics and Nicomachean Ethics it has purely intrinsic value. To do justice to the complexity of the issues involved, the author addresses a broader question about the nature of civic happiness: whether it is merely the aggregate of individual happiness or an organic quality that arises from the structure of the state. Answering this question has implications for how contemplation contributes to civic happiness. The Element also discusses how many citizens Plato and Aristotle expected to be engaged in contemplation in the ideal state.
This study addresses a significant knowledge gap in the literature by examining the relationship between religious involvement and subjective wellbeing (SWB) among older adults in Taiwan, a cultural context that has been underrepresented in existing research, with a focus on gender and age differences. Using data collected in Taichung City in 2017 (N = 645), this study measured religious involvement through religious affiliation, religiosity and frequency of religious participation, and assessed SWB via life satisfaction and happiness. Findings revealed no significant association between religious involvement and life satisfaction. However, religious participation was positively correlated with happiness. Gender differences were observed: Buddhism and Taoism were positively associated with life satisfaction among males, whereas religiosity and religious participation were significantly related to life satisfaction and happiness among females. Age disparities were also found, with religiosity significantly relating to both life satisfaction and happiness in the old-old group (70–89 years) but not in the young-old group (60–69 years). These findings highlight the nuanced associations between religious involvement and SWB, emphasising the importance of considering gender and age variations in future research. Future studies should further explore the cultural contexts that shape these relationships and examine other potential mediating factors to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how religious involvement influences wellbeing across different demographic groups.
Existential happiness is happiness that one has a basic life at all. Having a basic life, as I understand it, involves being the subject of experiences and being an agent in some minimal sense. As I argue, existential happiness is a fitting response to having a basic life. To make this argument, I look at two possible accounts of the fittingness of existential happiness: the value of a basic life and attachment to the constitutive elements of one’s life. I also consider a few possible sources of existential happiness, including encounters with death, counterfactual thinking, and hedonically positive feelings of awe directed toward one’s own consciousness.
What are the basic coordinates of the dispute between Heidegger and Levinas over the phenomenology of “death” and its larger ontological or ethical significance? Or, put in the “perfectionist” terms developed in Chapter 4, in what ways do Heidegger and Levinas disagree about how we human beings become genuinely or fully ourselves? Examining the convergences and divergences of Heidegger’s and Levinas’s phenomenologies of death, this chapter suggests that Heidegger and Levinas both understood themselves as struggling to articulate the requisite ethical response to the great traumas of the twentieth century. By comparing their thinking at this level, I contend, we can better understand the ways in which Levinas genuinely diverges from Heidegger even while building critically on his thinking.
In Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education (2005), I sought to establish and build upon the hermeneutic thesis that Heidegger’s concern to reform education spans his entire career of thought. In my view, a radical rethinking of education – in a word, an ontologization of education, one that situates a transformative death and rebirth of the self at the very heart of the educational vision that founded the philosophical academy in Plato’s Republic – forms one of the deep thematic undercurrents of Heidegger’s work, early as well as late. We will come back to this “ontologization” of education at the end, but I want to begin by addressing a worry I did not previously thematize and confront. If my interpretive thesis is correct, then we should expect to find some sign of Heidegger’s supposed lifelong concern with education in his early magnum opus, Being and Time. The fact, then, that little or nothing had been written on Being and Time’s “philosophy of education” before my first book came out could reasonably be taken to cast doubt upon my thesis that a philosophical rethinking of education was of great importance to Heidegger’s work as a whole. Such a worry, of course, does not arise deductively; even if Being and Time contained no philosophy of education, one might be able to explain such an omission in a way that would leave my general thesis intact. Rather than trying to preserve the thesis in the face of such a hermeneutic anomaly, however, I will instead demonstrate that no such anomaly exists. This chapter will seek both to show that Heidegger’s philosophy of education deeply permeates Being and Time and to explain some of the context and significance of this fact, thereby coming to understand yet another interlocking set of philosophical implications arising from Heidegger’s phenomenology of existential death.
This Element explores the connection between God and happiness, with happiness understood as a life of well-being or flourishing that goes well for the one living it. It provides a historical and contemporary survey of philosophical questions, theories, and debates about happiness, and it asks how they should be answered and evaluated from a theistic perspective. The central topics it covers are the nature of happiness (what is it?), the content of happiness (what are the constituents of a happy life?), the structure of happiness (is there a hierarchy of goods?), and the possibility of happiness (can we be happy?). It argues that God's existence has significant, positive, and desirable implications for human happiness.
This study explores the relationship between maternal working hours and a child's emotional well-being using data from the UK Millennium Cohort Study. Child well-being is assessed through self-reported happiness and a well-being index that includes concerns, temperament, bullying, and behaviour. Results show a positive association between maternal employment and child well-being, supported by factor analysis combining child, mother, and teacher reports. The association remains consistent across income levels and is unaffected by commuting time or cohabitation status. These findings highlight the importance of maternal employment and contextual factors in shaping child well-being.
While in his early years, Kahneman followed the world of classic utilitarianism in which smart individuals base decisions on how they will truly feel each moment in the future, Kahneman in Mandel (2018) adopted a very different position, namely that what matters is the story people tell of their lives. He thus grappled with evolving stories of both the future and the past, and the presence of different decision-supporting evaluations for the short-run and the long-run.