Narrow bracketers who are myopic in specific decisions would fail to consider preexisting risks in investment and neglect hedging opportunities. Growing evidence has demonstrated the relevance of narrow bracketing. We take a step further in empirical investigation and study individual heterogeneity in narrow bracketing. Specifically, we use a lab experiment in investment and hedging that elicits subjects’ preferences on rich occasions to uncover the individual degree of narrow bracketing without imposing distributional assumptions. Combining prospect theory and narrow bracketing can explain our findings: Subjects who invest more also insure more, and subjects insure significantly less in the loss domain than in the gain domain. More importantly, we show that the distribution of the individual degree of narrow bracketing is skewed at two extremes, yet with a substantial share of people in the middle who partially suffer from narrow bracketing. Neglecting this aspect, we would overestimate the severity of narrow bracketing and misinterpret its relation with individual characteristics.

There is evidence that risk-taking behavior is influenced by prior monetary gains and losses. When endowed with house money, people become more risk taking. This paper is the first to report a house money effect in a dynamic, financial setting. Using an experimental method, we compare market outcomes across sessions that differ in the level of cash endowment (low and high). Our experimental results provide support for a house money effect. Traders’ bids, price predictions, and market prices are influenced by the amount of money that is provided prior to trading. However, dynamic behavior is difficult to interpret due to conflicting influences.

Choice behavior is typically evaluated by assuming that the data is generated by one latent decision-making process or another. What if there are two (or more) latent decision-making processes generating the observed choices? Some choices might then be better characterized as being generated by one process, and other choices by the other process. A finite mixture model can be used to estimate the parameters of each decision process while simultaneously estimating the probability that each process applies to the sample. We consider the canonical case of lottery choices in a laboratory experiment and assume that the data is generated by expected utility theory and prospect theory decision rules. We jointly estimate the parameters of each theory as well as the fraction of choices characterized by each. The methodology provides the wedding invitation, and the data consummates the ceremony followed by a decent funeral for the representative agent model that assumes only one type of decision process. The evidence suggests support for each theory, and goes further to identify under what demographic domains one can expect to see one theory perform better than the other. We therefore propose a reconciliation of the debate over two of the dominant theories of choice under risk, at least for the tasks and samples we consider. The methodology is broadly applicable to a range of debates over competing theories generated by experimental and non-experimental data.

Strictly proper scoring rules are designed to truthfully elicit subjective probabilistic beliefs from risk neutral agents. Previous experimental studies have identified two problems with this method: (i) risk aversion causes agents to bias their reports toward the probability of $1/2$, and (ii) for moderate beliefs agents simply report $1/2$. Applying a prospect theory model of risk preferences, we show that loss aversion can explain both of these behavioral phenomena. Using the insights of this model, we develop a simple off-the-shelf probability assessment mechanism that encourages loss-averse agents to report true beliefs. In an experiment, we demonstrate the effectiveness of this modification in both eliminating uninformative reports and eliciting true probabilistic beliefs.

We exploit testing data to gain better understanding on framing effects on decision-making and performance under risk. In a randomized field experiment, we modified the framing of scoring rules for penalized multiple-choice tests. In penalized multiple-choice tests, right answers are typically framed as gains while wrong answers are framed as losses (Mixed-framing). In the Loss-framing proposed, both non-responses and wrong answers are presented in a loss domain. According to our theoretical model, we expect the change in the framing to decrease students’ non-response and to increase students’ performance. Under the Loss-framing, students’ non-response reduces by a 18%-20%. However, it fails to increase students’ scores. Indeed, our results support the possibility of impaired performance in the Loss-framing.

In this paper we examine how risk attitudes change with age. We present participants from age 5 to 64 with choices between simple gambles and the expected value of the gambles. The gambles are over both gains and losses, and vary in the probability of the non-zero payoff. Surprisingly, we find that many participants are risk seeking when faced with high-probability prospects over gains and risk averse when faced with small-probability prospects. Over losses we find the exact opposite. Children's choices are consistent with the underweighting of low-probability events and the overweighting of high-probability ones. This tendency diminishes with age, and on average adults appear to use the objective probability when evaluating risky prospects.

The house-money effect, understood as people’s tendency to be more daring with easily-gotten money, is a behavioral pattern that poses questions about the external validity of experiments in economics: to what extent do people behave in experiments like they would have in a real-life situation, given that they play with easily-gotten house money? We ran an economic experiment with 122 students to measure the house-money effect on their risk preferences. They received an amount of money with which they made risky decisions involving losses and gains; a randomly selected treatment group received the money 21 days in advance and a control group got it the day of the experiment. From a simple calculation we found that participants in the treatment group only spent on average approximately 35 % of their cash in advance. The data confirms the well documented results that men are more tolerant to risk than women, and that individuals in general are more risk tolerant towards losses than towards gains. With our preferred specification, we find a mean CRRA risk aversion coefficient of 0.34, with a standard deviation of 0.09. Furthermore, if subjects in the treatment group spent 35 % of the endowment their CRRA risk aversion coefficient is higher than that of the control group by approximately 0.3 standard deviations. We interpret this result as evidence of a small and indirect house money effect operating though the amount of the cash in advance that was actually spent. We conclude that the house money effect may play a small role in decisions under uncertainty, especially when involving losses. Our novel design, however, could be used for other domains of decision making both in the lab and for calibration of economic models used in micro and macroeconomics.

We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of deliberation time on behavior under risk and uncertainty. Towards this end we ask our participant to make quick, intuitive evaluations of a number of lotteries and report resulting certainty equivalents. Yet, we invite them to modify these initial decisions, whenever they find, after (additional) deliberation, that they do not precisely represent their preference. Both certainty equivalents are incentivized (a double-response method). The choice of evaluated lotteries allows us to semi-parametrically estimate the value function and the probability weighting function within the paradigm of the cumulative prospect theory. The main finding is that deliberation raises the probability weighting function (reduces pessimism), especially in the case of lotteries involving unknown probabilities.

The literature on emotion and risk-taking is large and heterogeneous. Whereas some studies have found that positive emotions increase risk-taking and negative emotions increase risk aversion, others have found just the opposite. In this study, we investigated this question in the context of a risky decision-making task with embedded high-resolution sampling of participants’ subjective emotional valence. Across two large-scale experiments (N = 329 and 524), we consistently found evidence for a negative association between self-reported emotional valence and risk-taking behaviors. That is, more negative subjective affect was associated with increased risk-seeking, and more positive subjective affect was associated with increased risk aversion. This effect was evident both when we compared participants with different levels of mean emotional valence as well as when we considered within-participant emotional fluctuations over the course of the task. Prospect-theoretic computational modeling analyses suggested that both between- and within-participant effects were driven by an effect of emotional valence on the curvature of the subjective utility function (i.e., increased risk tolerance in more negative emotional states), as well as by an effect of within-person emotion fluctuations on loss aversion. We interpret findings in terms of a tendency for participants in negative emotional states to choose high-risk, high-reward options in an attempt to improve their emotional state.

The heart of prospect theory is the value function, proposing that the carriers of value are positive or negative changes from a reference point. Daniel Kahneman observed that if prospect theory had a flag, the value function would be drawn on it. The function is nonlinear, reflecting diminishing sensitivity to magnitude. When describing how human lives are valued, the function exposes profound incoherence. An individual life is highly valued and thus vigorously protected if it is the only life at risk. But that life loses its value when it is one of many endangered by a larger tragedy. Beyond this insensitivity, the function may actually decline when many lives at risk become mere numbers. The more who die, the less we care. Implications of this deadly ‘arithmetic of compassion’ for understanding and managing the risk from nuclear weapons are briefly discussed.

In March 2024, Daniel Kahneman – the man who did perhaps more than anyone else to shape the field of behavioural public policy – died. He is among a small handful of scholars who have had a huge effect on my own career, and in this essay – the first in a series of essays in a special section of the Journal that honour him – I reflect on how his work inspired much of my own.

Precision irrigation is a potential viable strategy for water use reductions on golf courses by making variable or site-specific irrigation applications. A group of US golf course superintendents were surveyed to examine whether and how superintendents’ risk preferences (attitudes) affect the adoption decisions of precision irrigation technologies on their golf courses. Under the prospect theory (PT) framework, a lottery experiment was used to elicit the measures of three risk attitudes, that is, risk curvature, probability distortion, and loss aversion. Using these three measures and other questions in the survey, we found that risk curvature has a significant positive effect on the precision irrigation technologies adoption on golf courses, while probability distortion affects the adoption negatively. Compared to the golf course in low precipitation areas, superintendents’ risk attitudes are more likely to affect the precision irrigation technologies adoption in the golf course in high precipitation areas. Additionally, risk curvature dominates the adoption decisions for newer technologies, while probability distortion dominates the older technologies adoption decisions. Our research enriches the literature on the decision-making behaviors of managers by considering how probability distortion, a factor typically ignored by other studies, affects technology adoption decisions and adds to the literature on examining the technology adoption behaviors under PT by focusing on golf course superintendents, a group that has not been studied.

Adopting eco-friendly technologies, such as converting lawns to alternative low-input grass species, can reduce household expenditures and mitigate negative environmental impacts at the same time. However, the rate of adoption of these technologies has not been as high as expected. This study develops a behavioral framework to identify barriers to new technology adoption by incorporating both prospect theory and present bias. We apply the framework in a choice experiment to investigate the relative importance of several factors that shape decisions associated with adoption of low-input turfgrass. We find that loss aversion plays a significant role. Though consumers exhibit present bias, long-term benefits still matter to them. Insights from the behavior model suggest that marketing and government programs that promote cost–benefit-efficient technologies should focus on eliminating or reducing potential losses caused by product failure.

Although many models for risky choices between gambles assume that information is somehow integrated, the recently proposed priority heuristic (PH) claims that choices are based on one piece of information only. That is, although the current reason for a choice according to the PH can vary, all other reasons are claimed to be ignored. However, the choices predicted by the PH and other pieces of information are often confounded, thus rendering critical tests of whether decisions are actually based on one reason only, impossible. The current study aims to remedy this problem by manipulating the number of reasons additionally in line with the choice implied by the PH. The results show that participants’ choices and decision times depend heavily on the number of reasons in line with the PH — thus contradicting the notion of non-compensatory, one-reason decision making.

In “Risky choice framing: Task versions and a comparison of prospect theory and fuzzy-trace theory”, Kühberger and Tanner (2010) examined the impacts of removing stated zero/non-zero complements of risky options on the gain/loss framing effect. They also tested two rival theoretical explanations for this effect: prospect theory and fuzzy-trace theory. The present study aimed to examine the reliability and robustness of the evidence provided by Kühberger and Tanner by precise replication in Study 1. The original findings were reported for conditions in which the probability of the risky option was fixed, and the expected value of the two alternatives was approximately equivalent. The present study also aimed to examine the generality of their findings under additional conditions in which large, medium and small probabilities of the risky option were assigned, and the expected value of the certain or risky options differed. The main findings of Kühberger and Tanner (2010) were successfully replicated and confirmed under the original and additional conditions. The implications of these findings are discussed.