In this article I defend the possibility of the Virgin Mary's free consent to bear the Son of God at the Annunciation against Blake Hereth's argument that God's offer cannot but be either coercive or deceptive, or both. I argue that the Immaculate Conception does help ensure this possibility, contrary to what Hereth also argues against me.

The Christian and Islamic doctrine of the virgin birth claim God asexually impregnated the Virgin Mary with Jesus, Mary's impregnation was fully consensual (virgin consent), and God never acts immorally (divine goodness). First, I show that God's actions and Mary's background beliefs undermine her consent by virtue of coercive incentives, Mary's comparative powerlessness, and the generation of moral conflicts. Second, I show that God's non-disclosure of certain reasonably relevant facts undermines Mary's informed consent. Third, I show that a recent attempt by Jack Mulder to rescue virgin consent fails. As divine goodness and virgin consent are more central to orthodoxy, Christians and Muslims have powerful reason to reject virgin birth.

This essay highlights the dynamic theology of nature and grace expressed within The Divine Narcissus by Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz (1651–95). Inspired by thinkers such as Augustine and Bernard of Clairvaux and, later in her life, an emphasis on the Immaculate Conception, she details an aesthetic relationship between grace and nature: human nature is created to reflect, in grace, the perfect beauty of the incarnate Son of God. Moreover, by securing positive roles for the contributions of women and for indigenous Mexican religious devotion, she highlights the way in which this dynamic between nature and grace recovers the authentic voice of the least in society—those whose voices have been unjustly suppressed by violent domination.

Popular devotion to the Virgin Mary can often be understood as implying a doctrine of deification, that is, of becoming perfect as our Heavenly Father is perfect. The Mother of God herself is the primary example of the deified person, and she in turn assists her devotees in their own process of becoming deified. The doctrine of deification articulated by Maximus the Confessor and John Scotus Eriugena provides an account that explains particularly well the theology implicit in much Marian devotion, and this is illustrated by two sets of examples, namely, devotional texts concerning the in partu virginity, and devotional practices at the shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes.

Anselm's argument for the salvific necessity of the Incarnation in his Cur Deus Homo is justly famous and elegantly simple: only man ought; only God can; therefore, only a God-man both ought and can (atone for sin). Unfortunately it is a paralogism, trading on an equivocal use of ‘ought’. It is not difficult, however, to reconceive the meaning of the terms ‘ought’ and ‘can’ in a way that both renders the argument formally valid and deepens our christology. Sin may be conceived, per Anselm's own insistence, as a condition of the human soul in its relation to God, a failure of the human will to establish itself in harmonious union with the divine will. If the integrity of created human nature requires that its psychological conditions are propagated together with it, then one who has both the duty and ability to atone for sin must be descended from Adam but must enjoy the original justice of the soul that Adam rejected and deformed in himself. Thus, systematically reconstructing Anselm's argument has the surprising consequence of enabling us to posit an argument for the salvific necessity of the Immaculate Conception as a preparatory stage in the hypostatic union of the Incarnation.