Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights enshrines the right to liberty, one of the oldest and most fundamental rights in the human rights tradition, and one of the core rights in the Convention. Central to the judicial understanding of Article 5 is the ‘exhaustive justification principle’: unlike with other rights, such as the right to privacy, interferences with liberty can only be justified by one of the specific reasons listed in Article 5 itself. This article shows that this rigidity has posed problems in practice: faced with modern developments unforeseeable at the time of the Convention's writing, such as the use of novel policing techniques and the COVID-19 pandemic, judges have interpreted Article 5 in an unusual and artificial way, sacrificing the exhaustive justification principle in doing so, in order to achieve sensible outcomes. The integrity of Article 5 has been threatened, with serious consequences for the future protection of the right to liberty. This trend is explained, evidenced and evaluated, and some (partial) solutions and concessions are considered.

This article analyses the interaction between the application of mutual recognition in criminal matters and the right to liberty. The main argument is that the current content of the right to liberty in EU law is unsuitable for mutual recognition procedures. As for the structure of this article, firstly, the main features of mutual recognition as a method of inter-state cooperation in criminal matters are outlined. Secondly, the approach of the European Union (especially the Court of Justice) to the right to liberty is clarified. Thirdly, four mutual recognition instruments are analysed in light of the right to liberty: namely, the Framework Decisions on the European Arrest Warrant; the Transfer of Prisoners; the Probation Measures; and the European Supervision Order (ESO). The assessment confirms that the higher level of automaticity in judicial cooperation introduced by mutual recognition requires a rethink of the existing understanding of the right to liberty in EU law.

The Irish State has been party to a collection of international treaties and declarations that directly affect the care of those who suffer from mental disorders. These documents set up what are considered as minimum core standards that outline the standard of care that should be provided as a basic human right. This article reviews the relevant sections of these documents and reflects as to how they have been applied in Ireland. International conventions, which have the status of a treaty, are monitored and interpreted by various commissions and committees. This article draws on the comments of these bodies as to how a state should provide for those with mental illness. Areas such as the rights of children who are mentally ill and those who are detained by the state are examined in detail. Other areas covered are the right to the highest attainable level of mental health care, the right not to be subjected to a clinical trial, equal access to mental health care, and the right to be safeguarded against unjust involuntary detention.