Past experimental research has shown that when rating systems are available, buyers are more generous in accepting unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. However, it also suggests that, under these conditions, sellers behave more fairly to avoid receiving negative feedback. This paper experimentally investigates which effect is stronger with the use of a rating system: buyers’ inflated inequity acceptance or sellers’ disapproval aversion. We explore this question by varying the information condition on the buyers’ side. Our experiment shows that in a setup where the size of the pie is common knowledge for both buyers and sellers, when a rating system is present, the sellers exhibit disapproval aversion but the buyers do not display greater acceptance of inequity. By contrast, when only sellers are aware of the size of the pie, sellers behave aggressively to exploit buyers and their behavior does not change in the presence of a rating system; however, buyers display greater acceptance of inequity when a rating system is present. We discuss how these results can be explained by a theoretical model that includes sellers’ social disapproval aversion and buyers’ disappointment aversion in addition to the players’ inequality aversion.

By analyzing more than 1,400 expert tasting notes, we assess the so-called gender profile of Bordeaux wines. We identify 329 gender-related wine descriptors, with a good balance between masculine and feminine descriptors. Some wines and vintages are described as more feminine than others, but no clear trend over time emerges. Our regression analysis further reveals that more feminine wines receive similar ratings and sell at similar prices as their more masculine counterparts, but they are perceived as having a much more limited aging potential.

Krupka and Weber (2013) introduce an incentive-compatible coordination game as an alternative method for elicitation of normative judgments. I show, however, that people provide virtually the same responses in incentivized and non-incentivized versions of the Krupka-Weber game. Besides ratings of social appropriateness, I also elicit ratings of fairness of all possible offers in an ultimatum game. Ratings of social appropriateness and fairness are similar for low offers (below or equal to the equal split), but not for high offers which are judged to be more appropriate than fair.

This paper highlights how international organizations can use global performance indicators (GPIs) to drive policy change through transnational market pressure. When international organizations are credible assessors of state policy, and when monitored countries compete for market resources, GPIs transmit information about country risk and stabilize market expectations. Under these conditions banks and investors may restrict access to capital in noncompliant states and incentivize increased compliance. I demonstrate this market-enforcement mechanism by analyzing the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body that issues nonbinding recommendations to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The FATF's public listing of noncompliant jurisdictions has prompted international banks to move resources away from listed states and raised the costs of continued noncompliance, significantly increasing the number of states with laws criminalizing terrorist financing. This finding suggests a powerful pathway through which institutions influence domestic policy and highlights the power of GPIs in an age where information is a global currency.

Crop yield and weed control rating have been used to measure weed and crop response to weed management treatments, eliminate unacceptable weed management treatments, and select “best” treatments for recommendation to farmers. However, the mathematical relationship between crop yield and rated weed control has not been reported before from such treated screening experiments. Likewise, differences have not been reported before in rated weed control among experienced observers (i.e., reliability) when rating the same experiments and for an experienced observer over time (i.e., repeatability). Data from published experiments on zone herbicide application in field corn in which weeds reduced yield to various amounts were reanalyzed to examine these issues. For this study, relative corn yield was calculated as a percentage of the 1× broadcast herbicide rate for two observers and either three experimental site-years or their average. For observer A, relative corn yield (%) increased linearly as rated total weed control (%) increased for all 3 site-yr and their average. For observer B, equations were curvilinear in 2 of 3 site-yr. For both observers, equations accounted for little data variability in relative corn yield (r2 = 0.25 and 0.25 in site-year 1, respectively, 0.38 and 0.36 in site-year 2, 0.58 and 0.57 in site-year 3, and 0.43 and 0.42 for their average). When rated total weed control by observer A was graphed against that of observer B, the relationship was a nearly ideal 1:1 linear relationship in only 1 of 3 site-yr. In two other site-years, equations were nonlinear, indicating that one observer distinguished smaller differences between treatments at lower rated control than the other observer. Between-row total weed cover and in-row total weed height influenced observer weed control rating.

Background: This study aims to develop and validate a Chinese translation of the 6-item De Jong Gierveld Loneliness Scale – a widely used instrument to measure loneliness – specifically determining its psychometric properties in community-dwelling Chinese elders in Hong Kong. The relationships between loneliness and several clinical variables are also assessed.

Method: The English version was translated into Chinese. Content validity was established by group discussion and Delphi panel. The questionnaire was administered to 103 Hong Kong Chinese community-dwelling elders. Statistical analysis was performed to test the reliability and validity of the scale.

Results: The content validity was high as shown by the results of the Delphi panel. Cronbach's α of the 6-item scale was 0.76. For the inter-rater reliability of the six items, the intra-class correlation coefficients ranged from 0.98 to 1.00. The emotional loneliness subscale significantly correlated with the social loneliness subscale (ρ = 0.37; p < 0.001). In using a direct question to measure loneliness, 21 participants (20%) reported that they were lonely. The overall loneliness scale score significantly correlated with the answers on the direct question of loneliness (rpb = 0.71; p < 0.001). The overall loneliness score showed significant correlation with Cornell Scale for Depression in Dementia (ρ = 0.29; p = 0.003), current smoking status (rpb = 0.24; p = 0.014), and some objective social characteristics.

Conclusion: The Chinese version of the 6-item De Jong Gierveld Loneliness Scale is a reliable and valid measure of loneliness in Chinese elders.