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1 results

1 - What do animals think?
- By Dale Jamieson, New York University
Edited by Robert W. Lurz, Brooklyn College, City University of New York
Book:

The Philosophy of Animal Minds

Published online:

05 June 2012

Print publication:

03 September 2009, pp 15-34
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Summary

The chapter explores how we should think about specifying exactly what it is that a particular animal thinks on a particular occasion. It identifies a tension in our thinking about animal minds and reviews some ways of trying to resolve it. The fundamental problem we face is that most people are committed to the following pair of propositions: many animals think; exactly what animals think on particular occasions cannot reliably be characterized. The chapter discusses four families of responses to the problem: eliminativism, wet eliminativism, brute content view, and interpretivism. If we are tempted by interpretivism, then perhaps we should rethink, not just the problem with which we began, but the very way in which we have come to portray the mind in philosophical discourse. The idea of content is a metaphor that infuses the way in which philosophers think about mind and language.