This chapter deals with the issue of epistemology or the oftentimes implicit theories of knowledge that guide research and methodological choices. The chapter starts with a brief discussion of what it means to live in a society in which the factual basis of truth can be easily questioned – the post-truth climate. It then outlines several popular conceptions and misconceptions about epistemology and maps out some of the main epistemological positions that inspired if not research then certainly philosophical debate. The second part of the chapter argues for pragmatism as an epistemology that can help us deal with the complexities of doing empirical research in a post-truth context by transcending the old realist–relativist divide and fostering methodological pluralism.

This chapter discusses the interaction between QAnon and the media. As the group turned from fringe to mainstream, it swamped social media. Eventually, social media companies had to take measures to stop the spread of disinformation associated with QAnon. Groups such as QAnon might use media to manipulate news frames and set agendas, which propels conspiracy-laden topics to mainstream media sources, and creates a platform for spreading disinformation. This chapter also examines how social media use relates to belief in conspiracy theories, and the potential consequences of exposure to conspiracy theories on social media platforms. This relationship between conspiracies, media, and disinformation is explored and applied to QAnon. A brief discussion of how QAnon is similar or different from other groups in their use of social media is offered, along with some research questions for future study about the QAnon movement.

QAnon attracted considerable attention from politicians and the press during 2020. Headlines claimed that the group had exploded across social media platforms and was becoming mainstream; these claims were supported by instances of violence and studies of online activity. However, public opinion polls tell a different story. We examine polling data from 2018–2021 to understand the size and scope of QAnon support. Only 5–8 percent of the American public supports QAnon, making it one of the least supported conspiracy theories typically polled on. Moreover, support for the QAnon movement has remained stable over time, with no indication of becoming “mainstream.” We also find that QAnon support is less the product of left-right orientations, as often argued, than anti-establishment sentiments and anti-social personality traits. We argue that politicians strategically trafficked in QAnon rhetoric to expand their support, simultaneously activating a once irrelevant dimension of public opinion.

In the concluding chapter, Power Must Change Hands: COVID 19, Power, and the Imperative of Knowledge, I note that the COVID 19 pandemic broke while this book was being completed and, therefore, I offer my reflection on the pandemic and Pentecostal power. In my description of how the Pentecostal establishment responded to the pandemic, I argued that what that apocalyptic event revealed was that the forms of power which they have invested in and acquired over the years did not anticipate the world-changing event of COVID-19. As a result, foremost figures showed they had no immediate answer for the situation other than to resort to conspiracy theories and myths of their embattlement that did not quite stand up to the demands of the historical event.

Chapter 7 analyzes misinformation and conspiracy theories as contemporary examples of fake news. These include the “death panels” controversy, the Obama “birther” conspiracy, Pizzagate, QAnon, and Covid-19–related myths and conspiracies. Not all conspiracy theories originate from the American right, although this chapter documents how the highest profile ones are embraced by right-wing media and the Republican Party. These conspiracies rise to prominence after being indulged by Republican officials, right-wing media outlets, and in social media. Social media increasingly serve as prime disseminators of reactionary conspiracies. I also examine how traditional “agenda setting” news media have held the line against these conspiracies, with consumption of these venues associated with increased rejection of the conspiracies. In contrast, social media consumption – in general and particularly for Republican Americans – is regularly associated with embrace of conspiracies. This rising culture of conspiratorialism has reached crisis levels with movements like QAnon, and with the Covid-19 pandemic and the failure of millions of Americans to take the crisis seriously or think about it in factual ways. In an era when traditional media gatekeepers are being pushed aside in favor of social media venues, people curate their own information and construct echo chambers, allowing conspiracy theories free reign.

The introduction provides an overarching discussion of the main contributions of the book. It reviews the main argument of the book, that the meaning of social construction theory varies dramatically depending on the sociopolitical context within which one engages, as related to partisanship, media consumption, socialization, and other factors. The book consists of two parts, the first exploring what fake news means to different groups of Americans, as related to Donald Trump’s rhetoric, media coverage and discourses on fake news, and public opinion of fake news. The second part of the book includes case studies of how fake news is discussed and understood in various contexts, related to US foreign policy, climate change, and conspiracy theories.

Chapter 1 reviews the meaning of fake news, post-truth, propaganda, disinformation, and misinformation. It engages with theoretical questions related to social construction theory and propaganda. The chapter situates the book within a larger sociohistorical framework recognizing the history of American war propaganda pertaining to US official rhetoric, the news media, and public opinion, and how propaganda has been used to manipulate the public into supporting US foreign conflicts. It also examines the conditions under which people question war propaganda. The chapter reviews scholarly works covering post-truth, fake news, disinformation, and misinformation. It also discusses the rise of “new media” – particularly social media and the impact they have on rising public misinformation in American politics. A review of competing works discusses the potential of social media to empower and disempower the public. Social media are used to connect people to politics and each other and to help organize social movements. But they have also fueled a political culture of paranoia, conspiracies, and anti-intellectualism, which are perpetuated by rising disinformation embraced by both political parties – but primarily on the American right.

Standard approaches to transparency emphasise transparency in data: the principle that data about government activity should be accessible and accurate. This chapter draws on in-depth fieldwork in southwest Nigeria to show how standard data-focused efforts are insufficient to meet popular demands for a government that is knowable and visible. Transparency in data is only one conception of the core concept of transparency. Transparency in things involves demonstrating transparency through the delivery of tangible, concrete outputs, whereas transparency in people demands that the social networks, relations and obligations in which their leaders are embedded should be made legible. Political competition in twenty-first century southwest Nigeria exemplifies the tensions between these rival conceptions of transparency. Whilst the technocratic reforms of the ‘Lagos model’ meant that more government data were in the public domain, there was widespread popular suspicion that official documents may be hiding as much as they reveal. Two examples from Oyo State in the 2010s show how sensitivity to these alternative conceptions of transparency helps explain otherwise counter-intuitive popular responses to government efforts at ‘good governance’. A final section explores the possible consequences of failing to attend to transparency in people, drawing on examples of populist politics in Nigeria and elsewhere.

This chapter turns to the dynamics of democratic discontent when it seizes power, focusing on Trump but referencing other cases where relevant. It analyzes the influence of Trumpism on the left and finds a mirror image to the dynamics in Spain, where the rise of left-wing populism provoked a populist backlash among the radical right. In the United States, extreme disgust with Trump’s agenda drove many further to the left, increasing leftist Democratic discontent. The second section analyzes the final months of the Trump presidency, as its response to the Covid-19 crisis faltered and Trumpism degenerated into an arcane morass of conspiracy theories. Using experiments and observational data from the PSAS, the chapter argues that pro-Trump conspiracy theories served as a coping mechanism for his followers. As the Covid-19 crisis ravaged both the lives and livelihoods of America, and as it became increasingly clear that Trump would not be reelected, the anxiety his followers felt, regarding a situation that their loyalty to the populist prevented them from accepting, became intolerable. Conspiracy theories allowed the followers to escape anxiety and embrace resentment by giving them targets for their rage.

The Introduction lays out the book. It introduces the concept of democratic discontent, explaining how it differs from milder forms of political displeasure and how it can manifest in different forms like populism, ethnonationalism, conspiracism, and antipathy to democratic regimes. It then briefly describes the conflict between economic and cultural approaches to discontent, showing that both make valid findings, yet neither hypothesis is totally consistent with existing research. To overcome this impasse, the chapter introduces the affective political economy theory of economics, emotions, and culture, where emotions induced by economic troubles prime large groups of citizens to embrace culturally discontented narratives; cultural discontent then produces various forms of discontent, based on local conditions. Finally, it lays out the book’s empirical approach, discussing the use of mixed methods to test the theory, including experiments, observational surveys, and qualitative analysis and comparison of cases; this section also justifies the case selections. This section advises different kinds of readers about which sections they might find most interesting and which might be less relevant, especially regarding statistically dense sections of the book.

This chapter serves two primary purposes. First, it establishes the book’s conceptual schema of political discontent. It identifies three ways in which discontent can manifest: against regime institutions (low regime support/regime antipathy), against the political elite (anti-elitism and populism), or even against reality (conspiracism). This section addresses conceptual debates in the study of each type of discontent, selecting or developing definitions according to set criteria. It also discusses the two primary ways discontent can influence behavior: through support for political outsiders and through contentious politics. Second, the chapter summarizes existing approaches to the study of discontent. It discusses shared elements of the global political order, especially neoliberal capitalism, liberal democracy, and more recently multiculturalism. Political discontent varies in form from case to case but is generally shaped by a rejection of one or more elements of this order. Reviewing the scholarship on each subtype of discontent, the chapter finds a recurring debate between economic and cultural origins. Neither approach can fully explain discontent, but neither can be ignored or disproven. As a result, the chapter concludes that a comprehensive theory must synthesize these two approaches.

This chapter describes and justifies the book’s theoretical framework, which proposes that economics influences democratic discontent by fomenting cultural discontent, with emotions connecting economics and culture. After briefly discussing the economic consequences of the Great Recession and the collapse of the commodities boom, it explains the affective intelligence theory (AIT) of emotions. AIT conceptualizes emotions as continuously operating surveillance systems, producing specific motivational and cognitive patterns that are not tied to the situation that aroused them. Given this, the chapter proposes that economic turmoil generates resentment and anxiety, which primes large groups of citizens to become aggressive, hostile toward outgroups, and hyperattentive to threatening information. Individuals so influenced gravitate toward social narratives that emphasize group conflict and prejudice against opposing social groups, thus fomenting cultural discontent. This, in turn, produces democratic discontent. The chapter concludes by discussing various contextual factors that may inhibit or intensify this theoretical process or prevent discontent from manifesting in certain ways.