In democracies based on elections, representation brings a novel kind of freedom to the fore, one that does not need to be associated with the citizen’s direct action or presence in the place where decisions are made, as is the case in direct democracy. It enlarges the space and meaning of politics in ways that cannot easily be reduced to electoral authorization and consent, and it invariably connects with both the lawmaking institution and the citizens’ voluntary participation, their equal right to define the political direction of their country but also claim, vindicate, and monitor their representatives. This chapter analyzes “political representation” in its actors, components and processes and compared it to other forms (as statistical sample and embodiment) and finally discusses the implications of the mixture of representation and democracy in contemporary politics.

Chapter 4 provides a definition of the visual arts through the lens of complex dynamic systems. Art is defined as (1) a temporally contingent, iterative process involving many interacting components; (2) a distributed and situated process of enactment; (3) an emergent phenomenon; (4) a unique and authentic visual embodiment of self-determined artistic meaning; (5) an embodied meaning that exploits meta-stable, critical state dynamics of values; (6) a pluriform complex dynamic; and (7) a process governed by a dynamic of presentation, re-presentation, and reference. Finally, definitions of art are presented as critical state attractors in artworld systems (all the technical concepts are explained in Chapter 3).

This chapter begins the constructive heart of the book, retrieving concepts from the Christian theological tradition to thematize the meaning of conflict as a feature of creaturely life. An initial exploration into Thomas Aquinas’s theological metaphysics of creation shows the importance of attending to the specific features of human being and action that distinguish human relation from divine relation. I then analyze three central components of human creaturehood – namely, finitude, contingency, and embodiment – and show how each gives rise to conflict as an aspect of creaturely goodness. Conflict, I argue, arises simply when embodied persons pursue their diverse desires, goods, and courses of action in a finite and contingent world shared with others. I conclude the chapter with a reflection on an instance of profoundly ordinary conflict, showing how the kinds of human relationships we tend to prize most are animated by the negotiation of conflict, as well as how personal, relational, and social maturity come by way of these negotiations.

Chapter 7 discusses the short-term timescale of artistic activity, which includes both the creation and experience of art and shows how the creation or the experience of a painting or installation is a dynamic system with typical features of complexity. The creation of a work of art is described as a process in an attractor landscape, with self-organizing attractors as emergent types of creative activity. Existing linear models of creation are compared to a complexity model. An example is given of how a very short-term activity, namely, a single brushstroke, is a complex system in itself, interacting with higher and lower timescales. The discussion of the experience of art begins with existing sequential models and shows how they can be reinterpreted as non-linear, complex, metastable processes occurring on interacting timescales.

Doppelgänger is a term drawn from the writing of Jean Paul Richter in his novel Siebenkäs. This term is examined and discussed in this chapter. It stands for the possibility of the existence of a double of a living person and therefore raises questions about the nature of the self and of mind too. The concepts of self and mind are explored and the implications for philosophy of mind are examined. The importance of attending to the empirical literature rather than using thought experiments is emphasized.

This final chapter returns to the issues that the cognitive neuroscience of autoscopy raise for the philosophy of mind. The neuroscience project is to develop a detailed understanding and explanation of the relation between the physical and mental. I appeal to the works of Paul Schilder, Antonio Damasio, and Mohed Constandi to forge a tentative way of understanding how multiple perceptual modalities such as proprioception, vision, touch, and somatic perception are integrated to form a unified sense of the self and the body.

Mental imagery can be used to simulate imminent, distant possible, or even impossible futures. Such mental simulation enables people to explore the consequences of different actions they want to perform or the consequences of being in different kinds of situations. Predictive simulation retrieves embodied knowledge but also creates new knowledge because people can compare different simulated scenarios and draw conclusions from that.

The chapter outlines key principles in Cognitive CDA, which inherits its social theory from CDA and from cognitive linguistics inherits a particular view of language and a framework for analysing language (as well as other semiotic modes). In connection with CDA, the chapter describes the dialectical relationship conceived between discourse and society. Key concepts relating to the dialogicality of discourse are also introduced, namely intertextuality and interdiscursivity. The central role of discourse in maintaining power and inequality is described with a focus on the ideological and legitimating functions of language and conceptualisation. In connection with cognitive linguistics, the chapter describes the non-autonomous nature of language, the continuity between grammar and the lexicon and the experiential grounding of language. The key concept of construal and its implications for ideology in language and conceptualisation are discussed. A framework in which construal operations are related to discursive strategies and domain-general cognitive systems and processes is set out. The chapter closes by briefly introducing the main models and methods of Cognitive CDA.

Chapter 3, ‘God on Earth’, argues that, for John, Jesus’s body is the place where one may see God. It opens with John’s association of Jesus with the tabernacle and the temple, the most comprehensive descriptions of Jesus’s flesh and body in the Gospel, and asks whether one can read Jesus’s body as the literal ‘house of God.’ Evidence for this reading comes from an overview of Israelite and Early Jewish theologies that portray a God who can be in two places at once. John evidences a corresponding understanding of God’s dual presence in his association of the flesh and body of Jesus with the tabernacle and temple and in the Farewell Discourse. The chapter concludes that God can be on earth in Jesus’s body as well as in heaven.

The introduction raises the question of how one ought to understand the challenge of God’s invisibility/visibility in the Fourth Gospel with regard to its stated purpose: ‘These things are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God.’ Scholars and theologians have often taken God’s invisibility to be ‘absolute’, in the sense that it describes an immaterial, eternal God whose deity is invisible by nature. While John claims that no one has ever seen God, it also describes God as incarnate in Jesus Christ, the one in whom the Father may be seen. The introduction shows that scholars have not yet satisfactorily defined the nature of divine invisibility in John nor reckoned with the import of this important theme for John’s purpose. It proposes that, according to John, God must become physically visible in Jesus in order for belief to obtain.

Avowing that love awakens one’s attention to the material world and to one another, Corinne provides a theory for establishing human–nonhuman connection, the energizing and curative praxis of belonging with. The heroine’s thing therapy positively associates women with materiality and, while exercising her right to connect with things, she sustains her élan vital. This chapter argues that she harnesses her feminist thing theory to teach her lover to respect the female body’s integrity and rights and to challenge his repressive politics: If Oswald could belong with materiality by sensuously responding to things, he could remedy his commitment to abstraction and his nationalistic gender proscriptions. Diagnosing Oswald’s melancholy as also emerging from his identification with “modern” (post Renaissance) art, associated with Napoleon’s tyranny and a self-absorptive grief that paralyzes creative potential, Corinne offers a remedy: companionship with classical art. Her thing theory has political ramifications, for it provides a workshop for practicing an embodied cosmopolitanism that itself ameliorates nationalism’s intolerances.

This chapter examines how the Venus de Medici entered the historical storylines of eighteenth-century models of gender, and – once plundered by Napoleon and whisked to Paris – the narrative of artistic restoration and political liberty. The statue generated complex thing–human interactions, for viewers collapsing boundaries between marble and human flesh imagined the Venus as both a withdrawn ideal yet intimately connected to them: touching her, they measured her proportions and gauged her sexual “motives” while debating whether she met British standards of female modesty. Belinda, which alludes to the Venus, also engages in these activities as characters “measure” each other; the novel, however, incorporates those travelers’ debates about the Venus’s modesty, sexuality, and virtue to emancipate female characters from calculating standards that produce negative consequences such as racism and gender stereotyping. Embedded in Belinda, the Venus obliquely restores the right for Lady Delacour to her body and to invoke nonperfection and nonconformity as a just privilege.

With animal embodiment, the project of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature comes full circle: The opening selection of text on space and time end with twin terms – place and movement – and in animal embodiment we finally get the natural phenomenon that does justice to both. The animal body is the first physical body to have three properly distinguished dimensions, and it is only in virtue of those qualitative, organic dimensions that we can abstract away a three-dimensional Euclidean space in which such bodies are taken to appear and to move. Hegel divides his discussion of the animal into discussions of its formation, assimilation, and species-process, and the chapter adopts that categorization as its structure. As a first pass, it says that form (die Gestalt) gives us the special point 0 for time and the step from the plane to an enclosing surface for space; assimilation gives us the order of time and the step from line to plane for space; and the species process (Gattungsprozeß) gives us the linearity of time and the step from point to line for space. These combinations display the animal body as the spatio-temporal object par excellence, and thus the object by reference to which all spatiality and temporality is understood.