Dictatorships that use plebiscites – that is, referendums initiated by the executive – have a longer expected lifespan. A successful plebiscite sends a signal that makes coordination for collective action more difficult and induces the falsification of preferences. It also enhances the status of the dictator within the regime and against potential rivals through the use of agenda power. As a result, plebiscites are followed by decreased mobilization and a reduced risk of palace coups. This, in turn, adds years to the dictator's tenure. We have found evidence to support these propositions by utilizing data from various databases of autocratic regimes that span from 1946 to 2008.

The June 2016 Brexit referendum sent international shock waves, possibly causing adjustments in public opinion not only in the UK, but also abroad. We suggest that these adjustments went beyond substantive attitudes on European integration and included procedural preferences towards direct democracy. Drawing on the insight that support for direct democracy can be instrumentally motivated, we argue that the outcome of the Brexit referendum led (politically informed) individuals to update their support for referendums based on their views towards European integration. Using panel data from Germany, we find that those in favour of European integration, especially those with high political involvement, turned more sceptical of the introduction of referendums in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum. Our study contributes to the understanding of preferences for direct democracy and documents a remarkable case of how – seemingly basic – procedural preferences can, in today's internationalized information environment, be shaped by high-profile events abroad.

Rivka Weill claims that in the nineteenth century the foundation of the UK constitution changed from parliamentary sovereignty to popular sovereignty, originally as a matter of constitutional convention but today as a matter of law. I argue, to the contrary, that parliamentary sovereignty as a legal principle and popular sovereignty as a political principle are perfectly compatible. Constitutional conventions are essentially political not legal requirements. Therefore, a constitutional convention requiring popular approval of constitutional change, if it ever existed, would not have violated parliamentary sovereignty. But if it did exist, it was displaced by the Parliament Act 1911 and has not been revived since. Moreover, there is no evidence that courts today have legal authority to enforce any requirement, conventional or legal, requiring such approval.

The international community increasingly promotes referendums as it intervenes in self-determination conflicts around the world. However, the ability of self-determination referendums to bring about peace remains uncertain. This paper develops the argument that the conflict resolution potential of self-determination referendums is conditional, depending on whether or not they are held under the mutual agreement of the relevant minority and majority groups. When mutually agreed, self-determination referendums are likely to generate shared perceptions of fair decision-making and thereby increase chances for peace. By contrast, unilateral self-determination referendums are likely to increase ethnic grievances and, therefore, the risk of separatist violence. I find support for this argument in a global statistical analysis, short case studies, and a survey experiment. Overall, this study suggests that self-determination referendums can make a positive contribution to peace, but only if the conditions for a partial compromise on a referendum, including its terms, are ripe.

Carl Schmitt and AV Dicey are two of history's most influential constitutional theorists, and they offer two of history's most influential accounts of referendums. In most respects, their approaches to referendums are in direct opposition to each other. On Schmitt's view, the purpose of referendums is to acclaim executive actors. On Dicey's view, the role of referendums is to constrain them. Despite disagreeing about whether referendums should acclaim or constrain the executive, Schmitt and Dicey agree that an agenda-setting role for representatives in referendums is inevitable. This paper argues that, in the UK context, if Schmitt and Dicey are right about the necessary agenda-setting power of representatives in referendums, then the accounts of referendums they each offer must be two sides of the same coin. Given the dominance of the executive over the legislature in the UK and the uncodified nature of the constitution, referendums are processes that necessarily both acclaim and limit the executive.

This article explores the strategic functions of independence referendums. These referendums are normally framed as popular decisions on statehood over a certain territory. However, I argue that the popular will does not always have the decisory function that plebiscitarian theories suggest. In fact, actual decision referendums are rare; often independence referendums are instead used strategically as a leverage and signalling tactic. The article is structured as follows. First, I propose two key criteria to classify independence referendums regarding actors and timing. Through the application of these criteria, I build a typology proposing four main uses of referendums: leverage, signalling, decision and ratification. Second, I focus on the specific case of leverage referendums. I argue that analyzing the outcomes of leverage referendums can provide some clues about why secessionists still call for these referendums even though they almost never result in internationally recognized statehood. Finally, I conclude by discussing the implications of my findings.

International institutions are increasingly being challenged by domestic opposition and nationalist political forces. Yet, levels of politicization differ significantly across countries facing the same international authority as well as within countries over time. This raises the question of when and why the mass public poses a challenge to international cooperation. In this article, we develop a theoretical framework for understanding the nature and implications of politicization of international cooperation, outlining three scope conditions: the nature of public contestation, the activities of political entrepreneurs, and the permissiveness of political opportunity structures. By empirically examining these scope conditions, we demonstrate that politicization can have both stabilizing and destabilizing effects on international cooperation. Highlighting the systemic implications of politicization for international cooperation has important implications for international relations scholarship. Although international organizations may face challenges, they also have ways of being remarkably resilient.

Partisanship is a powerful driver of economic perceptions. Yet we know less about whether other political divisions may lead to similar evaluative biases. In this paper, we explore how the salient divide between “Remainers” and “Leavers” in the UK in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum has given rise to biased economic perceptions. In line with the cognitive dissonance framework, we argue that salient non-partisan divisions can change economic perceptions by triggering processes of self- and in-group justification. Using both nationally-representative observational and experimental survey data, we demonstrate that the perceptions of the economy are shaped by the Brexit divide and that these biases are exacerbated when respondents are reminded of Brexit. These findings indicate that perceptual biases are not always rooted in partisanship, but can be triggered by other political divisions.

Despite their multiplication over the last 15 years, studies on the support for assemblies composed of citizens selected by lot are rare and the few that exist analyse citizens’ attitudes towards such mini-publics as consultative bodies associated with traditional representative institutions. In this article, we examine support for citizens selected by lot as new policymakers who take the most important political decisions instead of political representatives. We contrast support for this radical democratic innovation with support for two other reforms that increase citizen participation: generic support for a greater involvement of citizens in policymaking, and specific support for citizen-initiated referendums. The goal is to understand whether the drivers of support for citizens selected by lot overlap or differ from the drivers of support for other forms of citizen participation. We rely upon data from the 2017 French Election Study.