Hermann Andreas Pistorius (1730–1798) was a pastor and frequent contributor to the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, an important journal of the German Enlightenment. Pistorius reviewed nearly every one of Kant’s major works for the journal as well as many texts by both Kant’s defenders and critics. This chapter contains Pistorius’ review of Johann Schultz’s Elucidations of Herr Professor Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, the first book-length commentary on the first Critique. In the review, Pistorius uses Schultz’s Elucidations as the occasion for examining some of Kant’s own doctrines directly, such as his theory of space and time and the distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Particularly relevant to the second Critique are Pistorius’ criticism of Kant’s solution to the third antinomy, his claim that the first Critique is inconsistent with the Groundwork, and the claim that Kant is illegitimately biased towards moral ideas.

The third and final review authored by Pistorius in this volume is his review of the second Critique. The review completes a fascinating exchange between Pistorius and Kant that begins with the former’s early review of Schultz’s Elucidations and the Groundwork, among others, continues with Kant’s responses to these reviews in the second Critique, and ends here with Pistorius’ review of the second Critique. In the review, Pistorius returns to some of the same points made in his previous reviews, such as the ‘priority of the good’ objection, the charge of empty formalism, and Kant’s conception of freedom. A major theme of the review is Pistorius’ inability to accept Kant’s distinction between the empirical and intelligible character of human beings, and other topics include a discussion of the highest good and Kant’s relationship to Stoic moral philosophy.

Pistorius’ review of the Groundwork was without a doubt the most important early review, at least with respect to its influence on the second Critique. Pistorius raises several important objections in the review, many of which are now regarded as classic responses to Kant’s moral theory in the literature. These include: the empty formalism objection, the claim that Kant is a covert consequentialist, that only hypothetical imperatives can bind human beings, and that there is a distinction to be made between happiness through instinct and happiness through reason. Kant was aware of the review and responds to Pistorius explicitly in the second Critique, such as in the second chapter of the Analytic, where he replies to a “certain reviewer,” i.e., Pistorius, who claimed against the Groundwork that “the concept of the good was not established before the moral principle.” (5:8.27–9.2)

In his 1786 review of Johann Schultze’s Elucidations of Professor Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (1784), Pistorius criticizes Kant’s concept of transcendental freedom as it is represented in Schultze’s work. Given the expository aim of Schultze’s work and Pistorius’s claim that some of the objections he raises have already been addressed in his review of Kant’s Prolegomena, it is reasonable to presume that Pistorius generally took his criticisms of Schultze to apply equally to Kant. Pistorius observes that Kant’s solution to the Third Antinomy rests on transcendental freedom’s supposed independence from temporal conditions; however, Pistorius maintains, transcendental freedom – qua the capacity to begin a state from itself – presupposes temporal conditions insofar as these conditions are implied by the concept of beginning. Thus, the concept of transcendental freedom is supposedly internally consistent.

The 1786 review of Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals by Hermann Andreas Pistorius raised the objection that Kant's categorical imperative is an "empty formalism" that needs an antecedent conception of the good long before Hegel made the same charge in 1802.  Kant's explicit response to Pistorius in the Critique of Practical Reason is just to double-down on the priority of the right over the good.  However, I suggest that Kant's characterization of humanity as an end in itself as the "ground of a possible categorical imperative" in the Groundwork, on the one hand, and his account of the highest good as the complete object of morality in the second Critique, on the other, together provide a much fuller and satisfactory response to the "empty formalism" objection.