The Ontario Review Board (ORB) makes and reviews dispositions that limit the freedoms of individuals found not criminally responsible (NCR) due to a “mental disorder.” Their dispositions must be responsive to the risk NCR individuals pose to the public. To assess how risk is measured, the authors studied twenty-six publicly accessible court files pertaining to the appeal of ORB dispositions. The authors studied hospital reports, the ORB’s dispositions, and transcripts of ORB hearings found in the court files. In this paper, the authors draw on institutional ethnography and critical legal theories of jurisdiction to analyze how certain citational practices—namely citation of closely related statutes and the ORB’s procedures—participate in structuring the ORB’s analysis of risk. The authors argue that risk becomes legible to participants in the NCR process through the intertextual mediation of these citations, which legitimize and naturalize the NCR individuals’ dependence on forensic institutions.

Over the last decade, there has been a spate of incidents in Canada and the United States involving Saudi Arabian nationals who, while out on bail for predominantly sexual crimes, were able to abscond from the countries despite having surrendered their passports. Investigation has revealed evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the government of Saudi Arabia has, in fact, assisted its nationals to escape on these occasions. This article makes the case that this kind of conduct amounts not just to unfriendly acts but also to infringements upon the territorial sovereignty of both states and serious breaches of the international law of jurisdiction. It surveys the possible remedies available to both injured states and, in light of the fact that neither state has sought any such remedy, examines possible remedial routes for the victims of the Saudi nationals’ crimes. It remarks upon the utter failure of either Canada or the United States to address these acts, concluding that such wilful neglect both corrodes sovereignty and undermines the will to address sexual crimes.

The grip of austerity in European politics since 2008 presents a double puzzle: electorally weak center-left parties offering no definite alternative, and the surprisingly efficient pursuit of “fiscal consolidation”. To understand this double puzzle this article investigates the institutional bases of alternative economic thinking during the 1930s versus the post-2008 crisis years. Noting the recent prominence of a new social type, the European economist-technocrat (eet), I highlight the historically specific order to which the eet is indigenous: rarefied, international professional circuits that tend to work over, not through, party politics. This contrasts sharply with the nationally-based, party-connected economists who developed new economic orthodoxies between the 1930s and 1960s, including Keynes himself. Approaching the study of economic culture in the public sphere in a Polanyian moral markets framework, I argue that the linkages between European economics and financial technocracies help to explain Europe’s double puzzle. Theoretically, I argue that a focus on expertise and parties, and not just states, is central to our understanding of economic culture in the public sphere.

The psychology of aging includes a variety of theoretical perspectives, methodological conventions, and techniques and targets of application. Psychological aging-related processes include phenomena from such disparate domains as neurological, sensory, physiological, physical health, mental health, cognition, personality and affect, social, family, interactional, and coping and adjustment. Canadian researchers actively contribute to these and other research topics and professional issues. We summarize a broad and inclusive model of the psychology of aging and highlight some of the ways in which Canadian research and training reflects and advances numerous pertinent scholarly agendas.

Les concepts de compétence, d'autonomie et d'authenticité sont examinés. Diverses définitions du terme « autonomie » sont distinguées, et les auteurs prétendent que deux d'entre elles n'englobent aucun concept différent de la compétence mentale (la capacité de prendre des décisions) et de l'authenticité. L'accent est mis sur la distinction des questions de capacité et de compétence, et sur des cas où une intervention salutaire est justifiée.

The objective of this study was to attempt to develop an index of assessment items important to most, if not all, mental capacity determinations. A group process, judgmental method was used. Three separate panels of multidisciplinary experts were assembled to define relevant assessment items and to assign importance weights to the items. All three panels generated a list of assessment items, but panelists refused to assign importance weights. Four items were identified by all three panels, six were identified by two panels, and three were identified by one panel only. A composite list of mental capacity assessment items was generated, but the study failed to generate a standardized assessment instrument.

Using a case scenario involving a marginally competent elderly woman living alone at risk, we assessed the care decisions made by older adults (n = 82) and health care professionals (HCPs, n = 87), and identified differences in the values underlying the care decisions. Overall, participants did not place a high value on independence when they appraised the risk to the client as high and safety as low. Under these conditions, elderly respondents tended to be more paternalistic in their decisions about care, while HCPs tended to be more beneficent. If the values of HCPs differ from those of elderly people, how likely is it that the care provided to marginally competent elderly people will be congruent with their wishes? The care provided by HCPs might be improved by incorporating knowledge of the values and perspectives of other older adults.

Only competent persons can give informed consent to health care. Current approaches define competence in essentially cognitive terms, thereby ignoring the fact that someone may be cognitively competent yet lack the capacity to give a valid consent. I outline a more robust theory of competence that includes not only cognitive but also emotional and valuational parameters. I then distinguish competence from capacity, and indicate the role this distinction can usefully play in the extended and continuing care setting. I also show how this distinction is consistent with several recent Canadian legal decisions, and outline its usefulness in interpreting and applying relevant provincial statutes.