In Chapter 7, the authors home in on the policy implications and avenues for future research, which build upon the empirical and theoretical findings that are explicated in Chapters 3–6. The discussion herein revolves around the following questions: What do the empirical operational code results mean for the day-to-day conduct of the politics of the MENA region? How do these at-a-distance leadership analysis findings and inferences help us to make sense of MENA’s international relations today? How does the actor-specific analysis in this book cue regional and international policymakers on understanding and engaging with certain political leaders in the MENA region? This chapter addresses these questions through utilizing a case study approach. These four salient cases are: 1) Iran’s nuclear program and the diplomatic crisis with the United States (2010–2022); 2) the Egyptian crisis in the wake of the Arab uprisings (2011–2014); 3) the Syrian civil war (2011–2022); and 4) the rise and fall of the Islamic State and its top leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in Iraq and Syria (2013–2019). This chapter briefly introduces these cases and discusses how individual-level leadership analyses can be used to make sense of these crises.

This chapter examines the causes, prosecution, outcomes, and consequences of civil wars. It defines the concept of civil war, distinguishes between nationalist and secessionist civil wars, and presents several factors thought to drive civil war onset, including grievance, relative deprivation, identity, lootable resources, and state capacity. It then examines factors that might affect the likelihood of ending civil wars once started, including whether the issues under dispute are seen to be indivisible and the severity of commitment problems. It describes the consequences when rebel groups fighting a civil war are fragmented, and relatedly when there are several actors fighting in a civil war. The chapter then lays out possible solutions for ending civil wars and creating lasting peace, including third-party guarantors, power-sharing, and creating integrated police and security forces. It then discusses some of the devastating human consequences of civil wars The chapter applies many of the concepts in the chapter to a quantitative study on whether peacekeepers help prevent civil wars from recurring, and a case study of the Syrian Civil War.

This chapter explores the relationships between environmental stresses, natural resource shortages, and violent conflict. It describes ideas such as tragedy of the commons, carrying capacity, and common pool resources, as well as Malthusian theories. It also explains how environmental stresses can affect various kinds of conflict, through dynamics such as states sharing transboundary water resources clashing over maritime assets such as fishing and petrochemical reserves; resource shortages fueling conflicts over distribution among substate populations; and shortages causing internal migration, in turn fueling "sons of the soil" conflicts. It also describes how state capacity, rural economies, and groupness can affect the connection between environmental stresses and conflict. The chapter discusses how conflict can in turn exacerbate environmental stresses, and pays special attention to the consequences of climate change for conflict. The chapter applies many of these concepts to a quantitative study on the relationship between drought and conflict, and a case study on the role of drought in causing the Syrian Civil War.

This chapter offers context to the primary case study of this book – the Syrian civil war. It does this by elaborating more fully on two broader topics – on the one hand, a historical overview of the Syrian regime and the onset of the revolution; and on the other hand, a summary of the major ceasefires used during the civil war. These two subjects are of course inexorably interconnected. By providing an overview of some of the important aspects of Syria’s recent political and social history, we gain a better understanding and appreciation of two themes of relevance for this book: firstly, the nature of the Syrian state, in particular the structure and essence of the Assad regime; and secondly, the ramifications of this for how ceasefires have played out during the Syrian civil war.

The highly centralized character of governance in Syria obscures the state’s long history of experimentation with decentralization. This chapter traces the origins of administrative decentralization and the state of governance in Syria, covering the situation prior to the uprising of 2011, and continuing through 2017, a period of fragmentation of authority between the Bashar al-Assad government, the Arab opposition, and Kurdish parties. The chapter describes how each of these three systems reviewed have adapted and responded to the others, creating a set of complex dynamics that will likely continue to echo into Syria’s political future. Even as opposition areas face collapse, and the future of Kurdish Rojava is increasingly uncertain, local governance modalities developed in these areas continue to operate even in regions retaken by the government. The continued experimentation and local decision-making taking place within these local bodies may well have implications for Syria, and the broader Middle East, for decades to come.

Part I is about the social origins of people who became fixers in 2010s Turkey and Syria. Some were refugees from Syria’s civil war or journalists ousted from Turkey’s domestic press as the Turkish state successively captured opposition outlets; these prospective fixers turned to work with the international media for the promise of stability. Others came from non-journalism backgrounds but, inspired by developments such as Turkey’s “Kurdish Opening” or the 2013 Gezi Park protest movement, found in fixing the opportunity to pursue adventurous and idealistic aspirations. Fixers of different backgrounds help foreign reporters in different ways: some provide insider access to local events and people, while others help their clients to make sense of phenomena from an outsider perspective.

This chapter takes up the “forever war” theme by returning to Iraq just prior to Obama’s troop pullout and to Afghanistan where he inherited a failing war. Coming into the White House, Obama fulfilled his campaign pledge to end Bush’s “dumb war” in Iraq but left the country vulnerable. The violence in the Syrian civil war attracted al Qaeda militants from Iraq. They formed the nucleus of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the most fearsome terrorist network in the world. ISIS seized land in Syria, invaded Iraq, and announced a caliphate. Obama answered Iraq’s pleas for help. US and allied airpower, along with SOF, turned the tide of battle. The Pentagon again used local allies; this time mostly Kurds who formed the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces. The SDF fought ISSI and the Damascus regime to carve out an enclave in Syria. Meanwhile in Afghanistan, Obama endorsed the Pentagon’s surge of troops to nearly 100,000 so as to exit the war as in Iraq. He changed course and stopped U.S. participation in combat roles in 2014. He decreased troops to around 8,000 before leaving office. At first Trump upped the troops and gave his generals greater freedom to act. Then, he, too, scaled them down to 2,500 in Afghanistan and Iraq, while negotiating with the Taliban to leave totally by May 1, 2021.

A definitional modification has had the effect of greatly magnifying the perceived importance and frequency of terrorism. The United States failed in its military interventions in Libya and in the Syrian civil war, both of which replaced coherent if unpleasant regimes with chaos and murderous disorder. There was, however, a successful campaign against Islamic State, or ISIS, or ISIL, an especially vicious, ultimately self-destructive, insurgent group that had a genius for making enemies and owed its initial successes in 2014 primarily to the often-monumental incompetence of the US-trained Iraqi army. However, as with al-Qaeda after 9/11, ISIS scarcely presented a challenge to global security, inspired near-total hostility in the area, and was soon pushed back. In defense and in decline, ISIS relied primarily not on counteroffensives, but on planting booby traps, using snipers, and cowering among civilians, and the costs for defeating it might have been lower if the methods to do so had been more measured. The strategy against ISIS worked because of a couple of features not likely to be found in many other conflicts: local forces were prepared to do the fighting and dying, and ISIS inspired existential angst in the US public.

The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria raised the prospect of a Turkish-led regional order, backed by Qatari economic power, and based upon the regional ideological co-dependencies of the AKP. At the same time, the renewed potential for a grand bargain between the United States and Iran held out the possibility that empowered Iranian reformists might substitute integration into Western economic and security frameworks for the Axis of Resistance. This chapter first examines the ways in which Turkey and Qatar sought to consolidate a new regional order based on alignment with Western-friendly Islamist governments. It then elaborates upon the counterrevolutionary forces within the region, emanating from both pro-Western and Axis of Resistance actors, that militated against the realisation of a new regional order. The final section of the chapter sketches the main features of a restored regional order based on authoritarian resurgence and sectarianised antagonisms across all pivotal powers in the region.

This chapter explores the foreign policy discourse of the old Anglosphere coalition during the fourth phase of the crisis and civil war in Syria, following the military intervention of Russia, in support of Assad. First, the chapter considers the Anglosphere response to the Russian intervention. Second, it analyses how the intervention influenced the discursive war of position in the Anglosphere. Third, it explores the impact of Donald Trump’s election in the United States, including his administration’s relationship with Russia, the unexpected decision to bomb Assad’s forces and the new discursive opportunities his presidency afforded.

This chapter explores the foreign policy discourse of the old Anglosphere coalition during the second phase of the crisis and civil war in Syria. First, the chapter analyses Obama’s warning of a ‘red line’ over chemical weapons use. Second, it explores the route out of the rhetorical entrapment enacted by this phrase. Third, it maps out the discursive debates on war and peace that divided the international community and ran through the Anglosphere in 2012 and 2013. The analysis of this second phase establishes the context in which Islamic State would shoot to prominence at the start of 2014, altering the nature of the crisis and civil war, as well as the language and calculations of Anglosphere states.

This chapter explores the foreign policy discourse of the old Anglosphere coalition during the first phase of the crisis and civil war in Syria, from early 2011 to mid 2012. First, the chapter considers the Anglosphere response to the Arab Uprisings, as protests spread to Syria. Second, it analyses the evolution of Anglosphere foreign policy discourse, as Assad’s crackdowns intensified. Third, it analyses calls for regime change and support for regional allies, amidst a policy of not intervening militarily. In all three cases, the USA is shown to lead, within a nevertheless intimately interconnected old Anglosphere coalition. This analysis sets the ground for shifting Anglosphere foreign policy from August 2012, as chemical weapons concerns rapidly overtook a policy of democracy promotion at a distance.

The conclusion revisits the book’s three principal themes: language, the Anglosphere and Syria. First, it maps out the significant theoretical implications for understanding the way in which language, discourse and policy intertwine across the transnational political space of the Anglosphere. Second, it notes that military intervention in Syria has once again served to reinforce the ties that bind together the old Anglosphere coalition. Third, it reflects on the scale of the crisis in Syria, as well as the prospects for the country and its people going forward.

This chapter explores the foreign policy discourse of the old Anglosphere coalition during the third phase of the crisis and civil war in Syria. First, the chapter considers the Anglosphere response to the rise of Islamic State, as the Anbar Campaign saw the group seize territory in northern Iraq. Second, it analyses the re-working of discourses of the War on Terror to articulate and frame the new threat for Anglosphere audiences. Third, it explores the discursive war of position that structured foreign policy debates in the USA, UK and Australia. The chapter explores how, despite some resistance, the Anglosphere rallied against the new threat in contrast to the Syrian Civil War’s first two phases.

The Introduction asks three questions: (i) Why study Syria? (ii) Why focus on the foreign policies of the USA, UK and Australia? And, (iii) Why analyse language? First, the case is made for the study of Syria as the principal crisis on the planet today. Second, the case is made for the study of three of the world’s leading interventionist states, intimately connected through a sense of shared values, culture and identity, which propels them into repeated patterns of coalition warfare. Third, the case is made that policy responses and possibilities are contingent upon their discursive architectural foundations. Finally, the Introduction maps out the structure and arguments of the book.

This chapter traces the development of the crisis and civil war in Syria through the identification of four distinct but overlapping phases, which structure and set the context for the analysis in the book’s second half. The focus here is on domestic developments within Syria, rather than Anglosphere foreign policy. First, the origins of the crisis are mapped out, beginning with the regional Arab Uprisings in the spring of 2011. During this phase of the conflict, the crisis in Syria developed as a battle for human rights and democratic reform. Second, the chapter traces the war’s next phase, which was dominated by concerns about – and the use of – chemical weapons, following Obama’s 2012 pronouncement of a red line and the subsequent attack in Ghouta in 2013. Third, the chapter charts the rise of Islamic State in 2014. In this period, Syria became the epicentre of a new War on Terror. Fourth, from late summer 2015, the chapter traces the emergence of Syria as an explicit site of Great Power proxy warfare, following the intervention of Russia on behalf of Assad.