Path dependency relies upon historicity and context to understand how institutions sustain themselves through time and are compelled to change at critical junctures. Some consider this approach as being deterministic, focused on external shocks to institutions and better at explaining stability rather than change. Others consider that there is also agency in institutional change, that actors may seize upon opportunities within institutions to find novel solutions to new challenges, or that a succession of incremental changes may fundamentally alter institutions without any external shock. We understand language regimes as being path dependent, while accepting that various actors may work within the regime to bring forth incremental changes in language policies. These changes may occur through various policy processes rather than through major disruptions. The impetus for this process may come from within the institutions, where state actors may try to adjust policies to a new context, or from language groups who express dissatisfaction towards the regime and mobilize to demand change. The chapter first discusses the possibility that language regime can change; second, it draws upon the institutional literature to describe how a language regime may change; third, it uses the case of French in Ontario to illustrate this process.

Clark Kerr, President of the University of California, famously coined the term the “multiversity” to capture the expansion of universities in mid twentieth-century America to the point that they contained multiple and often competing (and indeed conflicting) goals, interests, and trajectories. While Kerr waxed eloquent about the value of the multiversity, he worried about the loss of community and purpose he associated with the smaller undergraduate college – especially in relation to undergraduate education. In particular, he worried that incentive structures for faculty led them to focus on narrow research as well as their own entrepreneurial opportunities outside the university, while they became more detached from undergraduate teaching on the one side, and more resistant to administrative leadership and guidance on the other. I follow up on the tensions between administrators and faculty and the ways in which disciplinary structures impede both intellectual openness and institutional experimentation.

Chapter 1 is a short survey of the institution and institutional change literature in connection with development. Four themes of interest for the rest of the volume are considered in turn. First comes an important clarification about what is meant by ‘institution’ in the development literature and how it is to be interpreted in the rest of the volume. Second, the chapter deals with the question of the relationship between formal and informal or transitional institutions, a question of first importance in developing countries, especially when the two types of institutions enter in conflict. Third, the dynamics of institutions is discussed, the distinction being made between institutions that evolve endogenously or alternatively persist in spite of a changing environment or being clearly suboptimal. Finally the chapter briefly examines the main arguments in the debate about radical versus gradual institutional reforms.

Why do successive education reforms within a country resonate with familiar assumptions about educational goals, society, class, and state, even at moments of radical change? Repeating cultural narratives sustain continuities within institutional change processes, by influencing how new ideas are interpreted, how interest groups express preferences, and how institutional norms shape political processes. Repeating narratives make it more likely for some types of reforms to be implemented and sustained than others. This chapter develops a theoretical model suggesting how cultural narratives are transmitted across time and an empirical method for assessing cross-national differences in cultural narratives. Each country has a distinctive “cultural constraint,” or a set of cultural symbols and narratives, that appears in a nation’s literary corpus. Writers collectively contribute to this body of cultural tropes; despite individual fluctuations, they largely reproduce the master narratives of their countries. Computational linguistic processes allow us to observe empirical differences between British and Danish cultural depictions of education in 1,084 works of fiction from 1700 to 1920. Cultural narratives do not determine specific outcomes, as tropes must be activated in political struggles. Yet we can show how significant cross-national differences in literary images of education resonate with British and Danish educational trajectories.

Despite having few natural resources and peasant serfs, Denmark developed public primary education in 1814, while Britain delayed the mass, public school system until 1870 and provided little instruction to working-class students. Later, Denmark’s secondary education system included publicly-funded vocational training programs, while Britain developed a single-track system that ignored technical skills. Fiction writers and their cultural narratives contributed to educational choices. Authors became important individual political agents in school reform movements, by using fiction to advance policy ideas and inspire emotional outrage. Writers collectively contributed to the nationally distinctive symbols and narratives about education that appeared in their country’s literature. Each generation of authors inherited these distinctive cultural tropes from their literary ancestors, reworked these for new problems, and passed these along to future generations. Studying fiction writers and their narratives offers a tangible way to evaluate how culture matters to political outcomes, as we may empirically (with computational linguistics and a close reading of texts) observe significant cross-national differences in historical literary images of education. The work suggests how cultural narratives contribute to the emergence of coordinated and liberal varieties of capitalism and reflects on how cultural narratives provide a source of continuity within long-term processes of institutional change.

Chapter 3 elaborates on the linkages between technology and international institutions. It also introduces the guiding questions at the core of the book: how do international institutions respond to the promises and perils associated with transformative novel technologies? When do international institutions respond, when do they not respond, and why do their responses differ? Finally, how could institutional responses be designed in order to better facilitate the realization of technological promise and the avoidance of perils? The chapter contextualizes these questions within broader theoretical discussions in international regime theory and cooperation theory. A key point is that international institutions play a limited, albeit indispensable role in the regulation of transformative novel technologies. International institutions are no substitute for regulation at other scales, including at national levels, but are vital for managing the various transboundary aspects of transformative novel technologies.

Institutions are the system of legal rules and social norms that enhance individual economic property rights. Individuals take them as exogenous, but they are endogenous to the entire system. Institutions are complicated distributions of economic property rights and are therefore the result of attempts to maximize wealth net of the transaction costs involved. This chapter defines institutions, relates them to property rights, reviews the literature, and provides numerous examples of institutions and their evolution.

Technological solutions to sudden factor shortages are difficult and costly, hence unlikely to be sought if such easier solutions as factor substitution or factor mobility are available. When the demand does arise, a technological innovation is likelier: (a) the more intense the demand; (b) the less daunting the leap from existing technologies; and (c) the larger the pool of potential innovators. The size of that pool is restricted by language barriers but expanded by vehicles that transmit new ideas. Governments can do little to stimulate creation of a new technology but can adopt or reject the institutional changes that the new technology requires. Military technology is often seen as causative of political change, but the supporting evidence is weak. New techniques of warfare more often arise in response to changed availability of factors. A positive supply shock renders all other factors newly scarce. Thus the “China shock” of increased availability of low-skill labor has created incentives in advanced economies to develop technologies that economize on scarce human and physical capital.

Chapter 1 begins with the story of the 2015 La Línea customs fraud scandal and its connections to the criminal structures mounted by military intelligence at the height of the 36-year civil war. Drawing on this illustrative example, the chapter reframes debates on post-conflict statebuilding and puts forward a novel argument about how counterinsurgent elites introduce institutional innovations that undermine core state activities. It further lays out the key theoretical contributions of the book, specifically as they relate to war and state formation and post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. The chapter also introduces the Central American context and explains why it is a fruitful setting in which to explore the institutional legacies of civil war. It then discusses the book’s methodology and the unique archival and interview sources of data.

Chapter 2 presents the book’s theory of wartime institutional change, which accounts for why civil war is a site of institutional transformation, conceptualizes different wartime institutional logics, and elaborates the causal process through which undermining rules evolve amid conflict. It argues that the perceived escalation of the insurgent threat within civil war unsettles prevailing institutional arrangements and empowers political and military elites who, as the architects of counterinsurgency, possess high levels of decision-making discretion. Under the pretext of combatting the “internal enemy,” this counterinsurgent elite introduces alternative rules of the game, which correspond to its narrow interests. The latter half of the chapter tackles why undermining rules persist within and beyond conflict. Where counterinsurgent leaders can knit together a broader set of interests with a stake in the wartime procedures and successfully co-opt new peacetime political and economic spaces, the undermining rules are more likely to survive. By contrast, shifting postwar elite alignments generate chronic instability, disrupting the institutional status quo.