In his 1786 review of Johann Schultze’s Elucidations of Professor Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (1784), Pistorius criticizes Kant’s concept of transcendental freedom as it is represented in Schultze’s work. Given the expository aim of Schultze’s work and Pistorius’s claim that some of the objections he raises have already been addressed in his review of Kant’s Prolegomena, it is reasonable to presume that Pistorius generally took his criticisms of Schultze to apply equally to Kant. Pistorius observes that Kant’s solution to the Third Antinomy rests on transcendental freedom’s supposed independence from temporal conditions; however, Pistorius maintains, transcendental freedom – qua the capacity to begin a state from itself – presupposes temporal conditions insofar as these conditions are implied by the concept of beginning. Thus, the concept of transcendental freedom is supposedly internally consistent.