This title delves into the mechanisms and processes of international human rights litigation, focusing on the various judicial and quasi-judicial bodies that adjudicate human rights complaints. It examines the diversity of international complaints mechanisms, including regional human rights courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as nonjudicial bodies such as the Human Rights Committee and other treaty bodies. The section discusses the conditions of admissibility for international complaints, the procedures for examining claims, and the standards of proof and evidence. It also explores the role of provisional measures in protecting human rights during litigation and the challenges in enforcing international human rights decisions. By providing insights into the litigation process, this title highlights the importance of access to justice and the role of international bodies in holding states accountable for human rights violations.

This chapter employs ethnographic insights to develop a generalizable theory of criminalized governance. The theory accounts for why gang organizations and their members engage in varying levels of coercion and benefits provision to residents living in areas where they operate. When gangs compete, they rely more on coercion and violence as they demand heightened levels of obedience from local communities. When police are actively enforcing against gangs, however, they will provide more responsive benefits to local populations to gain resident support in their effort to avoid detection and arrest. Although gang-level incentives may seem to predominate, the role of residents is crucial. The chapter describes how resident responses within these various security environments can shape the nature of the threats to gangs and, thereby, governance outcomes. The chapter concludes by describing the dynamics that should be observed within each of the ideal-typical criminalized governance regimes and addresses several alternative factors that may shape these outcomes.

This chapters traces the evolution of the Nova Holanda gang’s governance practices from the mid-1990s until the occupation of Maré by the Brazilian Military in April 2014 through the analysis of newspaper archives, oral histories with residents and gang members, and a dataset of anonymous gang denunciations. Following its integration into the Comando Vermelho faction, CVNH maintained a benevolent dictator regime, combining high levels of coercion with responsive benefits, until several years of warfare with their primary rival led to the use of extreme forms of coercion against residents as disorder prevailed. By 2004, the war between CVNH and Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) had ended though enforcement continued to be active and frequent, leading to a social bandit regime, in which the gang offered significant benefits and engaged in low levels of coercion. Then, following the resurgence of TCP in 2009 until the arrival of the Brazilian military, CVNH can be considered a benevolent dictator gang once again. They ramped up their coercive behavior in response to TCP’s more aggressive posture while providing significant benefits to avoid frequent police enforcement efforts.

The navigational freedoms are unavoidably curtailed to some degree in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as compared with the traditional high seas freedoms. One of the main reasons for this compromise was to accommodate coastal States’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the newly established maritime zone. Nevertheless, the limitation of the navigational freedoms by the coastal State can only be justified if they are made in accordance with the formula of the attribution of rights and freedoms in the EEZ and must be exercised in good faith and by giving due regard to the exercise of these freedoms and rights. It is noteworthy that coastal States have been able to utilise mechanisms developed by competent international organisations to adopt and implement some of these limitations through the rules of reference, particularly regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment from international shipping. This chapter first identifies the scope of the preserved freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, then examines how they may have been affected by the exercise of a coastal State’s rights and jurisdiction, before discusses the remedies to address these impacts.

In practice, there are several obstacles to the application of the substantive legal framework analysed in the previous chapters. First, there is a risk of contractual provisions that deviate from the legal norm. The qualification of certain rules as mandatory law may prevent such contractual deviation. Even so, effective recourse to the protective regimes throughout the course of the contract is not guaranteed. Reference may be made to the possibility for corporate partners to have recourse to trade secret protection and the apparent limited invocation of the protective legal framework. Collective enforcement may contribute to enhanced transparency throughout the music value chain and counter musicians’ fear of commercial retaliation. Further bolstering extra-judicial enforcement is likely to fulfil an important complementary role.

This chapter brings together the research findings and answers the main research question, namely how the legal framework can contribute to a achieving a fair(er) balance between the interests of musicians and their main corporate partners. It summarises the potential bottom-up initiatives, as well as the possible regulatory action identified throughout the book.

This chapter tests observable implications of localized peace enforcement theory at the individual level using two experiments conducted in Mali. First, the chapter presents the results of a study designed to measure willingness to cooperate using a trust game where participants send money to an anonymous partner from a different ethnic group. A randomly assigned group of participants is told that two patrolling officers (from either the UN or France) will punish any low partner contributions with a fine. While the UN treatment increased participants’ willingness to cooperate, the France treatment had no effect. Follow-up interviews confirmed the importance of perceptions of the UN’s impartiality. Second, the chapter outlines the results of a survey that presents respondents with a vignette describing a communal dispute. Respondents were then randomly assigned to a control, UN, or French treatment group. Assignment to the UN treatment group – but not the French treatment group – reduced the likelihood that respondents said a communal dispute would escalate. To probe the plausibility of localized peace enforcement theory specifically, the chapter concludes with an analysis of specific questions about individuals’ perceptions of peacekeepers from the survey.

Chapter 1 places the institution of belligerent reprisals in relation with the two conceptual frameworks of reciprocity and enforcement. First, it sketches the trajectories by which international law has approached the phenomenon of belligerent reprisals, identifying extant prohibitions and clarifying the requirements for their lawful adoption. After recalling outstanding questions in the international regulation of the mechanism, it describes the two paradigms that legal theory could draw from to conceptualize belligerent reprisals. On the one hand stands reciprocity, as embodied chiefly in the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach; on the other, the paradigm of enforcement as manifested in countermeasures. Having described their main tenets, the chapter shows how these two blueprints, despite co-existing in the early theories on belligerent reprisals, have come to be seen as mutually exclusive, thereby offering two clearly distinct alternatives for the following formalization of the purpose and function of the mechanism.

Chapter 2 explains how belligerent reprisals have come to be interpreted as tools to induce compliance with the laws of armed conflict. It does so by highlighting three cumulative processes. First, it looks at the role that post–World War II tribunals, the ICTY and the ICRC have played in stressing the procedural elements of belligerent reprisals, emphasizing the highly formalized set of steps to be taken before the adoption of the measure while downplaying the retaliatory act itself. Then, it claims that the main thrust of this proceduralization lies in the creation of a regulatory framework that attributes a specific legal meaning to the retaliatory conduct and, by so doing, allows for an assimilation of belligerent reprisals with the notion of countermeasures. In turn, this analogy leads to the attribution to belligerent reprisals of a sanctioning character that protects the primary norm from the risk of persistent non-compliance. The outcome of these three processes is the attribution to belligerent reprisals of a chiefly coercive purpose, interested in inducing compliance with the laws of armed conflict and markedly influenced by the enforcement paradigm.

The Introduction explains the relevance of a theoretical inquiry into the purpose and function of belligerent reprisals. It highlights several examples in recent practice where the vocabulary of belligerent reprisals has been harnessed by parties to an armed conflict, pointing to the continued relevance of the institution in contemporary warfare. At the same time, it outlines persisting difficulties in the terminology, regulation and governance of reprisals, and shows that they all derive from the failure by international legal theory to give a proper legal vest to the purpose and function of the mechanism. It points to fundamental fallacies both in how the question has been approached, and in how it has been answered. It proposes an alternative to existing accounts and outlines how it will be investigated in the book.

Whilst the United States ever more frequently imposes unilateral secondary sanctions, the debate on their lawfulness has only intensified. This chapter focuses specifically on the legality of imposing access restrictions, that is, denying third state sanctions evaders access to the United States and its commercial and financial markets. Until the late 2000s, it was widely held that access restrictions were a means of enforcing US prohibitions. The issue, therefore, was whether the United States had prescriptive jurisdiction to impose such prohibitions. If not, enforcement by way of access restrictions was unlawful. More recently, this has become contested. Some now argue that access restrictions are justified on uncontroversial jurisdictional grounds because they only regulate the behaviour of US persons on US territory. Others argue that access restrictions merely amount to a lawful withdrawal of privileges. In this chapter author’s view, these arguments are not convincing. Based on the relevant US legislation, the chapter shows why access restrictions are indeed enforcement tools. Since the underlying prohibitions cannot be justified under customary international law, such enforcement is unlawful. Furthermore, the international community has consistently condemned US secondary sanctions legislation, including access restrictions, as unlawful, leading to a customary international law prohibition.

Chapter 9 explores regulatory compliance, enforcement and certification. It analyses the vital role of enforcement action and how rules aimed at influencing human and institutional behaviour are translated into social reality. It draws attention to the human interaction that takes place during encounters with regulatory enforcement officials and regulators. We discuss how ‘risk-based’ approaches to regulation can be understood and operationalised. It then touches upon the investigatory powers of public regulators, and the nature, purpose and variety of regulatory sanctions. Finally, it examines the role of ‘private’ bodies and other ‘regulatory intermediaries’ in certifying that a regulatee’s activities complies regulatory standards which purport to offer consumers, as primary beneficiaries, ‘assurance’ of the quality of the resulting outputs.

This chapter is concerned with court orders made prior to final judgment, and with enforcement of final judgments. These are matters of civil procedure. They do not deal with final determinations of rights and are not remedies in the technical sense. Rather, they protect the ability of the court to award remedies.

First, if there is a dispute over certain subject matter, it is important that the subject matter of the dispute be maintained until the court can adjudicate the dispute. This is where interlocutory remedies and pre-judgment remedies are relevant. These remedies are awarded before the court makes a final determination of the proceedings and are generally intended to maintain the status quo pending the decision. Such remedies include interlocutory injunctions, which restrain or compel a person to do a particular thing. There are other pre-judgment remedies, such as freezing orders and search orders, which prevent the defendant from removing property from the jurisdiction or from destroying evidence before proceedings can be brought. These ensure that proceedings are not nugatory.

Secondly, after final judgment has been handed down, there must be a means of ensuring that the judgment debtor does what the court has ordered; otherwise the judgment lacks ‘teeth’. Courts have coercive mechanisms which ensure that a defendant complies with an order to pay damages or an order of specific relief.

The law of civil remedies has frequently been described as a ‘capstone’ private law subject. In other words, it is the culmination of a student’s knowledge of private law, and it is intended to assist all the disparate strands from previously studied private law subjects to come together.

It is for this reason that we will take a generally ‘functional’ approach to the organisation of this book, grouping remedies from across different areas according to the broad functions they perform so that parallels and contrasts can be made.