This article aims to enrich the emerging, multi-coloured tapestry of ‘international law in context’ through a study of how international economic law operates in complex investment-related disputes. Focusing on the Eco Oro v. Colombia investor-state arbitration, and drawing on both doctrinal analysis and sociolegal research, the study investigates how different actors make sense of the issues, of the dispute, and of the law. Besides shedding light on the neglected multi-actor, multi-layered dimensions of investment disputes, and on tensions between often incommensurable values, juxtaposing arbitral proceedings and underlying social realities highlights how investor-state arbitration involves a socio-political process of re-presenting actors, territory, the environment, and livelihoods through the prism of international arrangements that are primarily designed to protect foreign investment. The findings provide policy pointers on the need for systemic reform of international investment law, moving away from the predominant emphasis on investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement, towards a governance model that effectively considers the social, political, and environmental dimensions of foreign investment projects.

Following a three-year post-termination transition period to bring investor-state arbitration disputes, the investment protections afforded by Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) finally expired in June 2023. Chapter 11 was one of the most litigated, cited, commented, and copied investment treaties. An important, but largely ignored, part of its legacy is how the making of NAFTA Chapter 11 shaped its subsequent successful diffusion. Combining traditional legal assessment with computational text-as-data analysis, this article shows how the give and take during the negotiations generated buy-in on the part of Mexico and Canada and emulation by Latin American countries who helped to spread NAFTA Chapter 11 language globally. The link between the making and diffusion of NAFTA Chapter 11 highlights the power of negotiated compromise: sharing the pen with others may sometimes be the most effective way to write the rules that come to shape the world.

This Article identifies the problems of an Appellate Mechanism for ISDS Tribunals in relation with its possible benefits. We propose the inclusion of certain design features to improve the working of an eventual Appellate Mechanism and help mitigate problems related to procedural, conflict resolution, and substantive concerns. We finish by identifying the most central problems with a possible Appellate Mechanism, which helps to narrow down options within the ongoing reform process at UNCITRAL. Overall, we illustrate how institutional choice is always contextual and that all institutional options are imperfect and subject to important trade-offs.

This article explores digitalization’s impacts on the existing international investment law regime. In particular, it examines whether international investment agreements (IIAs) apply to the digital economy, analyzing their scope of application, including the definition of protected investment and protected investor, as well as the territorial application of those treaties. We conclude that the IIAs and their provisions are, in principle, not intended for the digital era. However, their usually broad definitions are likely to cover investments in digital assets, if there is a flexible interpretation of the required territorial nexus. However, we believe caution should be exercised about including digital transformation commitments in IIAs, as they could increase the chance of investor-state dispute settlement (-ISDS-).

On 24 June 2022, the Contracting Parties of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) finalized discussions on the modernization of the treaty. After fifteen rounds of negotiations, an agreement in principle was reached to be adopted by the Energy Charter Conference on 22 November 2022 in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.1 The ECT, adopted in 1994, establishes a legal framework that aims to promote international cooperation in the energy sector.2 It has a membership of 53 countries primarily from Europe and Central Asia, as well as the European Union (EU) and the European Atomic Energy Community. In recent years, the ECT attracted widespread public attention due to its impact on states’ environmental and climate policies. Particularly, the treaty’s provisions on investment protection, with investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) at the centre, allow foreign investors in the energy sector to challenge adverse state action before international arbitration and claim compensation for measures affecting their business activities. Fossil fuel investors have increasingly used the ECT to challenge environmental and climate measures, such as phasing out coal-fired power generation, banning offshore oil drilling in coastal areas, and prohibiting gas fracking projects. Such cases have fuelled concerns regarding the abilities of governments to roll-out large-scale climate action. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned that international investment agreements (IIAs) like the ECT could ‘be used by fossil-fuel companies to block national legislation aimed at phasing out the use of their assets’.3 With some of these damage claims running into billions of euros, the ECT enables fossil fuel investors to offload the costs and risks associated with their affected assets onto society at large in the face of necessary climate action. This would go, in the words of the editorial board of the Financial Times, against the ‘heart of the capitalist social contract’ and the ‘ability of markets to deal adequately with the challenge of climate change’.4

The article analyses investment rulemaking in new Asian regionalism in the context of evolving national legislation and regional trade strategies. It argues that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) represent Asia's pragmatic incrementalism in reforming the investment regime. The process reinforces the relationship between international economic law and domestic investment laws. In tandem with transforming international investment agreements, ASEAN expedited investment and services trade, and established the modern investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism. The RCEP further buttresses the ASEAN centrality in regional frameworks by consolidating ASEAN Plus One agreements. Yet, the RCEP's omission of ISDS reflects a distinct approach that may confront challenges to state-to-state proceedings and treaty shopping under overlapping pacts. Finally, the research sheds light on Asian countries' recent investment agreements and domestic dispute settlement that complement the liberal international order. These developments provide valuable models for developing countries and contribute to the understanding of global investment reforms from an Asian perspective.

A persisting question about investment treaties is whether they lead to regulatory chill – the reluctance to regulate on environmental and social issues due to fear of investment claims. The literature on this topic has been predominantly focussed on how the state responds to international pressures, and little has been written about what happens within the state itself. This article aims to fill that gap by analysing the interplay of domestic laws and institutions in the context of potential investment claims, based on the case study of mining in the Santurbán páramo region in Colombia. The article shows that even though Colombia had created laws and institutions that internalized international investment law, it did not bring about regulatory chill in the case of Santurbán; this is due to the role of domestic constitutional law and the Constitutional Court. This case study also adds to the understanding of how the Liberal International Order is shifting from international to domestic governance, by showing how domestic laws and institutions can have diverging priorities when determining how the risk of investment claims is dealt with.

In an era where legally binding international trade agreements are increasingly shaping domestic regulation in a wide range of areas, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement between the US, Australia, Japan and nine other Pacific Rim Countries, representing over 40% of world trade, has been described as setting the standards for 21st century trade agreements. This article analyses why the negotiations have dragged on for 5 years, and the resistance to the potential impacts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement on national democratic decision-making on health, environmental and other public interest regulation.

This Article studies the change in behavior over time for the professional actors in the international investment arbitration system. Using the results from a large-scale computational analysis, I find indications that the actors have increased their use of citations and their use of terms that originate outside of the litigated treaties. In light of these findings, I argue that the actors are increasingly challenging the insulated structural outset of international investment law with a more systemic approach to legal reasoning. Subsequently, I explore if theories from the realm of cognitive science may provide explanations for why the actors are changing their behavior and what consequences such cognitive mechanisms may have on the systems development.