This paper reports on the use of carrot (positive) and stick (negative) incentives as methods of increasing effort among members of work teams. We study teams of four members in a laboratory environment in which giving effort towards the team goal is simulated by eliciting voluntary contributions towards the provision of a public good. We test the efficiency-improving properties of four distinct environments: monetary prizes given to high contributors versus monetary fines assessed to low contributors, where high/low contributor is defined first in terms of absolute contributions and then in terms of contributions relative to abilities—which we call handicapping. Our results show that both carrot and stick can increase efficiency (i.e., contributions) levels by 10-28%. We find that handicapped incentives promise the highest efficiency levels, and when handicapping is not used penalties may be more effective than prizes. The implications for work teams and suggestions for practical implementation are discussed.

We examine how rewards and penalties under tournament incentives impact price behaviour in experimental asset markets. Adding a penalty to a reward-only contract, or a reward to a penalty-only contract, changes the traders’ behaviour. The experimental markets with adjusted contracts experience less trading, but longer-lived and larger bubbles. This observed effect of penalties is consistent with herd-driven behaviour under relative performance evaluation, while the effect of rewards reflects the influence of the convexity of bonuses. However, these effects dissipate with trader experience. Our findings contribute to the debate attributing market instability to incentive structures in the finance industry.

I study the effect of task difficulty on workers’ effort. I find that task difficulty has an inverse-U effect on effort and that this effect is quantitatively large, especially when compared to the effect of conditional monetary rewards. Difficulty acts as a mediator of monetary rewards: conditional rewards are most effective at the intermediate or high levels of difficulty. The inverse-U pattern of effort response to difficulty is inconsistent with many popular models in the literature, including the Expected Utility models with the additively separable cost of effort. I propose an alternative mechanism for the observed behavior based on non-linear probability weighting. I structurally estimate the proposed model and find that it successfully captures the behavioral patterns observed in the data. I discuss the implications of my findings for the design of optimal incentive schemes for workers and for the models of effort provision.

We study behavior within a simple principal-agent experiment. Our design allows for a large class of linear contracts. Principals can offer any feasible combination of (negative) fixed wages and incentives in the form of return sharing. This great contractual flexibility allows us to study incentive compatibility simultaneously with issues of ‘fair sharing’ and reciprocity, which were previously found to be important. We find a high degree of incentive-compatible behavior, but also ‘fair sharing’ and reciprocity. In contrast to other incentive devices studied in the literature, the incentives are ‘reciprocity-compatible’. Principals recognize the agency problem and react accordingly.

This paper reports the results of an experiment on how team heterogeneity in terms of productivity influences both the revenue sharing proposed by the principal to the team and the employees’ performance. Experimental evidence shows that when the team is heterogeneous, the principal does not try to motivate the agents through her sharing offer. Regardless of the level of team-based compensation, a large amount of free riding occurs since each agent is mainly influenced by his teammate's behavior. In contrast, when the team is homogeneous, agents are better able to cooperate, reciprocating the principal's offer.

We conducted a series of field experiments to investigate the ability of experimentally measured risk preferences to predict the contractual choices of workers in the real labour market. In a first set of experiments we twice measured workers’ risk preferences using the lottery approach of Holt and Laury (Am Econ Rev 92(5):1644–165, 2002). These workers subsequently participated in a contract-choice experiment, making 12 decisions. For each decision, the worker chose between his/her regular piece-rate contract and a particular fixed wage contract, each distinguished by the level of the fixed wage. One of the twelve decisions was then chosen at random and the worker was paid according to his/her choice for that decision over a period of two working days. We estimate the effect of risk preferences on contractual choices, controlling for measurement error and worker ability. Risk preferences effectively predict contract choices—risk-averse workers are more likely to select fixed-wage contracts. High-ability workers prefer piece-rates.

How to hire voluntary helpers? We shed new light on this question by reporting a field experiment in which we invited 2859 students to help at the ‘ESA Europe 2012’ conference. Invitation emails varied non-monetary and monetary incentives to convince subjects to offer help. Students could apply to help at the conference and, if so, also specify the working time they wanted to provide. Just asking subjects to volunteer or offering them a certificate turned out to be significantly more motivating than mentioning that the regular conference fee would be waived for helpers. By means of an online-survey experiment, we find that intrinsic motivation to help is likely to have been crowded out by mentioning the waived fee. Increasing monetary incentives by varying hourly wages of 1, 5, and 10 Euros shows positive effects on the number of applications and on the working time offered. However, when comparing these results with treatments without any monetary compensation, the number of applications could not be increased by offering money and may even be reduced.

The paper reports an experimental study on a promotion-demotion mechanism to mitigate the free-rider problem in a voluntary contribution setting. The mechanism hierarchically splits a group in two; we refer to one subgroup as the Major league and to the other as the minor league. The most cooperative subject of the minor league is switched with the least cooperative subject in the Major league. The results reveal a significant increase of cooperation levels in both leagues relative to the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We argue that a lack of sequentially-rational beliefs about continuation payoffs in Major and minor leagues leads to higher equilibrium contributions. The data suggest beyond that, the promotion-demotion mechanism regroups subjects deliberately according to their cooperativeness.

We use an experiment to evaluate the effects of participatory management on firm performance. Participants are randomly assigned roles as managers or workers in firms that generate output via real effort. To identify the causal effect of participation on effort, workers are exogenously assigned to one of the two treatments: one in which the manager implements a compensation scheme unilaterally or another in which the manager cedes control over compensation to the workers who vote to implement a scheme. We find that output is between seven and twelve percentage points higher in participatory firms.

The Korean ‘Safe Trucking Freight Rates System’ (‘Safe Rates System’) was an important effort to address road safety risks by regulating road transport supply chains. In effect between 2020 and 2022, the system set minimum standards for truck driver pay and placed obligations on road transport supply chain parties to comply with these standards. In this article, we explain how the system developed in response to the deregulation and restructuring of the road freight market in the late 1980s and 1990s. We also trace the influence on the system of regulatory development in Australia and debates at the International Labour Organization (ILO). In 2019, workers, employers, and government representatives at the ILO reached an agreement on the main principles of the Safe Rates regulatory model through the adoption of the Guidelines on the promotion of decent work and road safety in the transport sector. We use these principles to explain and evaluate the Korean system. We also summarise assessments of the system’s impact, arguing that the results of the few studies that exist, justify the continuation of the system. By locating Korean Safe Rates as part of a broader global trend, we respond to opponents’ claims that the system is without international precedent and make the system eligible for a global audience. In so doing, we seek to contribute to the ongoing debate about the reintroduction of Safe Rates in Korea and draw lessons from the Korean experience that may be used in other countries.

This paper focuses on the migrant pay gap in Spain. Going beyond descriptive evidence of the differences between immigrants and nationals in terms of wages, we analyse which part of the gross wage is most affected by features that cannot be captured using econometric models. Relying on microdata from the Wage Structure Survey, we divide the total gross wage into two main parts: base wage and wage supplements. Then we decompose the migrant wage gap into the explained and the unexplained terms, using a simple decomposition methodology, the Oaxaca-Blinder model. Our results show that a part of the differences in wage supplements does not seem to be explained by the set of control variables introduced in the model and that this effect is more pronounced when only men are considered. These findings offer a new perspective on the migrant pay gap in Spain and point to the importance of wage-setting practices related to wage supplements in explaining (and widening) the total migrant pay gap in our country.

Researchers have studied truck crashes extensively using methods appropriate for behavior, technology, and regulatory enforcement. Few safety studies associate crashes with economic pressure, a pervasive latent influence. This study uses data from the US Large Truck Crash Causation Study to predict truck crashes based on work pressure factors that have their origins in market pressures on motor carriers and truck drivers. Logistic regression shows that factors associated with the work process, including an index of work-pressure attributes, predict the likelihood that crash analysts consider the truck driver to be the person whose last action could have prevented the crash. While not proving causation, the data suggest that economic factors affecting drivers contribute significantly to truck crashes.

While other research has shown that higher paid truck and bus drivers are safer, this is the first study showing why higher paid drivers are safer. We estimate the labour supply curve for long-haul truck drivers in the United States, applying two-stage least squares regression to a national survey of truck drivers. We start with the standard model of the labour supply curve and then develop two novel extensions of it, incorporating pay level and pay method, and testing the target earnings hypothesis. We distinguish between long-haul and short-haul jobs driving commercial motor vehicles. Truck and bus drivers choose between long-distance jobs requiring very long hours of work away from home and short-distance jobs generally requiring fewer hours. The labour supply curve exhibits a classic backward bending shape, reflecting drivers’ preference to work until they reach target earnings. Above target earnings, at a ‘safe rate’ for truck drivers, they trade labour for leisure, working fewer hours, leading to greater highway safety. Drivers work fewer hours at a higher pay rate and likely have less fatigue. Pay rates also have implications for driver health because worker health deteriorates as working time exceeds 40 hours.

Large truck crashes remain a significant problem in the truckload sector of the US motor carrier industry. Employing a unique firm-level data set from a large US truckload motor carrier, we identified two different driver groups hired during two distinct pay regimes. Before-and-after data on wages and safety outcomes created a natural experiment. Higher wages paid to experienced drivers in the new pay regime led to higher driver retention rates. Experienced drivers had lower average crash costs and were more productive during each tenure month. Experienced drivers had a much larger expected discounted net present value when compared with inexperienced drivers. As the previously inexperienced drivers gained additional experience, their crash probabilities and their value began to mirror those of the experienced drivers, demonstrating the value of greater tenure. This research supports ‘safe rates’ public policy because safety pays – for trucking companies, for cargo owners and for society.

A growing number of Chinese firms motivate their employees through employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). Using a sample of listed firms in China, this paper examines the impact of ESOPs on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP), as well as the mechanisms of ESOPs. The empirical results show that ESOPs have a positive impact on firm TFP. The mechanism tests convey that ESOPs increase firm TFP by promoting research and development (R&D) investment and mitigating agency costs. These results are robust after accounting for endogeneity and using alternative metrics of TFP. In addition, we find that the positive effect of ESOPs on firm TFP is more pronounced in non-state-owned firms and firms with a less severe free-riding problem. Furthermore, the effect on firm TFP is positively associated with the subscription proportion of non-executive employees in ESOPs. Overall, the results of this study underscore the important role of employee ownership in firms’ productivity improvement.

In the trucking industry, truck drivers’ duties include not only driving trucks but also non-driving labor. However, non-driving work is not necessarily paid. This article analyses how the payment for non-driving duties (non-driving pay) affects truck drivers’ work hours. Using the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Long-Haul Truck Driver survey, the study finds that remunerating drivers for non-driving duties decreases drivers’ work hours. Drivers who are paid for their non-driving labor may reach their target earnings in fewer work hours, leading them to refrain from working extremely long hours and more willingly comply with working time regulations. The policy implication is that paying for non-driving labor can prevent drivers from working excessively long hours, mitigating fatigue, and consequent accidents. Thus, pay for non-driving labor may enhance their safety and health.

Understanding the distributional impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the labour market and ultimately on the living standards of the population is key to designing adequate policy responses to shield individuals’ and families’ livelihoods. This article illustrates the impact of COVID-19 on the labour market as well as on living standards in the case of a small open economy: Mauritius. We present descriptive evidence based on a unique set of telephone household surveys, representative of the Mauritian population, conducted between May 2020 and March 2021. We find that women had a higher risk of losing their job and leaving the labour force, reversing a decade-long trend of increasing labour force participation. Low-skill workers in sectors that depend on global demand – and even more so if employed informally – together with women were more likely to be affected by the crisis. One in three households reported a loss in income since the start of the pandemic, and the probability of experiencing this shock increases with the number of household members who lost their job and who were employed informally. From a policy perspective, our findings underscore the negative distributional consequences of the pandemic and provide substantive evidence for the viability of a further proactive policy stance to shield the livelihoods of vulnerable households during the economic recovery phase.

We investigate the impact of professional networks on men's and women's earnings, using a dataset of European and North American executives. The size of an individual's network of influential former colleagues has a large positive association with remuneration, with an elasticity of around 21%. However, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using various fixed effects as well as a placebo technique, we find that the real causal impact of networks is barely positive for men and significantly lower for women. We provide suggestive evidence indicating that the apparent discrimination against women is due to two factors: first, both men and women are helped more by own-gender than other-gender connections, and men have more of these than women do. Second, a subset of employers we identify as ‘female friendly firms’ recruit more women but reward networks less than other firms.

Environmental incentives are characterized by two distinct features: (1) a benefit-cost trade-off; and (2) private information about the trade-off. This suggests a degree of freedom of where to attach the private information, either to the benefit or the costs, as long as these choices imply the same behavior absent incentives (‘observation equivalent’). However, we show that different observation equivalent specifications can lead to different incentives. This is demonstrated for two cases: rainforest protection and contributions to a public good. Therefore, the choice of a private information parameter must be justified against observation equivalent alternatives.

Executive stock options (ESOs) are widely used to reward employees and represent major items of corporate liability. The International Accounting Standards Board IFRS9 financial reporting standard which came into full effect on 1-Jan 2018, along with its Australian implementation AASB9, requires public corporations to report their fair-value cost in financial statements. Reset ESOs are typically issued to re-incentivise employees by allowing the option to be cancelled and re-issued with a lower exercise price or later maturity. We produce a novel analytical Reset ESO valuation consistent with the IFRS9 financial reporting standard incorporating the simultaneous resetting of vesting period, exercise window, reset level and maturity. We allow for voluntary and involuntary exercise. Our analytical result is expressed solely in terms of standardised European binary power option instruments. Using the multi-state mortality model of Hariyanto (2014, Mortality and disability modelling with an application to pricing a reverse mortgage contract, PhD thesis, University of Melbourne), we estimate longitudinal disability and death transition probabilities from cross-sectional data. We determine survival functions for pre-vesting forfeiture or post-vesting involuntary exercise for use with weighted portfolios of our formulae to illustrate the effect of survival on the fair value. We examine the IFRS9 method of valuation using expected time to option exercise and demonstrate a consistent overestimation of fair value of up to 27% for senior executives.