In this article I analyze Salvador Allende’s economic program and policies. I argue that the explosion of inflation during his administration (above 1,500% on a six-month annualized measure) was predictable, and I show that the government’s response to it was political. I postulate that runaway inflation generated major disaffection among the middle class and that that unhappiness paved the way to Pinochet’s coup d’état in 1973.

I am broadly sympathetic to D. C. Matthew's analysis. However, in what follows, I restrict my remarks to a few areas where I think he either lacks empirical precision, or overstates his case.

By looking at the September 1949 devaluation dilemma faced by the governments of Pakistan and India, this article argues that it was an early episode of divergence between them following partition. The reasons why Pakistan did not devalue when India did so have remained largely obscured in the historiography. Deeply contested, the decision was a determining event through which the state staked its claim for economic sovereignty, internally and externally. It led to a 17-month-long official trade deadlock, especially in the eastern region of partitioned Bengal. It ended when the two governments established an exchange ratio for the two rupees, no longer at par with each other. This interactive delinking of currencies was symptomatic of the improvisational decoupling of the colonial subcontinent’s post-colonial states. In tracing its trajectory, this article contributes to the inconsiderable literature on why devaluation did not happen in Pakistan, revises the rationale offered, and presents the event as a contingent exercise in economic decolonization, generative of a post-colonial sovereign difference.

In December 1933, John Maynard Keyes published an open letter to President Roosevelt, where he wrote: ‘The recent gyrations of the dollar have looked to me more like a gold standard on the booze than the ideal managed currency of my dreams.’ This was a criticism of the ‘gold-buying program’ launched in October 1933. In this article I use high-frequency data on the dollar–pound and dollar–franc exchange rates to investigate whether the gyrations of the dollar were unusually high in late 1933. My results show that although volatility was pronounced, it was not higher than during some other periods after 1921. Moreover, dollar volatility began to subside towards the end of the period alluded to by Keynes.