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Holdups and Non-standard Breach Remedies in Delegation Contracts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Christophe Defeuilley
Christophe Defeuilley*
Affiliation:
cired (ehess and cnrs)
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Summary

A vast literature is devoted to assess the Transactional Approach in several empirical fields. Common to all these studies is the testing of transactional approach conjectures from the standpoint of private contractual relationships. The aim of this paper is to explore the relevance of Transaction Cost Theory in the French administrative legal context. The paper examines the delegation contracts used to manage the provision of urban services in France. The paper shows that (1) these delegation contracts can be considered as self-enforcing agreements (2) they do not operate in “the shadow of the law ” (3) they feature strong adaptive capabilities. A distinction is made between non-standard contractual arrangements and hybrid governance modes.

Résumé

Résumé

L’objet de cet article est de tester la pertinence des enseignements de la Théorie des Coûts de Transaction en les confrontant à des structures contractuelles qui ne relèvent pas du cadre juridique à partir duquel elle s’est construite. On traite des contrats de délégation utilisés en France dans la gestion des services urbains. On montre que (1) ces contrats peuvent être considérés comme des structures “auto - renforçantes ” ; (2) ne sont pas supportés par des mécanismes se situant en dehors des règles communes du droit administratif et (3) possèdent de fortes capacités d’adaptation. Cela montre qu’une distinction peut être introduite entre arrangements contractuels non - standards et formes hybrides de gouvernance.

Keywords

Transaction Cost Theory,delegation contracts,hybrid governance modes,French administrative law.K12,L14,L33Théorie des Coûts de Transaction,formes hybrides de gouvernance,contrats de délégation,droit administratif français.K12,L14,L33.
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 65 , Issue 3 , 1999 , pp. 349 - 371
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1999 

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Footnotes

*

Thanks to the participants of the CIRED workshop and two anonymous referees for criticisms and remarks. This paper has benefited from my collaboration with Mehrdad Vahabi. I am responsible for all the remaining errors.

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