This chapter describes, and transcribes in full, a Reminiscence event in which ten original members of the audience of the 1979 lecture were invited to talk about their impressions of the meeting forty years before. They describe the atmosphere and reflect on how things were considered then and now. Notes explaining other relevant work and biographies of individuals mentioned are appended.

As the last chapter of this book, we introduce some exciting and under-explored areas of future cognitive science. The first section reviews current large brain imaging databases elicited from the Human Connectome Project (HCP) movement. The second section focuses on the brain's resting state, called the default mode networks (DMN). The third section looks at the development of neuroprosthesis and how cognitive scientists can cooperate with interdisciplinary researchers in robotic engineering and brain--computer interfaces. The fourth section looks at cognitive science and the law, while the last section looks at self-driving vehicles.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the various kinds of memories we can have, when and why we forget, and how good systems and technology can help us. The chapter starts with the story of Lenny LeClair, a man permanently disabled after surgeons forgot multiple sponges in his abdomen. The story ends with a question: How could doctors forget something with such high consequences? And how could they forget so frequently? The examples move to even more dire consequences: people who were forgotten by dive boats while out scuba diving. Some lived, many died. I end with an example from my own life: forgetting to go for a run after a successful 1,580 days of a running streak. Again, the question is how we can forget such important information. I talk about how to avoid memory errors and failures. Tactics include memory training, such as using the method of loci to remember information. Lastly, I cover false memories and how they are created with application areas in police questioning of witnesses, especially children, and the horrors of the "recovered memory movement" thirty years ago.

Eyewitnesses play a significant role in criminal investigations and legal processes worldwide. Just like any other type of forensic evidence, eyewitness evidence has a margin of error. These errors, caused by numerous factors, affect the validity of eyewitness testimony. Some factors emerge at the moment of witnessing, while others occur afterwards. One of the main challenges for legal practitioners is to base their interviewing practices and decision-making on solid scientific evidence. Insight into the cognitive processes of a witness is vital for understanding why people make mistakes. Therefore, our chapter starts with a brief explanation of the organization of memory. Then, using a realistic example, we describe several variables that affect witness testimony, while loosely following the three stages of memory: witnessing, retention and retrieval. Next, we discuss various factors affecting judges’ and jurors’ assessments of witness testimony, which in turn influence legal decision-making. Finally, we summarize our findings and make some concluding remarks.

I review half-a-century of research in strategic and autobiographical memory, spanning Peter Ornstein’s scientific career (so far), highlighting Ornstein’s contributions to these literatures. I document advances in theory, understanding underlying processes, and application of memory development over the past 50 years, as well as the field’s substantial contribution to understanding cognitive development writ large, including issues of capacity, representation, intentionality, knowledge, and social context.

Research on factors that can affect the accuracy of children’s autobiographical remembering has important implications for understanding the abilities of young witnesses to provide legal testimony. In this chapter, I review our own research inspired by Professor Ornstein’s information-processing framework for examining children’s memory. Specifically, I focus on one factor that has much potential to influence how children remember their experiences, namely everyday conversations with peers and parents. Our studies show not only that the content of natural conversations can shape children’s event memory but that such exchanges can prompt the generation of entirely false narratives that are more detailed than true accounts of experience. Further, our work demonstrates various factors that can boost the damaging effects of conversationally conveyed misinformation. Implications of this collection of findings for children’s testimony are discussed.

This chapter argues that one can have some memory loss over time but remain the same person and be held responsible for one’s earlier actions. Amnesia following an action does not entail that the agent had no cognitive or volitional control when he acted. Amnesia as such is not a mitigating or excusing condition. But an individual who had undergone a substantial identity change from extensive memory loss could not be held responsible or punished because he would have become a different person. The chapter also considers dissociative disorders such as somnambulism. The main question regarding these states is whether they impair a person’s capacity to form and translate an intention into a criminal act. Dissociation comes in degrees. A person in a dissociative state may have enough behavior control to be at least partly responsible for her actions. In addition, the chapter examines memory loss in omissions and whether it can be a mitigating factor in cases involving negligence causing death. The chapter also argues that a victim of an assault does not have an obligation to retain a memory of it to testify against the perpetrator. Her cognitive liberty gives her the right to erase the memory.