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The scholarly and popular commonsense about corruption in the Philippines is that the country has always been corrupt. Seventy-eight years of corruption as an independent state (1946–2024) may as well have been a thousand. Lay and scholarly accounts explain this continuity with respect to traditional values and premature democratization. In both accounts, corruption is all but genetic to Philippine culture or politics. To be sure, continuity is self-evident if we are looking only at corruption scandals—but scandals have been accompanied by anti-corruption movements, broadly speaking. The two have gone hand-in-hand historically, suggesting that we need to understand them together. Taking them together, that is, focusing on their dialectic, produces, as I will show, a history of change. Specifically, how Filipinos relate to corruption has changed. They have become less tolerant of it in general and learned to embrace an anti-corruption model of politics. How scholars and policymakers conceive of corruption has changed. They have come to adopt a view of corruption as a generic social problem, effectively disembedding it from society. These developments have enabled a more intolerant approach such that, today, the greater danger lies in an anti-corruption “fundamentalism” leading to the rejection of politics altogether. Viewed as a whole, the history of corruption/anti-corruption has been a popular struggle over what politics should look like, and thus we might read their dialectic as driving the progress of political modernization from below.
Before the categories of Latino/a or Hispanic were adopted in academia and literary criticism in the United States, Latinx writers were often (mis)placed within a wide and ambiguous “Spanish” literary scene. This chapter explores how this tendency also extended to Filipinx American writers. It centers on José Garcia Villa’s early years in the United States, in particular the semi-autobiographical short stories in Footnote to Youth: Tales of the Philippines and Others (1933), wherein he reflects on his experience as a young Filipino American writer and finds continuities between the Philippines and New Mexico.
In understanding the authoritarian character of Rodrigo Duterte's rule followed by the return of the Marcoses to power, it is important to situate both within the context of ‘electoral dystopias’ in the Philippines: the colonial and postcolonial history of democratic institutions deployed by rulers to produce undemocratic social effects. Elections thus look two ways: they seek to mobilise popular expectations for change even as they become instruments for reproducing hierarchy and reinforcing the power of elites. It is within this paradoxical conjunction of popular desires for radical change and elite attempts at containing and channelling those desires for conservative ends that we can see the rise of authoritarian figures such as Duterte. This essay is based on the first chapter of the author's The Sovereign Trickster: Death ad Laughter in the Age of Duterte, published by Duke University Press in 2022.
Despite one of the world's strictest and longest lockdown policies, the Philippines' securitized approach to containing the COVID-19 pandemic has led to unnecessary suffering, especially in poor communities. This article explores how the Philippine government's prioritizing of punitive policies such as detaining quarantine violators or attempting to decongest Manila by sending poor families to neighbouring provinces, magnifies existing socio-spatial inequalities and further spreads disease. In many of these communities, poverty is a co-morbidity. As local governments struggle to provide frontline health and social welfare services, high-profile arrests, media shutdowns, and the proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill spark concerns about restrictions on free speech while movement is curtailed. Nevertheless, community and private sector efforts around localized healthcare, food security, and inclusive mobility indicate potential paths towards a ‘better normal’ that goes beyond just survival.
In this paper, I look into the lesser-known history of “comfort women” in the Philippines. I engage with the following questions: how did the trafficking and sexual exploitation of Filipino women emerge as part of state policy in the Japanese Empire? How was it dealt with in the aftermath of the war, especially in the face of shifting post-war alliances and the changing place of Japan in the geo-politics of the Cold War? How did events in the international arena, in turn, affect diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Japan, specifically with respect to aid and trade? Finally, how did the market forces at play affect state policy in the Philippines?
This essay, adapted and expanded from an article published in Foreign Affairs, explores the origins of the legend used by Donald Trump to justify torture and war crimes against terrorists that Gen. John “Black Jack” Pershing had Muslim prisoners in the Philippines shot with bullets dipped in pigs' blood. While the story is patently false, it is worth revising Pershing's knowledge that his men attempted to terrorize Philippine Muslims with pigskin burials, while asking what widespread American beliefs about Islam the story traded in. Approached in this way, the Pershing legend emerges not just as Trumpian fabrication, but as an archetypal parable of the “war on terror.”
This paper explores the politics of Asia-Pacific War memory and memorialization in Southeast Asia, evident in the production context and visual semiotic resources of Thailand's Victory Monument, a generic memorial to Thai war heroes, and the Philippines' Shrine of Valor, a historical shrine complex dedicated to Filipino and US soldiers of the Asia-Pacific War. These heritage structures represent two divergent memorialization practices that demonstrate how the commemoration or suppression of war memory is influenced by politics, agendas, and the benefits it brings to the state. In Thailand, the inward justification and outward restraint stem from the difficult choices the state had to make during the war. In the Philippines, while war memorialization was pronounced and served state aims, it was initially undermined by President Ferdinand Marcos, who wanted to bolster his fraudulent war heroism claims. The cases illustrate how diverging national memorial practices surrounding the war's contested past achieved similar aims and how memorial sites become repositories of meaning potentials through which we could make sense of the nation and its international entanglements.
This chapter compares the short-lived norm neglect regarding the 2011 no-fly zone over Libya with the longer-lasting, yet fragile, norm neglect of the Philippines and China regarding Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (SCS). In these entrenched norm disputes, norm neglect was surprising. This chapter shows that social pressure from in-group members in the Libya case and from the arbitral tribunal and domestic compliance constituencies in the SCS case facilitated claim agreement. While these audience reactions continue to uphold norm neglect in the SCS case, key audiences’ perception that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led coalition’s implementation lacked output legitimacy led to a norm impasse on Syria.
Moreover, the missing shared normative basis for the claim agreements rendered them fragile. The blurring of responsibility to protect (R2P) and protection of civilians (PoC) reduced the social strength or precision of R2P, as well as its breadth. The decrease in acceptance, and thus depth, of R2P due to the contested implementation of the no-fly zone further reduced the relative strength of R2P. In the SCS case, norm neglect is ongoing and thus the effect on norm strength remains to be seen. The increasing acceptance of the arbitral award and China’s frame rapprochement have slightly strengthened the applicability of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) norms.
Japan is the only place in the world where bananas are marketed and priced by cultivation altitude. In the late 1980s, plantation managers sourcing the fruit from the southern Philippine region of Mindanao discovered a paradigm-shifting formula: the higher up one grew, the sweeter the bananas became. And the sweeter the bananas were, the closer they were to replicating the taste of colonial Taiwanese bananas, lost in the switch to Philippine supply. This paper offers the first transnational history of the banana’s transition along the spectrum from a fungible commodity to a nonfungible product in the Asia-Pacific region. Engaging critical studies of commodities and plantations, it takes fungibility as the characteristic that makes goods interchangeable and as the principle that renders landscape and labor as empty vessels open to the projection of others’ desires. The paper argues that the introduction of kōchi saibai banana or “highland cultivated bananas” for the Japanese market brought not the reversal of fungible life to the Philippine highlands but rather its continuation. In so doing, this work critiques conceptual frameworks that understand fungibility through the idioms of liquidification and immateriality. Instead, it proposes a topographical approach, which sees processes of fungibilization as operating through the profoundly material rearrangement of human and environmental communities. By focusing on the tensions between fungibility and differentiation, this paper offers an account of both an idiosyncratic marketing strategy particular to the Philippines and Japan, and a dynamic that pervades the creation of all commodities under capitalism.
COVID-19 vaccine effectiveness (VE) studies are limited in low- and middle-income countries. A case-control study was conducted among COVID-19 and other pneumonia patients admitted to a hospital in the Philippines during the pre-Omicron and Omicron periods. To elucidate factors associated with in-hospital death, 1782 COVID-19 patients were assessed. To estimate absolute VE for various severe outcomes, 1059 patients were assessed (869 [82.1%] COVID-19 cases; 190 [17.9%] controls). Factors associated with in-hospital death included older age, tuberculosis (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 2.45 [95% confidence interval {95% CI} 1.69–3.57]), HIV (aOR 3.30 [95% CI 2.03–5.37]), and current smokers (aOR 2.65 [95% CI 1.72–4.10]). Pre-Omicron, the primary series provided high protection within a median of 2 months (hospitalization: 85.4% [95% CI 35.9–96.7%]; oxygen requirement: 91.0% [95% CI 49.4–98.4%]; invasive mechanical ventilation (IMV): 97.0% [95% CI 65.7–99.7%]; death: 96.5% [95% CI 67.1–99.6%]). During Omicron, the primary series provided moderate-high protection within a median of 6–9 months (hospitalization: 70.2% [95% CI 27.0–87.8%]; oxygen requirement: 71.4% [95% CI 29.3–88.4%]; IMV: 72.7% [95% CI −11.6–93.3%]; death: 58.9% [95% CI −82.8–90.8%]). Primary series VE against severe COVID-19 outcomes was consistently high for both pre-Omicron and Omicron in a setting where approximately half of the vaccinees received inactivated vaccines.
How can societies effectively reduce crime without exacerbating adversarial relationships between the police and citizens? In recent decades, perhaps the most celebrated innovation in police reform has been the introduction of community policing, where citizens are involved in building channels of dialogue and improving police-citizen collaboration. Despite the widespread adoption of community policing in the United States and increasingly in the developing world, there is still limited credible evidence about whether it realistically increases trust in the police or reduces crime. Through simultaneously coordinated field experiments in a diversity of political contexts, this book presents the outcome of a major research initiative into the efficacy of community policing. Scholars from around the world uncover whether, and under what conditions, this highly influential strategy for tackling crime and insecurity is effective. With its highly innovative approach to cumulative learning, this project represents a new frontier in the study of police reform.
In this chapter, we test the effects of community policing in the Sorsogon Province of the Philippines. The intervention generated a four-fold increase in police-citizen interactions in treated villages, but consistent with meta-analysis of all six sites in this volume, we found no effects of the intervention on crime rates or citizens’ attitudes about public safety. To disaggregate the effects of different aspects of community policing, we sequenced the implementation of community engagement (CEP) and problem-oriented policing (POP) but found no effects on the harmonized outcomes of either CEP on its own or the combination of CEP and POP. Finally, we present suggestive evidence of positive impacts on the specific types of crimes that barangays’ problem-oriented policing teams elected to focus on, indicating that while community policing cannot address all of a community’s problems en masse, it may improve specifically targeted issues.
The Philippine state considers its citizens living and working abroad as valuable assets, given their contribution to the economic growth and development of the home country. Philippine state interactions with its nationals overseas are largely characterized by engagement, support, and protection. This chapter examines how the Philippine government has implemented its diaspora policy over time. The chapter also underscores the protection of Filipino nationals as a principal task of the state which is conducted mainly through diplomacy, albeit at times supported by the military through rescue operations during crises. Legal frameworks and institutions have been established to cater to the needs of Filipino migrants abroad, especially those of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). The government has also actively entered into bilateral labor agreements and international conventions to promote their rights and welfare. While government agencies are organized to cater to this sector of society, there are limitations on state capacity such as bureaucratic inefficiencies and financial constraints. A comprehensive and inclusive multisectoral approach needs to be adopted, allowing other stakeholders aside from the government to take part in addressing key issues that concern the safety and welfare of Filipinos overseas.
This chapter revisits the efforts mostly spearheaded by ASEAN to bring the Third Indochina War to an end. As ASEAN is the sum of its parts, the chapter describes the perspectives of the various ASEAN member states as well as how they arrived at a collective decision.
In the post-Reconstruction USA, biopolitical technologies of governmentality became central to the project of racial control. As the USA moved from a settler colonial and slave-owning nation to a settler colonial and nation of overseas colonies, a politics of violence was followed by a pedagogy of recovery, particularly in education and health, through which the lives of racialized populations could be “improved.” The salubrious racial management of populations through discourses of health in the Philippines, Guam, Hawai’I, and Indian reservations emphasized distinctions between clean and unclean bodies, hygienic and unhygienic behaviors, and ultimately moral and immoral lifestyles. However, the technologies of care in the USA occupation of Japan during its reverse course phase (1948–1952) illustrate how racial–cultural difference could be refashioned for geopolitical purposes. While early in the occupation the Japanese were Orientalized as conformist, obsequious, and feudalist, Brides Schools for wives of American GIs exemplified how the creation of Japanese wives as perfectly assimilable subjects functioned to demonstrate American racial democracy during the Cold War.
While historians have recently called attention to the racial assumptions that shaped the debates over monetary reform in either the colonial Philippines or China during the first years of the twentieth century, this article analyzes the crosscurrents between efforts to “civilize” and “develop” Filipino and Chinese monetary systems. It first examines the history of the Philippine money question (1899–1903), revealing anxieties about the apparent attachment Native Filipinos and Chinese had to silver currency. U.S. colonial officials were ambivalent toward the Native Filipinos, seeing them as possibly teachable, but so-called silver savagism was seen as too deeply engrained in the Chinese community, making the Chinese appear as a threat to monetary stability. In the last section, the article turns to China, revealing how the outcome of the Philippine money question shaped how U.S. monetary experts approached their efforts to reform China’s monetary system. Throughout this process, U.S. colonial officials and monetary experts defined the Philippines and China (“silver countries”) and Filipinos and Chinese (“silver-handling types”) as overlapping objects of development. This analysis reveals how development was simultaneously an economic, racial, and imperial language.
The challenges besetting the Philippine mental health system demand multifaceted, strategic responses to ensure the holistic well-being of Filipino youth. Through the integration of mental health into primary care, augmentation of the professional workforce, bolstering information infrastructure, reforming medication accessibility, augmenting budgetary allocations and invigorating governance, the Philippines can pave the way for an inclusive mental health system that adequately addresses the exigencies of its younger demographic. In doing so, the nation can make substantial strides towards alleviating the negative impacts of adverse social conditions, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, on the mental well-being of its youth.
Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) remained at elevated risk for the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic because of persistent stressors to their health systems. Simultaneously facing high infection rates, strict containment measures and natural disasters, the Philippines provides important grounds for health research in LMICs. This review examined how the COVID-19 pandemic affected mental and psychosocial health in the Philippines. This scoping review included literature in English from 2020 to mid-2022 from PubMed, PsycInfo and SCOPUS, and used the PRISMA-ScR and PCC-question model. Two independent reviewers conducted blind article screening and data extraction using COVIDENCE software, followed by consensus building, data charting and analyses. This work identified 405 publications across PubMed (N = 56), PsycInfo (N = 106) and SCOPUS (N = 243), of which 76 articles addressed the Philippines. Article types included 54 research articles, 10 opinion pieces, 4 literature reviews, 6 letters to journals, 1 study protocol and 1 other report. These findings focused primarily on health professionals (N = 23) and educators/learners (N = 22) and reported mostly on moderate-to-severe clinical outcomes such as fear, depression, anxiety or stress. Coping behaviors, like resiliency and other ways of adapting to the pandemic, including religious, spiritual and community-oriented approaches highlighted experiences with stringent infection prevention and control measures to contain COVID-19 in the Philippines. The COVID-19 pandemic brought severe challenges to mental and psychosocial health in the Philippines. The literature focused mostly on healthcare workers and educators/learners, and moderate-to-severe mental health outcomes in these groups. There is a need to expand studies to other sociodemographic groups and communities across the Philippines. Future work stands to benefit from more in-depth qualitative, mixed methods, longitudinal and representative quantitative research in LMICs following this pandemic. Literature reviews remain important to synthesize post-pandemic experiences by providing context for future studies and health practice in the Philippines and other LMICs.
Research on public health, crime, and policing regularly discusses sex workers in Southeast Asia but rarely recognises them as agents of social and political activism. This paper shows that sex workers and their allies in Singapore and the Philippines have long and rich histories of challenging their criminalisation and stigmatisation through cultural activism, political advocacy, consciousness-raising, and the provision of direct services to fellow sex workers. Using feminist ethnography, including interviews and participant observation with Project X in Singapore and the Philippine Sex Workers Collective, this paper explores how sex work activists have strategically adapted to their political environments. In Singapore, they maintain resistance through ‘shape-shifting,’ working within state-sanctioned mechanisms, positioning themselves as public health service providers, and creating spaces for radical political advocacy. In the Philippines, where an anti-sex work position is more deeply entrenched within dominant social blocs, sex work activists aggressively criticise state policies on social media and in carefully vetted forums but remain strategically invisible to avoid exposure, harassment, misrepresentation, and prosecution. This paper looks at how sex work activists engage in claims-making — underscoring the differences in the political resonance of human rights in both countries — and interrogates how sex work activism challenges social hierarchies, especially concerning migrants and trans individuals. Overall, it contributes to a richer understanding of non-traditional forms of political activism in Southeast Asia and makes visible sex workers’ contributions to feminism and labour movements in the global south and non-Western contexts.
Chapter 3 examines Chinese coercion in the South China Sea. My previous work examines the overall trends of Chinese coercion in the South China Sea. I find that China used coercion in the 1990s because of the high need to establish a reputation for resolve and low economic cost. China used militarized coercion because the US withdrawal from the Subic Bay in Southeast Asia and the focus on Europe reduced China’s geopolitical backlash cost of using coercion. China then refrained from coercion from 2000 to 2006 because of the high economic cost and low need to establish a reputation for resolve. It began to use coercion again after 2007, but because of the increasing geopolitical backlash cost since the post-2000 period, Chinese coercion remains nonmilitarized, which includes economic sanctions and gray-zone coercion. This chapter also examines three case studies – the cross-national comparison of China’s coercion against the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, the Sino-Philippine Mischief Reef incident in 1995, and the Sino-Philippine Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012. These case studies demonstrate that the mechanisms of the cost-balancing theory are present in them.