This paper reports the results of a ‘probabilistic dictator game’ experiment in which subjects were given an option to share chances to win a prize with a dummy player. Using a within-subject design we manipulated two aspects of the decision, the relative cost of sharing and the nature of the lottery: the draws were either independent for the two players (‘noncompetitive’ condition) or one's success meant other's failure (‘competitive’ condition). We also asked for decisions in a standard, non-probabilistic, setting. The main results can be summarized as follows: first, a substantial fraction of subjects do share chances to win, also in the competitive treatments, thus showing concern for the other player that cannot be explained by outcome-based models. Second, subjects share less in the competitive treatment than in other treatments, indicating that procedural fairness alone cannot explain the data. Overall, these results suggest that models aiming at generalizing social concerns to risky environments will have to rely on a mix of distributive and procedural fairness.

We extend the study of procedural fairness in three new directions. Firstly, we focus on lotteries determining the initial roles in a two-person game. One of the roles carries a potential advantage over the other. All the experimental literature has thus far focused on lotteries determining the final payoffs of a game. Secondly, we modify procedural fairness in a dynamic—i.e. over several repetitions of a game—as well as in a static—i.e. within a single game-sense. Thirdly, we analyse whether assigning individuals a minimal chance of achieving an advantaged position is enough to make them willing to accept substantially more inequality. We find that procedural fairness matters under all of these accounts. Individuals clearly respond to the degree of fairness in assigning initial roles, appraise contexts that are dynamically fair more positively than contexts that are not, and are generally more willing to accept unequal outcomes when they are granted a minimal opportunity to acquire the advantaged position. Unexpectedly, granting full equality of opportunity does not lead to the highest efficiency.

We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether procedural fairness concerns affect how well individuals are able to solve a coordination problem in a two-player Volunteer’s Dilemma. Subjects receive external action recommendations, either to volunteer or to abstain from it, in order to facilitate coordination and improve efficiency. We manipulate the fairness of the recommendation procedure by varying the probabilities of receiving the disadvantageous recommendation to volunteer between players. We find evidence that while recommendations improve overall efficiency regardless of their implications for expected payoffs, there are behavioural asymmetries depending on the recommendation: advantageous recommendations are followed less frequently than disadvantageous ones and beliefs about others’ actions are more pessimistic in the treatment with recommendations inducing unequal expected payoffs.

Prior research has demonstrated that the ability to express one’s views or “voice” matters in social and economic interactions, but little is known of the mechanisms through which voice operates. Using an experimental approach based on the ultimatum game with the strategy method, we explore four potential channels for voice that encompass and expand on prior work: the knowledge effect of voice, the value expressive (or inherent value) of voice, the expectation effect of voice, and the procedural fairness effects of voice. Our results show strong effects through the value expressive and expectation channel, but not through either the knowledge channel or procedural fairness. In our view, voice is powerful because people like to express their views and they are disappointed when their views did not make a difference in their outcomes.

Which inequalities among individuals are considered unjust? This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to study distributive choices dealing with arbitrarily unequal initial endowments. In a three-person distribution problem where subjects either know or do not know their endowments, we find impartial behavior to be a stable pattern. Subjects either compensate for initial inequalities fully or not at all in both conditions, and they do so more often when they do not know their endowment than when they know it. Moreover, the type and the size of the good to be distributed also affect the frequency of impartial behavior.

The participants in deliberative mini-publics are typically randomly selected; therefore, mini-publics are often marketed as representative of the wider population. However, in practice, mini-publics are unlikely to be fully representative due to their small size and non-response bias. I report the results of a pre-registered survey experiment designed to assess the implications of deviations from statistical representativeness for citizens’ legitimacy beliefs (N = 1,308). Consistent with prior research, I find that the involvement of a mini-public in democratic decision-making can lead to substantial increases in perceptions of process legitimacy; however, even minor biases in the composition of mini-publics substantially decrease those gains while larger biases can wipe them out entirely. The results of this study temper hopes that mini-publics offer an easy fix to perceptions of low democratic legitimacy.

In response to our critics, we clarify and defend key ideas in the report Open and Inclusive: Fair Processes for Financing Universal Health Coverage. First, we argue that procedural fairness has greater value than Dan Hausman allows. Second, we argue that the Report aligns with John Kinuthia's view that a knowledgeable public and a capable civil society, alongside good facilitation, are important for effective public deliberation. Moreover, we agree with Kinuthia that the Report's framework for procedural fairness applies not merely within the health sector, but also to the wider budget process. Third, we argue that while Dheepa Rajan and Benjamin Rouffy-Ly are right that robust processes for equal participation are often central to a fair process, sometimes improvements in other aspects of procedural fairness, such as transparency, can take priority over strengthening participation. Fourth, while we welcome Sara Bennett and Maria Merritt's fascinating use of the Report's principles of procedural fairness to assess the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, we argue that their application of the Report's principle of equality to development partners' decision-making requires further justification.

We summarise key messages from the World Bank Report Open and Inclusive: Fair Processes for Financing Universal Health Coverage. A central lesson of the Report is that in decision-making on the path to Universal Health Coverage (UHC), procedural fairness matters alongside substantive fairness. Decision systems should be assessed using a complete conception of procedural fairness that embodies core commitments to impartial and equal consideration of interests and perspectives. These commitments demand that comprehensive information is gathered and disclosed and that justifications for policies are publicly debated; that participation in decision-making is enabled; and that these characteristics of the decision system are institutionalised rather than up to the good will of decision-makers. Procedural fairness can improve equity in outcomes, raise legitimacy and trust, and can help make reforms last. While improving procedural fairness can be costly and there are barriers to achieving it, the range of instruments that countries at varying levels of income and institutional capacity have used with some success shows that, in many contexts, advances in procedural fairness in health financing are possible and worthwhile.

Although the fair financing report, ‘Open and Inclusive: Fair Processes for Financing Universal Health Coverage’, has many sage things to say about democratic deliberative processes, its title belies its content: the report does not offer any assessment of processes for financing universal health coverage. What it does instead is scrutinise processes for deciding how to finance universal health coverage without any linkage to substantive questions concerning financing, and, moreover, the discussion is not narrowly focused on fairness.

The policy-making process for health financing in most places lacks equity, failing to adequately consider the voices of ordinary citizens, residents, and especially those facing significant disadvantage. Procedural fairness is about addressing this imbalance, which requires a recalibration of power dynamics, ensuring that decision-making incorporates a more diverse range of perspectives. In this comment, we highlight the important contributions made by the report ‘Open and inclusive: Fair processes for financing universal health coverage’ in furthering the understanding and importance of procedural fairness in health financing decision-making especially as it relates to the three sub-functions of financing – revenue raising, pooling, and purchasing. We also argue for the importance of conceptual clarity – especially as to the added value of procedural fairness vis-à-vis accountability – and critically review the proposed framework for procedural fairness, emphasising the role of voice as the linchpin to advancing equity in influence.

Research on the relationship between performance and trust is commonplace in social sciences, yet trust in child protection systems (CPS) remains an emerging area of study. This research delves into how three dimensions of performance – distributive justice, procedural fairness, and functional effectiveness – affect trust in CPS in England and Norway, drawing insights from organisational and social psychology literature. A cross-sectional survey collected data from 981 individuals in England and 1,140 in Norway. Results suggest that procedural fairness and the competences indicator of functional effectiveness significantly and positively impact trust in CPS in both countries. Resources significantly influence trust in Norway’s CPS, while distributive justice has no impact on trust in either country’s CPS. These findings hold theoretical and practical implications for trust in CPS.

How do citizens react to repeated losses in politics? This paper argues that experiencing accumulated losses creates strong incentives to externalize responsibility for these losses to the decision-making procedure, which can, in turn, erode legitimacy perceptions among the public. Using a survey experiment (N = 2,146) simulating accumulated losses in a series of direct votes among Irish citizens, we find that decision acceptance and the perceived legitimacy of the decision-making procedure diminish with every loss. Three accumulated losses depress the perceived legitimacy of the political system. These effects are mediated by procedural fairness perceptions, suggesting that even when democratic procedures are used, accumulated losses can induce a belief that the process and system are rigged.

Does information about the way victims of gender-based violence (GBV) are treated by the police influence evaluations of government policies to combat gender-based violence? I theorize that because most citizens have incomplete information about such policies, information about procedural fairness should be given more weight when forming evaluations of the government’s performance in this domain. Using original experiments embedded in public opinion surveys collected from Brazil, I find that information about procedural unfairness powerfully predicts more critical evaluations of GBV laws and the government’s performance in helping victims. In addition, these critical opinions influence bystander intervention attitudes. Mediation analysis confirms that views of procedural unfairness are critical in explaining these effects. The implications of the findings for the implementation of specialized services are discussed in the results and conclusion.