Chapter 1 addresses the false belief that prejudice and discrimination are individual in nature and not systemic or institutional. Many people believe that racism, sexism, or homophobia comprise an individual’s negative feelings toward marginalized groups – a person has hate in their heart and discriminates against the relevant target. It is certainly the case that people can hate members of certain groups and that hate can manifest in discrimination. However, inequality is also refleted in insitutions. It is systemic and structural. That is, inequality is reflected in laws, policies, and practices, and is baked into insititutions such as health care, the criminal legal system, marriage, education, the military, and so on. Chapter 1 describes the key terms associated with systemic inequality, and describes the process by which systemic inequality is established and maintained. The chapter concludes with strategies to reduce systemic and structural inequality.

The Conclusion describes the stakes of ignoring the impact of bigotry. In particular, the ways in which bigotry impacts the lives of those who benefit from it are a focus.

Chapter 7 examines the belief by some that affirmative action amounts to reverse racism and reverse sexism. The distinction between affirmative action and equal opportunity is described, as is the common belief that affirmative action involves quotas (quotas are illegal). Practices that undermine meritocracy in both college admissions and in employment are explored. These practices include legacy admissions, donors, and, in the context of employment, biases in job selection. Chapter 7 makes the case for the need of affirmative action because subtle forms of bias infiltrate all aspects of employment. The chapter critically examines the argument that diversity benefits organizations. The chapter ends with a discussion of goal-oriented versus process-oriented affirmative action plans, and other strategies to reduce bias in admissions and employment.

I build upon the earlier discussion – in Chapter 3 – of internal forms of social "tiering" and exclusion to further interrogate the politics of belonging in Gulf monarchies, this time through the employment of foreign labor. I disentangle the ways in which foreign labor plays a role in the shaping and consolidation of the national community, and I distinguish among European "expats," non-GCC Arabs, Asian and African laborers. I argue that labor from the three different categories play similar but also distinct roles in the delineation of national community: While they are differentially incorporated in ways that protect the "nation" and appease the citizen-subject, varying degrees of marginality reflect Gulf society’s perceptions or aspirations of the difference between itself and "the other(s)." Additionally, I examine some of the peculiarities of the importation, organization and incorporation of foreign labor, connect them to the normative tradition, and consider how they serve the ruler’s objective to manage and control society.

This chapter considers what arguments can be offered to defend patents (the normative question). It revisits the three types of argument introduced in Chapter 2: the labour, utilitarian and personality arguments.

I read Kripke’s sketches of our ordinary view of meaning in his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language as attempts to highlight the features of meaning that enable us to draw the distinction between what seems right and what is right. I argue that Kripke thinks the best way to clarify these features of meaning is to describe metasemantic conditions that a speaker’s words must satisfy if the speaker is to be warranted in asserting a sentence in which the words occur. Although the view of meaning I attribute to Kripke is initially compelling, I argue that it rests on a subtle yet fundamental misunderstanding of the distinction between what seems right and what is right.

This chapter concludes by offering some brief reflections regarding the utility of grievance formation as a theoretical and methodological tool in socio-legal research in order to understand rights developments in context.

This chapter examines the multiple ways in which obtaining food was tied to labor in the ghetto. This includes trading labor for resources to purchase food as well as supplemental food which was provided for certain occupations. It explores different types of work in the ghetto including forced labor, work for the Judenrat, factory work, home-based piece work, as well as employment in the ghetto’s private sector. The chapter looks at ways in which people utilized their social networks to obtain better work as well as how hunger impacted productivity. This chapter also explores the tension between obtaining work that provided enough funds to meet one’s food needs versus positions which protected one against deportation and the strategies employed by individuals and households to meet their needs of adequate food and protection. This chapter also discusses the struggles of the Jewish communal leadership in providing labor to the Germans while feeding working and nonworking ghetto inhabitants. This chapter examines how the Germans took control of food distribution out of the hands of the communal leadership in order to prioritize labor.

A History of World War One Poetry aims to represent the global and multifaceted poetry that emerged from 1914–1918. While poetry did and does not occupy the same place in all national imaginaries, it was a literary genre that flourished during the Great War.The Introduction interrogates not only the term ‘war poetry’ but also the question of ‘who is entitled to write war poetry’.It argues that the poetry that emerged from World War One extended far beyond the British soldier-poet canon, reinforced by influential studies such as Paul Fussell's The Great War and Modern Memory. Rather, as the chapters demonstrate, it was generated and read by men and by women, combatant and non-combatant, and across a continuum in which protest and patriotism, modernity and tradition, propaganda and remembrance, humour and pathos, co-existed, if uneasily.

After half a century since the entrenchment of the notion of right to food (RTF) in international instruments, it remains elusive to millions of South Africans. This development evolves in the backyard of a country with high per capita income, entrenched constitutional provision safeguarding citizens’ RTF, being a net exporter of agricultural produce, and a comprehensive social security structure. Ironically, most of these citizens reside in townships or locations where residents constantly take to the streets in demand for basic social services and yet, have not pressed for the provision of food. Why is this the case, and how can this trend be reversed? In seeking to respond to these discursive questions, the chapters in this book address cardinal legal and politico-economic aspects of the RTF, by assessing the concepts, polices and institutions which have created the stark contrast or paradox between (persuasive) policies and (poor) practice. Assessing the means by which people access food (either through own production or purchase), the chapters adopt an interdisciplinary approach, spanning agriculture, economics, history, land economy, law, political science, nutrition and sociology, to determine the dynamics of the RTF and poor policy interventions.

Connections that help us feel valued and add value impact our health, happiness, love, work, and society. The consequences of mattering or not mattering can be seen everywhere, at every age. The lack of mattering often results in depression, suicide, and even aggression and xenophobia. People who suffer from depression, workers who feel alienated, and citizens whose identity is threatened feel devalued. They feel that their lives, work, and identity do not matter. While some respond to this situation by internalizing feelings of despondence, others overcompensate by nurturing feelings of superiority and joining nationalistic movements headed by authoritarian leaders. Feeling devalued or overvalued, in relationships, at work, and in the world, is one of the most serious threats facing us. They derive from a failure to foster mattering. They results can be disastrous for individuals and society as a whole. When disaffected masses feel that their identity is devalued in society, they respond in one of two ways. They either turn toward nationalism and extremism, as in the case of xenophobic movements, or they protest to defend their rights.

Feeling valued and adding value are not only complementary but highly interdependent. Together they create virtuous or vicious cycles. Marginalization and exclusion engender frustration, alienation, and even aggression, which make it very hard to gain positive regard. Appreciation, on the other hand, leads to self-confidence, mastery, and the desire to make a difference. This, in turn, will make you feel valued. Experiences of exclusion hurt because they threaten your sense of mattering; and if they happen often enough, research shows, they shatter your psychological and physical well-being. Indeed, the experience of exclusion has been linked to serious consequences, ranging from stress and depression to suicide to mass killings. In contrast to experiences of exclusion, if you’ve ever felt valued or had an opportunity to add value, you know how good it feels to matter – so much so that your health and happiness go up every time you experience these positive emotions. In fact, you live longer and feel more fulfilled when you experience them regularly.

In Chapter 1, based on the notion of emerging adulthood, we define adult entrenched dependence as a failure to emerge. Children’s dependence on their parents can be characterized as functional or dysfunctional. We propose ways to differentiate between the two. We clarify that the goal of our approach is not fostering "independence" (which we view as a rather problematic goal) but helping transform dysfunctional into functional dependence. The main changes we try to promote are: (a) developing a time perspective that allows parents to strive for better functioning; (b) helping parents transition from personal effacement into presence; (c) releasing parents from their "sacrifice mentality" in favor of recommitment to wellness; (d) helping parents counter the adult-child's entitlement; and (e) identifying and resisting various forms of violence, blackmail and exploitation.

Listening to everyday conversations, it is obvious that many people expect the concept "desert" to do much of the work in justifying positive or negative treatment of others. Indeed, considerations of desert seem to trump most every other consideration in determining what treatment is proper. When we are convinced that all parties have received what they deserved, then we no longer insist on redress. And it continues to nag at our moral sensibilities when we judge that some person has not received her due. Although some moral philosophers argue that desert should not have a central role in ethical frameworks, there are compelling reasons to preserve a central role for preinstitutional desert, which differs conceptually from entitlement and other institutionally based normative considerations.

Human services practitioners who are entering the field in the early twenty-first century, or who have worked in the field for some time and have seen wide-ranging changes in the ways human services are conceived, funded and delivered, face the same task of making sense of complexity at the government, organisational and grassroots levels. In analysing current social policy, it is appropriate to ask not only what is expected to be the impact of any proposed policy change on affected individuals and groups but also how the particular issue being addressed has come to be nominated as a social problem and which ideological forces are proposing change or opposing it. Social policy in Australia since white settlement has been shaped by dominant white, Judaeo-Christian values. Beyond that, any classification of Australian political dynamics and debates concerning social policy in terms of competing ideologies risks over-simplification. A distinguishing feature of successive Australian governments in the twentieth century was their respective approaches to social change being shaped by fundamentally different commitments to and strategies of social welfare provision.

Tyler Burge first introduced his distinction between epistemic entitlement and epistemic justification in ‘Content Preservation’ in 1993. He has since deployed the distinction in over twenty papers, changing his formulation around 2011. His distinction and its basis, however, is not well understood in the literature. This chapter distinguishes two uses of ‘entitlement’ in Burge and then focuses on the contrast between justification and entitlement, two forms of warrant, where warrants consists in the exercise of a reliable belief-forming competence. Since he draws the distinction in terms of reasons, this chapter brings his account of reasons altogether in one place. The chapter introduces a decision-procedure for classifying warrants as justifications or entitlements. The distinction is not the same as the inferential vs. non-inferential distinction. Inference is distinguished from processing, thinking, reasoning, and critically reasoning. Burge’s new formulation of the distinction was driven by the recognition of non-accessible modular reasons. Three kinds of access are distinguished.