We assess emerging relationships between production decisions and market channel selection among a small sample of hemp growers (22) in Colorado and Kentucky using qualitative interviews. We found producers differences by market channel, product and state. For instance, producers who relied on intermediated marketing strategies cultivated more acres on average and used fewer distinct market channels and strategies than those relying on direct markets. Product differences were found regarding processing, storage and perishability. Respondents identified four factors critical to their choice of market channels for their hemp products: research, profitability, trust and knowledge. The findings can help inform public and private decision-making regarding best hemp marketing practices and future needs of the hemp industry.

The 2018 farm bill is the latest in a history that dates to 1933. Commodity assistance is the only program in all farm bills, but with evolutionary changes. Current farm commodity programs largely make payments to farms, a stark contrast to the 1930s when they limited supply, put a floor under market price, and dampened price increases via public stocks. Crop insurance, which began as an experimental pilot program in 1938, now has its own farm bill title. Almost all commodity and insurance programs have provided assistance based on a calculation specific to an individual commodity's price and/or yield. However, an evolutionary change to whole farm commodity programs may be in its infant stages. They provide assistance for variation in a farm's aggregate revenue across multiple crops. Whole farm experiments currently exist in both the commodity and crop insurance titles. Analysis of a whole farm commodity program finds that its payments differ by year from actual payments made by current commodity programs and are smaller in total.

Agricultural commodity ‘dumping’ is the practice of exporting commodities at prices below the cost of production. Dumping cheats farmers of a fair return for their work. It cheats both the farmers in the USA who are paid below cost, and the farmers abroad whose crops compete with US exports in markets distorted by dumping. And dumping shortchanges the ecosystems upon which humanity depends for its survival. Neo-classical economics holds that when prices are low, suppliers will produce less. The persistence of dumping in the US agricultural commodity sector defies that assumption. In trade circles, where the problem is acknowledged to an extent, dumping is explained as a result of government subsidies. The authors argue that the dumping numbers provided by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy suggest this explanation is at best partial. They look at definitions of dumping, and explanations for how it arises and why it persists, in defiance of expectations that markets are self-correcting.

We analyze the effects of Price Loss Coverage (PLC), Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC), individual revenue protection insurance (RP), and Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) on the RP coverage level, certainty equivalent, and program payments. The model is calibrated to a representative wheat farm in Mitchell County in Kansas to analyze the effects of various policies. The result highlights that when insurance is framed as an investment, cumulative prospect theory predicts farmers’ coverage decisions accurately at 70%. ARC or PLC program increases the RP coverage level to 75%, but PLC and SCO jointly decrease the RP coverage level to 70%.

For most economic goods market participants are ‘not forced to make a deal.’ They can walk away, perhaps permanently, or revisit a transaction later if the terms of trade are more to their liking. That is not the case for food. It is a biological necessity to participate in the food market. This coercive property of food demand and other unique market characteristics make the agricultural sector very unresponsive to changes in price and hence—in contrast to textbook expectations—its ability to quickly self-correct. In recent decades agricultural policy legislation has not taken into account the root causes of agriculture's chronic price and income problems. As a result, it has been largely ineffective and unnecessarily expensive. We argue in this paper that a well-designed supply management program can take agriculture's unique characteristics into account in a way that benefits farmers, consumers and the public as a whole.

Nearly two decades into the 21st century, we revisit the topic of changes in the US agricultural system. We focus on trends in structure, technology and policy, and on the increasing influence of consumer preferences on this system, particularly for organic agriculture and local and regional foods. We examine technological innovations in the 21st century, including biotechnology, precision agriculture and indoor farming. Within overall trends toward consolidation, we identify an increasing number of vegetable farms and greenhouse operations, accompanied by a decrease in average size of those operations. We note the shift away from price support toward greater reliance on risk management in farm policy, and also track the impact of food movement trends on recent farm bills. While farm bill policies continue to focus on conventional field crop agriculture, some trends—expanded crop insurance, conservation program support and spending on federal data collection, research and community-based grants, for example—have begun to incorporate the growing movement toward organic, local and regional food systems into the mainstream of US agricultural production and policy.

As the 2018 farm bill approaches, some important trends have emerged regarding the policy preferences of different commodity producers. While some farm organizations like the American Farm Bureau advocate for expanding free trade, other groups argue for more trade protections and even greater support from the federal government. This paper examines the global context that shapes such divergent policy positions. I argue that global demand has expanded for particular commodities (especially, feed grains and meat), leading producers of those commodities to push for free trade and weaker political regulations of agriculture. At the same time, however, greater liberalization over the past 25 years has contributed to greater competition for some commodities, such as wheat. Liberalization in the world economy has also contributed to greater market instability, especially in terms of prices and production. This instability and increased competition have pushed some commodity producers to favor national regulations and trade protections for agriculture. Focusing corn, soybeans and wheat, I argue that these three aspects of the global context—global demand, international competition and price instability—shape the policy preferences of US producers regarding the 2018 farm bill. I draw on statistics from the United States Department of Agriculture and Food and Agriculture Organization to illustrate these aspects of the global context.

This paper is an historical analysis of how global pressures and aspirations have affected US farm bill debates over time, from the first farm bill in 1933 to the current debates over a 2018 farm bill. It focuses in particular on how nationalist and patriotic arguments have been used to support the USA's desired place in global agricultural markets over time. For example, debates over the 2008 farm bill reflected strong international concerns around both trade and energy, with early discussion focusing on keeping the USA ‘competitive’ as an agricultural exporter alongside emerging agricultural powerhouses, and later debates focusing on increasing domestic bioenergy production to ‘protect’ the USA from what were seen as risky energy imports. In other words, debates over trade and energy in 2008 provide insight into how stakeholders positioned the USA with respect to the rest of the world and how that positioning changed over the course of debates. But such questions about the USA's global aspirations—whether to maximize US production for export or protect US agriculture from global rivals—have been part of the farm bill since its earliest days. This analysis will examine how concerns over such national agricultural prominence in a globalizing context have played into and influenced the contours of domestic farm policy over time, with implications for the 2018 farm bill debates.

The 2002 Farm Act is used as a case study of three problematic considerations related to economists' role in policy issues: priority on economic efficiency versus income distribution, the role of benefit-cost analysis, and appropriate policies given market power of agribusiness. The results of the 2002 Act relevant to each of these issues have been widely criticized, raising questions about the effectiveness of economists' involvement. However, given the uncertainties about many key program effects, criticisms of the Act are themselves in question. In this context, the role of economists is seen analytically as generating information for Bayesian decision makers, and practically as gaining attention for that information in the political process.

The 2008 farm bill involved 16 months of debate. The end product is similar to the 2002 farm bill in the crops arena, continuing counter-cyclical payments, direct payments, and marketing assistance loans. In addition, however, the 2008 bill adds a new, optional counter-cyclical revenue program (Average Crop Revenue Election, or ACRE), authorizes a new permanent disaster program, and contains various other changes. The new ACRE program provides an entirely new set of dimensions for producers to consider in deciding whether to opt into the program, including the multi-year trade-off between the loss of potential “traditional” payments and the revenue protection provided by ACRE, as well as the producer's own expectations about yield and price trends and variability. The payment calculation associated with the new permanent disaster program appears at first glance to be relatively simple, although the whole-farm nature of the program and the number of variables makes it quite complex.

The 50/92 and 0/92reduced planting alternativestives of the 1985 farm bill allow farm program participants more flexibility in making production decisions. Specifically, these provisions relax the incentive to produce inherent in earlier commodity programs that linked deficiency payments directly to harvested acreage. This study examined the value of this additional decision flexibility for crop producers in the Blacklands of Central Texas. The results suggest that the reduced planting alternatives would not be used by, and have no value for risk neutral producers, but have substantial value for risk averse producers who would reduce planted acreage in years when yield expectations are low.

The use of national aggregate measures for the purpose of analyzing the impacts of agricultural policies often hides the impact of national policies on the distribution of benefits and costs between and within regions, size, and types of businesses. While economists can use national aggregate measures to indicate changes in overall efficiency due to policies, the tradeoff between efficiency and equity should be measured and the results provided to policymakers. These tradeoffs were not presented during the 1995–96 Farm Bill debate.

We review the implications of the 2007 Farm Bill for the risk management dimensions of U.S. agriculture and policy. Legislative proposals suggest significant changes in risk management policy, including the introduction of state or national revenue insurance. We also pursue an empirical analysis of the interrelationships of crop insurance, disaster relief, and farm profitability. We find an inverse relationship between disaster assistance and insurance purchases. Our analysis also suggests that farmers that buy insurance and that receive disaster payments tend to have higher returns to farming.

New revenue-based support programs in the 2008 Farm Bill represent a fundamental shift in farm programs and risk management decision-making. However, complexity, uncertainty, economics, and, arguably, an incomplete analysis of the new Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program all contributed to low enrollment in the new program in 2009. An effective analysis of ACRE should consider farm programs as part of an integrated risk management portfolio, including crop insurance, marketing, and other risk management tools as opposed to a separate lottery program. Improving this integration could be one of the most significant consequences of the 2008 Farm Bill.

Government farm support programs such as Loan Deficiency Payments (LDP) and Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCP) have payoff structures that effectively make them costless price insurance instruments. A combination of these payments with yield insurance may provide a viable alternative to revenue insurance. This paper finds that, contrary to expectations, the revenue product analyzed is uniformly superior to yield insurance under both current (2002) and proposed (2008) Farm Bill structures of government payments. Given minor adjustments, however, yield insurance combined with government payments can provide more effective risk management than revenue insurance in production areas with low yield–price correlation.

US agriculture operates in a market driven economy, although government policies can have influence on what farmers produce and how they produce it. As with other businesses, agricultural producers respond to economic incentives and disincentives, and make decisions to maximize their welfare; usually measured as net income. We examined how external economic drivers shape the type of agricultural systems that producers adopt. Specifically, we considered the influence of technological advancements, income supports embodied in farm legislation, and changes in market structure and consumer demand. Changes in technology have often favored large-scale and specialized operations. Many of the technological advancements have required large-scale production units to justify the investment. Often the technology has been commodity specific. However, there is some evidence that more diversified production units might be able to achieve economies of both scale and scope. The influence of commodity support programs has been ambiguous. As farm legislation has evolved to decouple production decisions from program benefits, the incentives to specialize in program crops (crops that receive price and/or income benefits under federal legislation, such as corn, other grains and oil seeds) have diminished. However, wealth and risk effects, albeit small, may have promoted or inhibited the adoption of a more integrated system. The ability of producers to adopt more integrated systems has been primarily influenced by their natural resource base and proximity to markets. Changes in market structure, channels and consumer demand in the past five decades have been dramatic with consolidation and specialization in both production and marketing sectors. However, the diversity of consumer demand has also created opportunities for more integrated farm operations. There is an increasing number of consumers who have become concerned about how and where their food has been produced. Markets for organic, locally produced, free range and the like are expected to grow. While price and income supports may have been biased towards specialization (as these programs were targeted to specific commodities), the reduction in risk associated with the programs has enabled producers to expand the number and diversity of their production enterprises. Furthermore, through the use of strategic alliances, cooperation among producers on a regional basis may eventually lead to greater integration and diversification than could be achieved for the individual farm operation.