Australia has one of the most ‘liberalised’ electricity sectors in the world. The sale of government-owned electricity companies has contributed to that liberalisation and a quarter of the proceeds of one of the world’s largest privatisation programmes. In 2014, the state governments of New South Wales and Queensland announced further electricity privatisations if re-elected. Advocates claim private ownership will mean more productive investment, lower costs leading to more efficient operations, lower prices for all consumers and better market functioning without government interference. Opponents contend that the true value of government businesses is not being realised at sale, retention can achieve returns greater than those from a sale, and that follow sale, prices will rise and jobs will be lost. This article demonstrates that the claims of either lower or higher prices, of job losses and of more efficient operations are tantamount to being myths of privatisation not borne out by reality.

Continental pawnbroking institutions, Monts-de-Piété, were introduced in Ireland in the 1830s and 1840s but did not establish a permanent status. Irish social reformers believed that a Mont-de-Piété system would reduce the cost of borrowing for the poor and also fund a social welfare network, thus negating the need for an Irish Poor Law. This article explores the introduction of the Mont-de-Piété charitable pawnbroker in Ireland and outlines some reasons for its failure. It uses the market incumbents, private pawnbrokers, as a base group in a comparative study and asks why the Monts-de-Piété were the unsuccessful ones of the two. The article finds that the public nature and monopoly status of Monts-de-Piété on the Continent realised economies of scale and gave preferential interest rates on capital, as well as enabling the Mont-de-Piété loan book to be cross-subsidised. These conditions were not replicated in Ireland, hence the failure of the Monts-de-Piété there.

In the 1940s, when the governor of Puerto Rico was still appointed by the U.S. president, a large state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector was established. Later, in 1948-1950, the island's first elected government privatised these SOEs. This paper documents both the creation of the SOE sector and its privatisation, and analyses the role played by ideology, political interests and economic concerns in the decision to privatise. Whereas ideological factors might have played a significant role in the building of the SOE sector, the privatisation process was driven by economic factors. In the cement sector, the competing private firm was more efficient and the SOEs in other sectors with no private competitors in the island showed permanent losses.

A vast literature is devoted to assess the Transactional Approach in several empirical fields. Common to all these studies is the testing of transactional approach conjectures from the standpoint of private contractual relationships. The aim of this paper is to explore the relevance of Transaction Cost Theory in the French administrative legal context. The paper examines the delegation contracts used to manage the provision of urban services in France. The paper shows that (1) these delegation contracts can be considered as self-enforcing agreements (2) they do not operate in “the shadow of the law ” (3) they feature strong adaptive capabilities. A distinction is made between non-standard contractual arrangements and hybrid governance modes.