Utilizing the theoretical framework of transnational legal orders (TLOs), this chapter treats two master questions in global governance: What are the limits to the power of the UN Security Council? Can rule-of-law (ROL) norms constrain UNSC powers? First, we outline a research design with emphasis on its documentary and unique internal empirical sources. Second, we sketch an interpretive narrative of UNSC engagement from the early 1990s to the present with ROL in three areas of UNSC action: peacekeeping, sanctions, and force. Third, we offer a new conceptual approach by proposing that ROL in the UNSC manifests itself in three dimensions: discourse, procedure (or rules), and structures. These dimensions come into play both internally, within the UNSC itself, and externally, in ROL institution-building in and between states, as well as in post-conflict zones, with a rather gray area between (e.g., when the UN peacekeeping missions are themselves subject to ROL oversight for the behavior of their personnel). Fourth, we examine the emergence of micro-TLOs under construction within the UNSC itself. We conclude with reflections on the potential for empowering elected members of the UNSC and weaker states in the UN to press ROL norms on the UNSC as a springboard for ROL global governance via the UNSC.

This chapter explores how the Indian state asserts its digital sovereignty through digital public goods, including the Unified Payment Interface (UPI), which is overseen by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), an entity governed by the Reserve Bank of India. This chapter demonstrates how, as part of the “India Stack,” indigenous digital payment design, architecture, and governance mechanisms allow for accessible, secure, and interoperable transactions in a mobile-first, open API-based payment network. This significantly reduces India’s dependence on foreign financial systems and protects it from shocks that could result from foreign sanctions (e.g., US economic sanctions of Russia in 2014 impacting MasterCard and Visa users in Russia). However, such a system is not without potential drawbacks, some of which include the dominance of foreign entities (e.g., Google Pay) on UPI as well as state-sanctioned monopolies that may minimize civil society participation and market competition. Besides interoperability and risk mitigation, the authors also advocate a multi-stakeholder governance model for the national digital payment system to bolster public ownership and institutional checks and balances.

This chapter delves into the question of the impact of extraterritorial and secondary sanctions on private contractual relations. It opens with a discussion of the characterisation of extraterritorial and secondary sanctions as potential legal or factual impediments to the performance of contractual obligations. A detailed analysis of the case law follows, bringing to the fore some degree of reluctance on the part of judicial authorities to allow operators to suspend the performance of their contractual obligations or to terminate contractual relations on account of their exposure to extraterritorial or secondary sanctions, at least in the absence of sanctions or force majeure contractual clauses. The chapter also explores the potential tension between such sanctions, on the one hand, and measures – commonly referred to as blocking statutes – enacted by states or by the EU to thwart their effects, on the other hand. A discussion, in this respect, of the relevant case law reveals a quest for a balance between policy objectives and economic soundness and shows the existence of incongruent views on the compatibility of sanctions clauses with blocking statutes.

Sanctions are intrinsically complex. Implementation of sanctions regulations often entails navigating an extremely dynamic environment consisting of numerous restrictions and prohibitions, difficulties in interpretation, inconsistent measures adopted by imposing jurisdictions and countermeasures. This has been evident following the sanctions against Russia, often described as unprecedented in scale. The more frequent resort to sanctions further means that an increasing number of international contractual relationships are affected. Financial institutions operating globally are particularly impacted. This is exacerbated by the use of secondary sanctions which remain a controversial foreign policy tool and even subject to countermeasures, for example, blocking statutes. Consequently, financial institutions and other economic operators with an international presence, torn between two conflicting regimes, face an unsolvable legal dilemma. This uncertainty extends to the termination of contracts involving persons or activities subject to secondary sanctions. Although in most cases international (financial) contracts contain sanctions clauses (often under force majeure provisions), it remains unclear whether these can be relied on, especially where the institution’s own jurisdiction opposes secondary sanctions. This chapter presents in more detail what are the practical challenges in sanctions implementation. It focuses on financial institutions and provide recommendations on how such challenges could be addressed.

Chapter 10 provides an overview of the role and functions of private enforcement within regulatory regimes and the availability of redress. It draws attention to different ‘models of legal responsibility’ upon which regulatory regimes rely in allocating and distributing legal rights and duties between those who are subject to regulation and those whom regulation is intended to protect (‘regulatory beneficiaries’). This chapter is the most legally focused chapter in the volume, selectively highlighting several features of the institutional and enforcement context in which regulation occurs. Examples are private litigation, collective redress mechanisms, the role of courts as authoritative and final interpreters of the law and ‘alternative’ avenues for redress.

This chapter addresses the weaknesses of tax penalties in current law as deterrents of high-end tax noncompliance and describes how Congress could introduce tax penalties that vary depending upon taxpayers’ means. The chapter begins with a discussion of the possible motivations for individual tax compliance, including potential adverse consequences of noncompliance and, specifically, civil tax penalties. It then considers why current civil tax penalties often fail to deter high-end tax noncompliance. Finally, the chapter presents means-adjusted tax penalties as a new approach to the design of civil tax penalties, illustrates this approach with several examples, and addresses additional concerns.

Modern capitalism and globalisation rely on the free movement of capital across borders. Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is unusual in applying not just to movement between Member States, but also to capital movements between Member States and third countries. It makes all measures which deter foreign investment unlawful, unless they can be shown to serve a public interest aim and be proportionate. Those principles have been applied to rules on land ownership, taxation and also to golden shares: a mechanism by which governments retain an influence over privatised strategic industries. That influence, because it serves the public interest and not profit, is considered by the Court of Justice likely to deter investors. The implicit view that any constraints on companies which hinder their profit-making are prima facie contrary to Article 63 is controversial. On the other hand, the Treaty also recognises the need for many restrictions on free movement of capital, to protect the cohesion of tax systems, or as part of sanctions or measures against money laundering.

Chapter 3 establishes the nexus between South African policies on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and their defiance thereof, and the continued parallel development of nuclear weapons. Drawing on recently declassified documents, I trace the national position of the South African government on NPT accession and the application of IAEA safeguards over the 1980s. Most importantly, the focus lies on domestic decision-making and how a small number of people in the South African government decided whether to sign the NPT. This also includes a careful analysis of Pretoria’s relations with the US government under President Ronald Reagan and related exchanges with the IAEA Secretariat under its Director-General Hans Blix, developing in parallel over the period from 1981 to 1988.

With a focus on the African Union, this chapter examines the Security Council’s practices when interacting with regional organisations in collaborative peace operations. The Security Council plays a critical role in two ways: (i) it identifies security threats and the required responses, and it authorises UN missions to deal with them; and (ii) it determines the role, if any, to be played by regional organisations and authorises the action they can take to address threats to peace in their regions. Africa is both the site of conflicts that have necessitated UN peace operations or the Council’s authorisation of enforcement actions, as in Libya in 2011, and home to that regional organisation which has engaged the most with the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. The overarching argument of this chapter is that – notwithstanding changes in the post-Cold-War international political landscape and the rise of other voices from the periphery – the status of the Security Council as custodian of the collective security system remains undiminished. Its centrality and primacy have not been challenged or usurped by the African Union or other regional organisations.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is essential for nuclear disarmament and world peace. This chapter compares three dispute-settling mechanisms in the NPT legal complex using the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) as an example: political measures, non-compliance mechanisms (NCMs), and international courts and tribunals (ICTs). It evaluates the value of each mechanism to ensure Iran’s compliance with its commitments. The discussion includes NCMs like the JCPOA and the UN Security Council regimes and ICT proceedings like ICJ (International Court of Justice) and CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union). Fact-finding processes at the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) are also emphasized. Finally, the relevance of these models for climate change, environmental protection, and creating a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone is discussed.

This chapter describes the first week of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the immediate sanctions and export control measures that followed. While focusing on the U.S. response, it describes key steps taken by the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Australia, and others. The chapter links developments in the ground war to the key economic responses by the forces aligned against Russia. As the extent of the Russian invasion became clear, sanctions were announced and subsequently ratcheted up extremely rapidly. The chapter also highlights the extraordinarily coordinated nature of the sanctions response.

This chapter discusses restrictions on the import of Russian oil and natural gas into the U.S. and Europe. The chapter also situates this discussion in the context of European dependence on Russian energy supplies and resulting difficulties in enacting energy-related sanctions and trade restrictions. It discusses how a price cap was implemented in order to make energy-related sanctions placed on Russia more effective. Finally, it considers how policymakers are attempting to balance current energy needs with longer-term goals like reducing dependence on Russian energy supplies and building towards a more sustainable future.

This chapter explores the extraterritorial application of the U.S. sanctions: namely, the ability of those sanctions regulations to reach non-U.S. actors or activities taking place outside of the United States. The chapter examines a recent trend towards increasing extraterritorial enforcement by the U.S. sanctions authority. In particular, the chapter discusses the objections of China to such extraterritorial application of U.S. sanctions laws. Of particular focus are Russia’s and China’s attempts to de-dollarize and resort to alternative financial networks to lessen the impact of these sanctions.

By the end of 2022, the sanctions were voluminous. But the economic and other measures deployed against Russia were not as comprehensive as other sanctions regimes had been. Technically, the sanctions remained targeted. There was no comprehensive trade embargo, for example, against Russia by the United States or the European Union. Regulated parties, however, tended toward overcompliance; companies also ceased to do business with Russia for reputational reasons. These trends meant that the implementation of targeted sanctions often resembled comprehensive ones in practice. But the Russia sanctions were not so sweeping as those imposed upon Cuba, Iran, North Korea, or Syria, for instance.

This chapter considers the impact of the sanctions in the short-term: both the economic impact on the Russian state and the Russian people, as well as sanctions’ failure to prevent further military action by Russia in Ukraine. Unintended knock-on or ripple effects of the sanctions are also discussed, as are the effects of the sanctions on world trading patterns and the economic health of other nations. The chapter also considers the potential long-term effects of sanctions on the Russian economy.

This chapter provides an in-depth look at how the sanctions regulations have affected finance and currency flows around the world. It examines SWIFT, the inter-bank worldwide messaging system, and how certain Russian banks were eventually banned from the platform. The chapter discusses correspondent banking, in which banks hold accounts for each other, and payment systems, which serve a variety of functions including facilitating the conversion of currencies. It examines how the sanctions disrupted the ability of Russian banks to carry out business using these tools.