The chapter articulates a political theory of secularism that can be defended against common, legitimate criticisms of existing forms of secularism. What I call minimal secularism is not vulnerable to the claim that secularism is hostile to religion, marked by an ethnocentric legacy of church-state separation, or committed to a Christian, and specifically Protestant, conception of religion. In addition, it is more structured and precise than liberal philosophies advocating state ‘neutrality’ towards the plurality of conceptions of the good life. Minimal secularism is a thin, yet attractive, transnational ideal for progressive politics.

This chapter explores how instructors designed their classroom management strategies in response to the student challenges discussed in their interviews. It is guided by three research questions: (1) How do instructors enact traditional and culturally responsive classroom management strategies in response to challenging student situations? (2) To what extent does instructor use of traditional and culturally responsive classroom management strategies align with action strategies associated with Model I and Model II learning values in the action science literature? (3) From an action science perspective, what consequences do traditional and culturally responsive classroom management strategies have for CUNY instructors’ behavioral worlds?

Module 6 presents various ways in which cultures understand, describe, and explain illness. These conceptualizations are based in cultural ontologies and epistemologies, affecting how people communicate about illnesses and their expectations for treatment and outcomes. Indigenous and shamanic traditions are presented.

Increased globalisation and the resulting ever-increasing diversity in society and workplaces lead us to one of the most interesting and challenging topics in business: intercultural communication. More people than ever are moving around the world to access jobs, try new lifestyles and explore different life opportunities. The possibility of finding yourself in an unfamiliar cultural context is highly likely. You may have already had the opportunity to meet and work with people from other cultures. Skills in managing intercultural relationships and predicting and managing intercultural issues are indispensable for a business professional. Business trips abroad, the internationalisation of industries, and globalisation are integral to the operation of many organisations.

Although Europe deserves condemnation for the ethnocentric and racist notions and attitudes that flourished within it both before and during the era of imperialism, these were preceded, accompanied, and countered by a singular interest in and openness to other peoples and cultures. The marks of this openness were an exceptional interest in travel and writings about it, in learning non-European languages and translating and circulating texts written in them, in correcting their own forbears’ calumnies and defamations of others by exposing myths and legends for what they were, and by acknowledging the historical and cultural achievements of other peoples. The notion that Asian governments were despotic spread chiefly because those who adopted it feared the spread of autocracy in their own countries, and it drew forth harsh criticism. Images of other countries or regions, especially China and the Near East, became mirrors in which Europeans contemplated the limitations and narrow prejudices of their own way of life.

The nationalist element of Brexit populism had an entrenched ethnocentric character that was capable of breaking out in the in the form of racism. By 2016 overt racism had become taboo in public, but Brexitspeak had the linguistic means to dog whistle it. The new racism also enlarged the sense of ‘racism’ to cover refugee migrants entering the UK who were not dark-skinned. The sources of racism in the UK are diverse and subject to debate. In this chapter the focus is on the likely impact of racist demagoguery in generating and sustaining long-term racist attitudes. The example of Enoch Powell and his ‘rivers of blood’ speech is scrutinised in detail. But Powellism persisted well beyond the 1960s and 1970s: twenty years on it motivated the murder of Stephen Lawrence. In the age of the internet, Powell was a legitimising icon among neo-Nazi networks and appeared in website videos quoting and visualising his notorious speech. But veneration of Powell also remained apparent among right-wing Conservative politicians, activists and writers, and in their networking with ultra-right individuals.

When we think of empirical research, we think of things we can observe. Empirical research, as conceived within a Western scientific framework, is discussed in this chapter by addressing the Eurocentric basis of research and the curriculum. It is now imperative to consider how to enrich sociological theory and find new ways of revealing innovative knowledge in educational research. This chapter highlights the role Indigenous knowledges and theories have in informing educational research and knowledge production. Indigenous Standpoint Theories (IST), situated within Indigenous knowledge paradigms, goes beyond Western research as this encompasses our way of knowing and being in the world. Foley and Rigney conclude that Indigenous research must work to free our people from oppressive barriers and reflect our lived experiences as Indigenous people. IST positions our people as knowledge holders and speaks to the significance of critically situating ourselves in relation to that knowledge.

During the peak of his contemporary popularity, F. Scott Fitzgerald lived abroad – mostly in France – for five years and eight months, much of that time pursuing a frenzied social life that impeded his literary work. His European travels included lengthy stays from May 1924 through the end of 1926 and then from March 1929 through September 1931, as well as a five-month sojourn in mid-1928. On foreign shores he experienced misery and elation: his wife Zelda's romance with French aviator Edouard Jozan; completion, publication, and celebration of his third novel, The Great Gatsby (1925); new friendships with Ernest Hemingway and with Gerald and Sara Murphy; innumerable alcoholic binges and embarrassments; false starts on a fourth novel and increasing self-doubts; domestic rivalry and acrimony; Zelda's first nervous breakdown and treatment; his hotel life and fugitive magazine fiction. Only after returning to the United States did Fitzgerald publish Tender Is the Night (1934), a work that despite its flaws plumbs the paradoxes of desire more profoundly than did Gatsby. Understandably, Tender has preoccupied scholars and biographers seeking insight into the author's life abroad, for its thinly veiled treatment of the Fitzgeralds' domestic calamities, set against the crazy violence of postwar Europe, reveals much about the author's own identification with expatriate culture. But the many short stories set at least partly in Europe likewise merit closer attention, less for their biographical connections than for their representations of the American migration to Europe after World War I.

The Introduction lays out the book. It introduces the concept of democratic discontent, explaining how it differs from milder forms of political displeasure and how it can manifest in different forms like populism, ethnonationalism, conspiracism, and antipathy to democratic regimes. It then briefly describes the conflict between economic and cultural approaches to discontent, showing that both make valid findings, yet neither hypothesis is totally consistent with existing research. To overcome this impasse, the chapter introduces the affective political economy theory of economics, emotions, and culture, where emotions induced by economic troubles prime large groups of citizens to embrace culturally discontented narratives; cultural discontent then produces various forms of discontent, based on local conditions. Finally, it lays out the book’s empirical approach, discussing the use of mixed methods to test the theory, including experiments, observational surveys, and qualitative analysis and comparison of cases; this section also justifies the case selections. This section advises different kinds of readers about which sections they might find most interesting and which might be less relevant, especially regarding statistically dense sections of the book.

This chapter begins applying the theory to the core cases, starting with Trumpism in the USA and Euroscepticism and Brexit in the United Kingdom. It traces the evolution of the populist radical right in both countries; throughout the process, economic trauma, compounded by inadequate or imprudent political responses to the unfolding crisis, stoked and inflamed cultural tensions. Yet in both cases, discontent failed to break through the political status quo as radical right antecedents like the Tea Party and the UK Independence Party (prior to Farage’s ascension to leadership) failed to embrace their supporters’ cultural radicalism. Only when Trump and Farage began to explicitly connect economics, culture, and politics did radical right populism manage to provoke a rupture. We support these arguments using original survey data in the USA, the British Election Study, and analyses of Trump’s rhetoric.

This chapter describes and justifies the book’s theoretical framework, which proposes that economics influences democratic discontent by fomenting cultural discontent, with emotions connecting economics and culture. After briefly discussing the economic consequences of the Great Recession and the collapse of the commodities boom, it explains the affective intelligence theory (AIT) of emotions. AIT conceptualizes emotions as continuously operating surveillance systems, producing specific motivational and cognitive patterns that are not tied to the situation that aroused them. Given this, the chapter proposes that economic turmoil generates resentment and anxiety, which primes large groups of citizens to become aggressive, hostile toward outgroups, and hyperattentive to threatening information. Individuals so influenced gravitate toward social narratives that emphasize group conflict and prejudice against opposing social groups, thus fomenting cultural discontent. This, in turn, produces democratic discontent. The chapter concludes by discussing various contextual factors that may inhibit or intensify this theoretical process or prevent discontent from manifesting in certain ways.

This chapter tests every step of the book’s theoretical framework using survey experiments. It uses profiles of three hypothetical citizens: Left Leaner, Right Leaner, and Tuned Out. As a narrative device to show how the theory is tested, the chapter then takes these citizens through the steps of our theory using experiments, which use writing exercises, videos, and text vignettes as treatments. The results of these analyses are presented using simple graphs and figures that are relatively understandable for readers with limited statistical expertise. We find that economic discontent does significantly increase populism, regime antipathy, and conspiracism, and that these effects are mediated through cultural discontent, resentment, and (in the case of conspiracism) anxiety, as expected. The chapter further shows that economic discontent increased negative intergroup attitudes, but only among conservatives.

The introduction highlights the attraction of the idea of human rights. It affords insight into the development of the new international standards, considers the philosophical foundations, presents matters of cross-cultural interpretation, and broaches the subject of controversies. The controversies reveal the underlying tension between cultural relativism and universalism. By turning to difficult challenges, it is possible to come to grips with shared values or cross-cultural universals. The powerful idea of human rights appeals because of the peremptory norms, known as ius cogens, e.g., the rights against slavery and genocide.

Carole Fleuret offers a vision of social injustice and racism in France during the 1980s by recounting her experience of  the denial of the languages of migration at school, including the language of her grandfather. Through her research, she fights against the loss of the linguistic capital using children’s literature, pluriliteracy repertoires and invented spelling to rethink school programs.

Ethnocentrism is an attitudinal construct that involves a strong sense of ethnic group self-centredness and self-importance. It is a universal phenomenon found across cultures and time periods. Although ethnocentrism can be expressed in many domains, it finds its expressions particularly significant in the political domain. This chapter provides a comprehensive review of ethnocentrism, with an emphasis on its implications for the field of political psychology. The chapter defines the concept and explains its unified theoretical approach, the group strength model of ethnocentrism. It discusses the role of ethnocentrism in political domains, such as nationalism, policy preferences, and political party and candidate support. Although ethnocentrism has been described as a 'delusion' by Gumplowicz back in 1879, it is a forceful delusion, which has a strong grasp over humans and is unlikely to disappear. Political psychologists, therefore, need to more carefully study ethnocentrism and its political implications across societies and political systems.

Nations and individuals vary in their support for human rights. International surveys face difficult issues (e.g., acquiring comparable samples, insuring equivalent meaning of survey questions in many languages), and these surveys are limited in the range of human rights issues examined and number of countries surveyed. Internationally, support for different kinds of human rights (civil and economic rights) correlate positively, although the rights that receive stronger support are shaped by a nation’s religion and culture. Individuals’ support for human rights is strongly positively associated with 'identification with all humanity', other universal values (e.g., 'protecting the global environment'), and the moral foundations of care and fairness, and strongly negatively related to ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, the social dominance orientation, and right-wing political ideology, A number of other constructs are also weakly associated with human rights support either positively (e.g., dispositional empathy) or negatively (e.g. need for structure).

Research exploring public opinion dynamics in the domain of immigration has exploded in recent decades, and for obvious reasons. Policy debates in developed democracies have intensified as barriers to movement fell in Europe and the USA and as populist leaders began to capitalise on, if not stoke, public anxieties about the influx of newcomers. A central question is why some individuals are so much more willing than others to allow immigrants into their country, and the debate has centred primarily around real economic consequences versus deep-rooted group identities and animosities. Given all the welcome attention to this fundamental question, we can only review a small slice of this burgeoning literature. To these ends, we provide a broad overview of the impact of real immigration contexts, economic versus symbolic group attachments, and the role of the media and elites may play in triggering either or both forces by triggering powerful emotions. Since these explanations are so difficult to causally untangle, and since the literature has focused so much on the USA and a few other countries, we pay special attention to recent, comparative research that goes beyond simple observational designs.