Risk aversion—the preference for certainty over potential gains or losses—is reduced when using a foreign language. We investigated 2 mechanisms for this foreign language effect using incentivized gambles with verbal probability expressions: (1) that people perceive prospects of winning as larger when a decision is made in their foreign language; (2) that people experience reduced negative affect toward risk in a foreign language. In Experiment 1, N = 229 proficient Polish–English bilinguals, using ungridded slider, assigned numerical values to 29 verbal probability expressions in both languages. We found small bidirectional differences in 13 of them, leading us to reject the first mechanism. In Experiment 2, N = 281 participants gambled in incentivized neutral expected value lotteries using a sample of the verbal probability expressions from Experiment 1. Participants gambled in either their native or foreign language, where participants could either accept around 50% of gambles (debiased to risk-neutral) or more than 50% (biased to risk-seeking). Surprisingly, we observed no significant risk aversion in either language condition, with participants’ gambling behavior close to 50% in both cases. The finding that participants showed no risk aversion in native language condition meant we could not test whether foreign language reduces risk aversion. However, this result did show that using a foreign language does not promote excessive risk-taking. Our findings suggest that using verbal probability expressions does not bias participants’ responses, and may inherently reduce risk aversion.

We present evidence of a direct social context effect on decision-making under uncertainty: the gender composition of those in the room when making individual risky decisions significantly alters choices even when the actions or presence of others are not payoff relevant. In our environment, decision makers do not know the choices made by others, nor can they be inferred from the experiment. We find that women become more risk taking as the proportion of men in the room increases, but the behavior of men is unaffected by who is present. We discuss some potential mechanisms for this result and conjecture it is driven by women being aware of the social context and imitating the expected behavior of others. Our results imply that the environment in which individual decisions are made can change expressed preferences and that aggregate behavior may be context dependent.

We present a new experimental evidence of how framing affects decisions in the context of a lottery choice experiment for measuring risk aversion. We investigate framing effects by replicating the Holt and Laury's (Am. Econ. Rev. 92:1644-1655, 2002) procedure for measuring risk aversion under various frames. We first examine treatments where participants are confronted with the 10 decisions to be made either simultaneously or sequentially. The second treatment variable is the order of appearance of the ten lottery pairs. Probabilities of winning are ranked either in increasing, decreasing, or in random order. Lastly, payoffs were increased by a factor of ten in additional treatments. The rate of inconsistencies was significantly higher in sequential than in simultaneous treatment, in increasing and random than in decreasing treatment. Both experience and salient incentives induce a dramatic decrease in inconsistent behaviors. On the other hand, risk aversion was significantly higher in sequential than in simultaneous treatment, in decreasing and random than in increasing treatment, in high than in low payoff condition. These findings suggest that subjects use available information which has no value for normative theories, like throwing a glance at the whole connected set of pairwise choices before making each decision in a connected set of lottery pairs.

We use a human-subjects experiment to investigate how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes in bargainers’ disagreement payoffs. Subjects bargain against changing opponents, with randomly drawn asymmetric disagreement outcomes that vary over plays of the game, and with complete information about disagreement payoffs and the cake size. We find that subjects only respond about half as much as theoretically predicted to changes in their own disagreement payoff and to changes in their opponent’s disagreement payoff. This effect is observed in a standard Nash demand game and a related unstructured bargaining game, in both early and late rounds, and is robust to moderate changes in stake sizes. We show theoretically that standard models of expected utility maximisation are unable to account for this under-responsiveness, even when generalised to allow for risk aversion. We also show that quantal-response equilibrium has, at best, mixed success in characterising our results. However, a simple model of other-regarding preferences can explain our main results.

There is substantial evidence that risky decision-making involves a stochastic error process. The literature has adopted different approaches to address this issue, however, risk preferences are not uniquely identified by the most popular methods; decision error is not predicted to monotonically decrease with risk aversion. This paper reports the results of an experiment that elicits risk preferences to identify risk averse individuals and evaluates the frequency the stochastically dominant of two lotteries is chosen. Risk averse subjects exhibit a strong preference for dominant lotteries. More importantly, violations are consistent with stochastic decision error that decreases with risk aversion.

We examine whether exposure to a more or less risky environment affects people’s subsequent risk-taking behavior. In a laboratory setting, all subjects went through twelve rounds of multiple-price-list decisions between a risky alternative and a safe alternative. In the first six rounds, subjects were randomly assigned to a high-, moderate-, or low-risk environment, which differed in the variances of the lotteries they were exposed to. In the last six rounds, subjects in all treatments made decisions on an identical set of lotteries. We found that subjects who had experienced a riskier environment exhibited a higher degree of risk aversion. Our experimental design allows us to conclude that this effect is driven by the risk environment per se, rather than the realized outcomes of the risk. This finding has important theoretical and policy implications.

This paper reports an experiment to determine whether subjects will learn to stop using a strictly dominated strategy that can be an above average reply. It is difficult to find an experimental design that eliminates the play of the strictly dominated strategy completely. The least effective treatment used money to motivate behavior directly. The most effective treatment used a binary-lottery with money prizes to induce preferences, but even this treatment required giving subjects plenty of experience. Doing so reduced the play of the strictly dominated strategy to around 10 percent by the end of a session. There is no evidence for the explosive cycling needed to make the strictly dominated strategy an above average reply.

We examine the properties of a popular method for eliciting choices and values from experimental subjects, the multiple price list format. The main advantage of this format is that it is relatively transparent to subjects and provides simple incentives for truthful revelation. The main disadvantages are that it only elicits interval responses, and could be susceptible to framing effects. We consider extensions to address and evaluate these concerns. We conclude that although there are framing effects, they can be controlled for with a design that allows for them. We also find that the elicitation of risk attitudes is sensitive to procedures, subject pools, and the format of the multiple price list table, but that the qualitative findings that participants are generally risk averse is robust. The elicitation of discount rates appear less sensitive to details of the experimental design.

Many important decisions are made under stress and they often involve risky alternatives. There has been ample evidence that stress influences decision making, but still very little is known about whether individual attitudes to risk change with exposure to acute stress. To directly evaluate the causal effect of psychosocial stress on risk attitudes, we adopt an experimental approach in which we randomly expose participants to a stressor in the form of a standard laboratory stress-induction procedure: the Trier Social Stress Test for Groups. Risk preferences are elicited using a multiple price list format that has been previously shown to predict risk-oriented behavior out of the laboratory. Using three different measures (salivary cortisol levels, heart rate and multidimensional mood questionnaire scores), we show that stress was successfully induced on the treatment group. Our main result is that for men, the exposure to a stressor (intention-to-treat effect, ITT) and the exogenously induced psychosocial stress (the average treatment effect on the treated, ATT) significantly increase risk aversion when controlling for their personal characteristics. The estimated treatment difference in certainty equivalents is equivalent to 69 % (ITT) and 89 % (ATT) of the gender-difference in the control group. The effect on women goes in the same direction, but is weaker and insignificant.

We study prudence and temperance (next to risk aversion) in social settings. Previous experimental studies have shown that these higher-order risk preferences affect the choices of individuals deciding privately on lotteries that only affect their own payoff. Yet, many risky and financially relevant decisions are made in the social settings of households or organizations. We elicit higher-order risk preferences of individuals and systematically vary how an individual’s decision is made (alone or while communicating with a partner) and who is affected by the decision (only the individual or the partner as well). In doing so, we can isolate the effects of other-regarding concerns and communication on choices. Our results reveal that the majority of choices are risk averse, prudent, and temperate across social settings. We also observe that individuals are influenced significantly by the preferences of a partner when they are able to communicate and choices are payoff-relevant for both of them.

Experimental research on first price sealed bid auctions has usually involved repeated settings with information feedback on winning bids and payoffs after each auction round. Relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium, significantly higher bidding has been reported. The present paper reports the results of experimental first price auctions with n = 7 where feedback on payoffs and winning bids is withheld. Under these conditions, average bidding is below the risk neutral Nash equilibrium prediction but converges to it with repetition.

Experiments frequently use a random incentive system (RIS), where only tasks that are randomly selected at the end of the experiment are for real. The most common type pays every subject one out of her multiple tasks (within-subjects randomization). Recently, another type has become popular, where a subset of subjects is randomly selected, and only these subjects receive one real payment (between-subjects randomization). In earlier tests with simple, static tasks, RISs performed well. The present study investigates RISs in a more complex, dynamic choice experiment. We find that between-subjects randomization reduces risk aversion. While within-subjects randomization delivers unbiased measurements of risk aversion, it does not eliminate carry-over effects from previous tasks. Both types generate an increase in subjects’ error rates. These results suggest that caution is warranted when applying RISs to more complex and dynamic tasks.

The house-money effect, understood as people’s tendency to be more daring with easily-gotten money, is a behavioral pattern that poses questions about the external validity of experiments in economics: to what extent do people behave in experiments like they would have in a real-life situation, given that they play with easily-gotten house money? We ran an economic experiment with 122 students to measure the house-money effect on their risk preferences. They received an amount of money with which they made risky decisions involving losses and gains; a randomly selected treatment group received the money 21 days in advance and a control group got it the day of the experiment. From a simple calculation we found that participants in the treatment group only spent on average approximately 35 % of their cash in advance. The data confirms the well documented results that men are more tolerant to risk than women, and that individuals in general are more risk tolerant towards losses than towards gains. With our preferred specification, we find a mean CRRA risk aversion coefficient of 0.34, with a standard deviation of 0.09. Furthermore, if subjects in the treatment group spent 35 % of the endowment their CRRA risk aversion coefficient is higher than that of the control group by approximately 0.3 standard deviations. We interpret this result as evidence of a small and indirect house money effect operating though the amount of the cash in advance that was actually spent. We conclude that the house money effect may play a small role in decisions under uncertainty, especially when involving losses. Our novel design, however, could be used for other domains of decision making both in the lab and for calibration of economic models used in micro and macroeconomics.

We experimentally investigate in the laboratory prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools and study how individual behavior is influenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the Gale–Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism independently of whether individuals can submit a complete or only a restricted ranking of the schools and (b) subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion are more likely to play “safer” strategies under the Gale–Shapley but not under the Boston mechanism. Both results have important implications for enrollment planning and the possible protection risk averse agents seek.

Since Holt and Laury (Am Econ Rev 92(5):1644–1655, 2002), the multiple price list (MPL) procedure has widely been used to elicit individual risk preferences. We assess the impact of varying list order and spacing, and of presentation via text or graphs. Relative to the original MPL baseline, some non-linear transformations of lottery prices systematically increase elicited risk aversion, while some graphical displays tend to reduce it.

I find necessary and sufficient conditions for first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) violations for choices from a budget line of Arrow securities. Applying this characterization to existing data, I compare FOSD violation rates across a broad set of risk preference elicitation tasks.

What is the relationship between short-run fluctuations in economic activity and the long-run evolution of the economy? There is empirical evidence that more perturbed economies tend to grow less. Yet matching this evidence has proven challenging for growth models without market failures. This paper examines the relationship between short-term fluctuations and long-term growth within a complete-market economy featuring Epstein-Zin preferences and unbounded growth driven by human and physical capital accumulation. With these preferences, risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution are allowed to be independent of each other. When the model is plausibly calibrated, the relationship between the mean and variance of growth turns out to be negative. In most cases, the effect of fluctuations on welfare is found to be negative and sizable, even when the long-run effect on growth is positive.