This paper highlights scholarly neglect of political legitimacy, the idea of a state's use of power in ways acceptable to its citizens. We argue that political legitimacy affects a state's ability to formulate and implement its policies, thus affecting governance. Our paper provides the first empirical evidence of the positive relationship between political legitimacy and governance. We combine novel cross-sectional data on political legitimacy and several governance indicators from 66 countries. Our results show that a one-standard-deviation increase in the legitimacy score increases the rule of law indicator by about one-third standard deviation. These results are robust across OLS, an instrumental variable method, and several other governance indicators. Moreover, our results reveal that in the presence of greater trust, political legitimacy has an enhanced impact on governance.

We argue that the effectiveness of Rwandan governments, both at implementing the 1994 genocide and inducing the current growth miracle, illustrates that the state has high capacity. Yet this capacity is not captured by conventional Weberian concepts, with their focus on taxation and formal bureaucracy. Rather, the capacity of Rwanda's state relies on its ability to leverage dense social networks which connect it to society. The origins of these networks lie in the construction of the historical state which expanded by merging with local lineages and kinship groups. Using data on the historical expansion of the Rwandan state as a proxy for the strength of state–society social networks we show they are uncorrelated with measures of Weberian state capacity. In a fieldwork exercise, we show that rule compliance today is positively correlated with our proxy, but uncorrelated with Weberian state capacity.

Incorporation of the informal sector in the general Kaleckian framework of agriculture–industry linkage is the primary target of this article. We show that the agriculture–informal sector interaction is distinctly different from the agriculture–formal sector relationship. Although agriculture supports the formal sector only from the supply-side, it helps the informal sector by providing both demand- and supply-side inducements. Next, contrary to the general perception of formal–informal complementarities, we rather propose a fundamental conflict. This conflict arises in the presence of the food supply-constraint or the generic resource-constraint. Subsequently, with these theoretical perspectives, we show that policies that are beneficial for the formal sector, in fact, constrict the informal economy.

Spearheaded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), there has been a rethinking of macroeconomic policies, in particular with regard to targeting inflation at a very low level in the wake of 2008–2009 global economic crisis. We provide a content analysis of the IMF Staff Reports on Article IV consultation of 12 Asian developing countries during the period 2009–2010 in order to see whether that rethinking has been reflected in the IMF’s advice. The findings of this study reveal that the IMF continues with its prescription of achieving low inflationary environment irrespective of country-specific circumstances.

We introduce contraceptives and social norms in an overlapping generations growth model of fertility and human capital. Parents can use costly modern contraceptives to control their family size, and each household’s fertility decision is influenced by the decisions made by others. Given the number of children born, parents decide how much education to provide and how much to save out of their income. We characterize the local dynamics of a stable steady-state equilibrium. Around this steady state, family planning interventions, which reduce the price of modern contraceptives, decrease fertility and increase human and physical capital. The effects of family planning interventions are larger when reproductive externalities are stronger.

We estimate the elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-skill workers using panel data from 32 countries during 1970–2015. Most existing estimates, which are based only on US microdata, find a value close to 1.6. We bring international data together with a theory-informed macro-approach to provide new evidence on this important macroeconomic parameter. Using the macro-approach, we find that the elasticity of substitution between tertiary-educated workers and those with lower education levels falls between 1.7 and 2.6, which is higher than previous estimates but within a plausible range. In some specifications, estimated elasticity is above the value required for strong skill-bias of technology, suggesting strong skill-bias is possible.

This article analyzes the impact of Augusto Pinochet’s autocracy on the Chilean economy. The study compares outcomes under Pinochet’s leadership with those in a synthetic counterfactual made of a weighted average of countries with similar characteristics. It finds that, relative to the control, Chilean income per capita greatly underperformed for at least the first fifteen years after Pinochet’s coup. The results are robust to extending the pool of donor countries and expanding the pretreatment period by switching data sets to capture potential heterogeneity of effects. The evidence suggests that Chile’s remarkable economic growth during the period 1985–1997 did not depend on Pinochet’s autocracy. These results further bring into question the effectiveness of the regime to enhance economic growth and the narrative of the Chilean miracle.

This paper examines the effect of national income on the total fertility rate (children born per woman). We estimate the effects on fertility of shocks to national per capita income using plausibly exogenous variations in oil price shock as an instrument for income and using instrumental variable generalized quantile regressions (IV-GQR). Using data for a panel of 122 countries spanning the period 1965–2020, our results show that national per capita income has generally a negative and significant effect on the total fertility rate. Looking at the entire spectrum of the fertility distribution, the IV-GQR estimates exhibit considerable heterogeneity in the impact of income on fertility. The income elasticity of fertility is relatively low at the upper tail of the distribution (for countries with high fertility) compared to the value at the median.

Knowledge of the long relationship between gender equality and economic growth is hampered by the lack of information and resources on the various dimensions of gender equality. This paper is a first attempt to assess the size of the gender gap and investigate its relationship with economic growth from a historical perspective. Exploiting a unique census-based dataset of 86 French counties in the mid-nineteenth century, I construct a historical gender gap index measuring the size of the gap between men and women in three critical areas: economic opportunities, educational attainment, and health. A county comparison allows me to identify the strengths and weaknesses of French counties in closing the gender gap. I find that France can be divided into two main areas, the North and the South. In particular, the Northern counties that have done most to narrow the gap display better economic performance. Boys' and girls' education and family structures appear to be crucial determinants of gender equality. Gender equality is positively and significantly associated with economic performance. Accounting for the multi-dimensions of gender equality is crucial for economic development.

Corruption is widely believed to have an adverse effect on the economic performance of a country. However, many East-and-Southeast-Asian countries either achieved or currently are achieving impressively rapid economic growth despite widespread corruption – the so-called East-Asian-Paradox. A common feature of these countries was that they were autocracies. We re-examine the corruption-growth relationship, in light of the East-Asian-Paradox. We examine the role of political regimes, in mediating corruption–growth relationship using panel data over 100 countries for the period 1984–2016. We find clear evidence that corruption–growth relationship differs by the type of political regime, and the growth-enhancing effect of corruption is more likely in autocracies than in democracies. The marginal effect analysis shows that in strongly autocratic countries, higher corruption may lead to significantly higher growth, while this is not the case in democracies. Alternatively, democracy is not good for growth if there is a high level of perceived corruption. We provide suggestive evidence that the mechanism by which corruption is growth-enhancing in autocracies is through the perceived credibility of the commitment of ruling political elites to economic freedom, thereby providing confidence to the firms to invest, leading to long-term growth.

The UK faces a number of economic challenges in the short to medium term. Prior to COVID-19, renegotiation of trading arrangements with the European Union was the most prominent of these. We build on existing macroeconomic analysis by assessing prospects for the UK’s regions generated by combining a global macroeconometric model and a regional computable general equilibrium of the UK. A central macroeconomic scenario shows a national average annual GDP growth rate of 1.7 per cent to 2044. When the macroeconomic scenario is applied across regions, growth rates range from 1.6 per cent for Cambridge to 2.2 per cent for Pembrokeshire; the standard deviation is low at 0.07 per cent and the coefficient of variation is 0.04 per cent. In contrast, much wider variation is observed in the standard deviation for exports (0.36 per cent), investment (0.11 per cent) and consumption (0.14 per cent). The country results favour Scotland, which grows at an annual rate of 1.8 per cent, whereas Wales is the slowest growing of the countries at 1.7 per cent. Consistent with the macroeconomic analysis, international trade is the most important contributor to the regional variation in growth rates. We also analyse the effects of higher government consumption relative to the forecasts and find most regions are predicted to experience lower economic activity except the handful in which government consumption is a much higher share of GDP than average.

This paper analyzes the behavior of cross-country growth rates with respect to resource abundance and dependence. We reject the linear model that is commonly used in growth regressions in favor of a multiple-regime alternative. Using a formal sample-splitting method, we find that countries exhibit different behaviors with respect to natural resources depending on their initial level of development. In high-income countries, natural resources play only a minor role in explaining the differences in national growth rates. On the contrary, in low-income countries, abundance seems to be a blessing but dependence restricts growth.

We examine the net benefits of social distancing to slow the spread of COVID-19 in USA. Social distancing saves lives but imposes large costs on society due to reduced economic activity. We use epidemiological and economic forecasting to perform a rapid benefit–cost analysis of controlling the COVID-19 outbreak. Assuming that social distancing measures can substantially reduce contacts among individuals, we find net benefits of about $5.2 trillion in our benchmark case. We examine the magnitude of the critical parameters that might imply negative net benefits, including the value of statistical life and the discount rate. A key unknown factor is the speed of economic recovery with and without social distancing measures in place. A series of robustness checks also highlight the key role of the value of mortality risk reductions and discounting in the analysis and point to a need for effective economic stimulus when the outbreak has passed.

The debate on the land–poverty nexus is inconclusive, with past research unable to identify the causal dynamics. We use a unique global panel dataset that links survey and census derived poverty data with measures of land ecosystems at the subnational level. Rainfall is used to overcome the endogeneity in the land–poverty relationship in an instrumental variable approach. This is the first global study using quasi-experimental methods to uncover the degree to which land improvements matter for poverty reduction. We draw three main conclusions. First, land improvements are important for poverty reduction in rural areas and particularly so for Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, land improvements are pro-poor: poorer areas see larger poverty alleviation effects due to improvements in land. Finally, irrigation plays a major role in breaking the link between bad weather and negative impacts on the poor through reduced vegetation growth and soil fertility.

Using novel microdata, we explore lifecycle consumption in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find that households' ability to smooth consumption over the lifecycle is large, particularly, in rural areas. Consumption in old age is sustained by shifting to self-farmed staple food, as opposed to traditional savings mechanisms or food gifts. This smoothing strategy indicates two important costs. The first cost is a loss of human capital as children seem to be diverted away from school and into producing self-farmed food. Second, a diet largely concentrated in staple food (e.g., maize in Malawi) in old age results in a loss of nutritional quality for households headed by the elderly.

In an overlapping generations model with multiple steady states, we analyse the impact of endogenous environmental policies on the relevance of history and expectations for the equilibrium selection. In a polluting regime, environmental preferences cause an increasing energy tax which raises the risk that the economy transitions to the inferior equilibrium under pessimistic expectations. However, higher environmental preferences imply an earlier switch to the clean energy regime. Then, the conflict between production and environmental preferences is resolved and the prospects of selecting the superior equilibrium improve, since positive expectations become more relevant. In an empirical analysis we find that people with environmental preferences tend to have more optimistic expectations about economic development. Using these findings to analyse the steady-state dynamics implies that agents with environmental preferences support higher energy taxes and switch to clean production more quickly. Due to their optimism, the likelihood of reaching the superior stable steady state increases.

I summarise new facts on hours worked differences across countries and their driving forces. The facts are derived from a comprehensive analysis of micro data sets. First, hours worked are substantially higher in poor than in rich countries. Second, lower hours worked in Europe than in the US can partly be explained by differences in vacation weeks and partly by differences in the demographic structure. Moreover, employment rates tend to be higher and weekly hours worked lower in Western Europe and Scandinavia than in the US, with the opposite being true in Eastern and Southern Europe. Last, among core-aged individuals, married women form the group that exhibits the largest differences in hours worked across countries. International differences in taxation, and especially in the tax treatment of married couples, are an important driver of these differences.

The process of structural transformation from the farm to a nonfarm sector is accompanied by technological change in both sectors and massive population growth. We investigate the effects of increasing population size (the population effect) and sector-specific productivity (the push and pull effects), both factor-neutral and factor-biased, in a parsimonious general equilibrium model under general forms of utility and production functions. All three effects may co-exist and interact in important ways. Generalizing the agricultural sector production function to CES is crucial for the population growth effect. Our analysis highlights how the relative importance of the three effects changes as the country develops and production and consumption conditions become more flexible.

After the 2001 crisis, Turkey continued to pursue the radical market-oriented reform strategy that had started in the early 1980s and followed the philosophy of the Washington Consensus. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the post-2001 period was relatively high, but it was a “jobless” growth caused by substantial productivity increases generated largely by intensifying the work process rather than by technological advancements. Economic growth in the post-2001 period benefited society very unequally. The growth regime of Turkey is vulnerable owing to high current account deficit; high currency mismatch, particularly in the corporate sector; high income inequality; high unemployment; and an unsatisfactory development of the industrial sector, despite some successes. We recommend a new development regime with selective capital controls, a balanced current account, an active industrial policy by the government, stronger trade unions and employers’ associations engaged in social dialogue combined with coordinated wage bargaining on the sectoral level, and last but not least, redistributive policies aiming to achieve a more equal income distribution.

We provide a new explanation for the narrowing and reversal of the gender education gap. We assume that parents maximize the full income of their children and that males have an additional income, independently of education. This additional income biases preferences toward sons and implies that females have relative advantage in producing income through education. When the returns to human capital are low, the bias toward sons is high, so that parents whose first newborns are females have more children. Consequently, daughters are born to larger families and hence receive less education. As returns to human capital increase, gender differences in producing income diminish, bias toward sons declines, variation in family size falls and the positive correlation between family size and the number of daughters is weakened. Ultimately, the relative advantage of females in education dominates differences in family size, triggering the reversal in the gender education gap.