In this article, I summarize the main takeaways from The Limitations of the Open Mind and reply to concerns raised by Miriam Schleifer McCormick and Nathan Ballantyne. In reply to McCormick, I emphasize potential difficulties involved in helping people change their minds while representing yourself as taking an “objective stance” toward them. In reply to Ballantyne, I clarify my reasons for thinking that open-mindedness is a matter of being willing to change your mind and that amateurs can in some ways and in some situations be more immune to misleading arguments than experts can.

There is growing concern about the impact of declining political trust on democracies. Psychological research has introduced the concept of epistemic (mis)trust as a stable disposition acquired through development, which may influence our sociopolitical engagement. Given trust’s prominence in current politics, we examined the relationship between epistemic trust and people’s choices of (un)trustworthy political leaders. In two representative samples in the UK and US (N = 1096), we tested whether epistemic trust predicts political leader choices through three political dimensions: dogmatism, political trust, and ideology. Although epistemic trust did not directly predict choices of political leaders, it predicted dogmatism and political ideology, which in turn predicted choices of political leaders. A network analysis revealed that epistemic trust and political dimensions only interact through their common connection with dogmatism. These findings suggest that cognitive and affective development may underlie an individual’s political ideology and associated beliefs.

According to certain views about human ontology, the way we seem is very different from the way we are. The appearances are a threat to such views. Here I take up and defuse the threat to one such view.

Pure immaterialism says that each of us is wholly immaterial. The appearances suggest otherwise. I argue that despite the fact that we might sometimes appear to be at least partly material, and that we can be perceptually justified in believing something solely on the basis of having a perceptual experience as of its being the case, none of us is ever perceptually justified in believing that we are even partly material (or that we’re not). Bottom line: we might be able to know whether we’re material, but we can’t know just by looking.

Some epistemic agents will not change their position on a claim. These are dogmatists, common creatures in our epistemic communities. This paper discusses the population-level epistemic effects of increasing numbers of dogmatists. All agents in the model are assigned a degree of belief (using a Likert-type scale) and adopt the beliefs of others in interactions. Subsets of agents are dogmatists. Analysis of model results suggests that even a modest increase in a group's dogmatists can have substantial effects on belief spread. I conclude by arguing that the model (a) helps identify two kinds of dogmatists and (b) suggests another way epistemic bubbles can form.

The so-called paradox of dogmatism has it that it seems that one is both entitled and not entitled to ignore evidence against what one knows. By knowing something, one knows it to be true, and one also knows that there can be no non-misleading evidence against what is true. But to ignore evidence against what one believes – and, surely, one believes what one knows – is to be dogmatic, something one should not be. I argue that there is no genuine paradox here. One's attitude to evidence is governed not by what one knows but by what one thinks one knows. Thinking that one knows something does not entail that it is true. Knowing this, one knows that there may be non-misleading evidence against what one thinks one knows and should be open to examining what purports to be evidence against it.

In a recent article, Mario Attie-Picker maintains that a number of experimental studies provide evidence against Sextus Empiricus's empirical claims about both the connection between belief and anxiety and the connection between suspension of judgement and undisturbedness. In this article, I argue that Sextus escapes unharmed from the challenge raised by the studies in question for the simple reason that he does not make the claims ascribed to him. In other words, I argue that Attie-Picker is attacking a straw man.

Several subjects are fully convinced that they are brains in vats whose experiences are hallucinatory. They confront a ‘skeptic’ who raises the possibility that they are not brains in vats who lack and hallucinate hands but ‘brains in skulls’ who have hands and see them. Familiar responses to skepticism are offered in support of the claim that the subjects know they do not have hands. The philosophical significance of this looking-glass approach to skepticism is also discussed. It is suggested that these familiar responses to skepticism do not achieve anything because, if we begin from the assumption that we are brains in vats, we can employ those same responses to skepticism to support the claim that we know we do not have hands. One interlocutor argues that things are not so dismal. The main conversation is framed by a discussion among night watchmen at some sort of skepticism laboratory.

This article presents two studies dealing with ageism. The objective of the first study was to adapt to French language and validate the Fraboni of Ageism Scale-Revised (FSA-R) which contains 23 items, while the objective of the second study was to test a structural model containing ageism as measured by the FSA-R and the “Big Three”: empathy, social dominance orientation, and dogmatism, controlled for by sex and age. The results of the first study (n = 323) generated a version of the FSA-R comprising 14 items, of which the psychometric properties were very satisfactory. Using structural equation modelling and bootstrap procedure, the results of the second study (n = 284) showed a direct negative and significant effect of empathy on agism. They also showed that this negative effect was mediated by dogmatism and social dominance orientation, which both exerted a positive effect on ageism.