In the classic Dubins-Savage subfair primitive casino gambling problem, the gambler can stake any amount in his possession, winning (1 − r)/r times the stake with probability w and losing the stake with probability 1 − w, 0 ≤ w ≤ r ≤ 1. The gambler seeks to maximize the probability of reaching a fixed fortune (the goal) by gambling repeatedly with suitably chosen stakes. This problem has recently been extended in a unifying framework to account for limited playing time as well as future discounting, under which bold play is known to be optimal provided that w ≤ ½ ≤ r. This paper is concerned with a further extension of the Dubins-Savage gambling problem involving time-dependent parameters, and shows that bold play not only maximizes the probability of reaching the goal, but also stochastically minimizes the number of plays needed to reach the goal. As a result, bold play also maximizes the expected utility, where the utility at the goal is only required to be monotone decreasing with respect to the number of plays needed to reach the goal. It is further noted that bold play remains optimal even when the time-dependent parameters are random.

In the classic Dubins-Savage subfair primitive casino gambling problem, the gambler can stake any amount in his possession, winning (1 - r)/r times the stake with probability w and losing the stake with probability 1 - w, 0 ≤ w ≤ r ≤ 1. The gambler seeks to maximize the probability of reaching a fixed fortune by gambling repeatedly with suitably chosen stakes. This problem has been extended in several directions to account for limited playing time or future discounting. We propose a unifying framework that covers these extensions, and prove that bold play is optimal provided that w ≤ ½ ≤ r. We also show that this condition is in fact necessary for bold play to be optimal subject to the constraint of limited playing time.

Optimal stopping rules are developed for the correlated random walk when future returns are discounted by a constant factor per unit time. The optimal rule is shown to be of dual threshold form: one threshold for stopping after an up-step, and another for stopping after a down-step. Precise expressions for the thresholds are given for both the positively and the negatively correlated cases. The optimal rule is illustrated by several numerical examples.

We consider a model that provides insight into the well-known Folk theorem in economics that when the discount factor β is sufficiently close to 1, expropriation will never occur. Although this Folk theorem is true in our model, our perspective is different. The discount factor β often is described as a “deep structural parameter” that is difficult to alter at a point in time. In contrast, we analyze the determinants of two thresholds β and β* that segment the unit interval on which β is defined into three subintervals. These subintervals correspond to the three possible equilibria for investment flows: autarky, underinvestment, and unconstrained optimal investment. These thresholds are of interest because they can be altered by specific policy interventions. As a consequence, even if β is small, some level of foreign investment can be supported. We construct measures of β for 40 countries, characterize β and β*, and discuss recent trends in investment flows.