The introduction explains the book’s argument that individuals impacted by the repercussions of interstate disputes dealt with by the Court should and can be further integrated into its procedure and considered in its legal reasoning. Through the lens of social idealism, it explains how the Court’s effectiveness and legitimacy may be compromised due to its reluctant approach towards individuals. It also clarifies the method, methodology, scope, and structure of the book.

This chapter argues that such judicialisation before the ICJ has not developed international environmental law in a way favourable to victims of environmental degradation. It first observes that certain promising human rights-focused environmental disputes were discontinued, indicating that other forms of peaceful dispute settlement remain significant in the environmental context. It then argues that raising arguments in certain incidental proceedings in environmental disputes, such as counterclaims, have limited the potential for certain decisions to develop peoples’ rights in environmental disputes. Finally, it argues that the Court’s perceived judicial caution has limited its ability to clarify the role of local populations in environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and develop certain environmental principles in light of populations, such as the precautionary principle or the principle of intergenerational equity.

This part focuses on the foundational aspects of international human rights law, exploring its theoretical, historical, and philosophical underpinnings. It examines the evolution of human rights ideas, the influence of various philosophical traditions, and the ongoing debates about the nature and universality of human rights. The sections address the epistemological ruptures between philosophy and law, and between law and justice, highlighting the challenges in reconciling these perspectives within a coherent human rights framework. The part also delves into normative pluralism, discussing the coexistence and interaction of multiple legal systems and norms within the global human rights framework. It covers treaty-based structures, customary international law, general principles of law, and the role of judicial decisions and soft law instruments. By critically analyzing these foundational elements, this part aims to provide a deeper understanding of the principles and values that underpin international human rights law and to highlight the complexities and nuances involved in defining and protecting human rights in diverse cultural and legal contexts.

States exhibit various commitments problems in creating international legal rules and institutions. International law is needed to solve collective action problems such as climate change, manage common pool resources, maintain peace, and realize justice. The paradox of commitment explains some of these commitment problems. States would benefit from more effective rules which reduce conflict, enable cooperation and coordination, and resolve collective action problems, but they are reluctant to restrict their own freedom in the name of those rules and the institutions tasked with interpreting and enforcing them. Constitutionalism is available as a language and process which can inform mechanisms for reducing states’ commitment problems. Drawing on legal philosophy, constitutional theory, and empirical social science, I propose to consider a form of global constitutionalism which encourages states to pre-commit to certain basic principles of international cooperation, institutions, and decision-making procedures. Without constitutional rules, international politics falls prey to power politics, vulnerable states are swept up by the brute force and inertia of the big military and economic powers, rule of law protections for states and individuals are weak, human security is at risk, and the threat of violence remains ubiquitous as the primary means of structuring the interaction among states.

The chapter recharacterises the founding instrument of international organisations as constitutions. They function as a legal basis for the organisation, they contain provisions about the mission of the organisation, about the organs/bodies and their competences, and regulate the relationship between the organisation and those who are legally subjected to it. It traces two waves of theories which have espoused different conceptions of constitution: The first wave revolved around the “small c-constitution” in the more neutral sense. The second wave postulated constitutions “with a capital C” that enshrine the constitutionalist trinity: rule of law, human rights, and democracy. In the current constellation of a global shift of power and ideology, a third theory for constitutions of international organisations, more responsive to the global social question and to the demands of the global south, is emerging. This third theory deserves to be pulled out into the light and should be fleshed out further. It should, on the one hand, not fall back on the small-c constitution and, on the other hand, take on board new principles, notably social transnational solidarity and contestatory democracy. This intellectual contribution can provide a basis for responses to the current pushbacks against international organisations.

This chapter focuses not on the possible content of a Bill of Rights, such as whether it should contain social and economic rights or only civil and political rights, but on the form any such Bill needs to take to be legitimate in a manner congruent with the moral norms of equal concern and respect underlying both rights and democracy. It explores four conceptions of Bills of Rights and the different ways they relate to democratic theory and practice. I start with the view of a Bill of Rights as distinct from normal legislation and that is ultimately the responsibility of the courts to defend. I distinguish between substantive and procedural accounts, in which the first focuses on upholding the rights necessary to ensure the outputs of democratic decisions reflect democratic norms whereas the second seeks to uphold the rights required for a due democratic process. I then turn to legislated rights and the role of Parliamentary Bills of Rights. Finally, I examine the role of democratic constitutional politics as a means for justifying and legitimising such rights instruments, be they upheld by legislatures or courts.

This chapter highlights the centrality of the rule of law to Khatami’s presidential campaign. It then reviews the policies of the heads of the judiciary in the post-Khomeini era, with the most far-reaching reform initiatives occurring during the tenure of Shahroudi (1999–2009). These included trying to phase out special courts, prohibiting the security services from running their own detention and prison systems, ending the death penalty for minors, ending execution by stoning, strengthening the rights of political prisoners, and reforming the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Many of these were reversed or watered down by Sadegh Larijani, head of the judiciary 2009–2019. Ebrahim Raisi (2019-2021) revived some of Shahroudi’s reforms in sentencing and also inaugurated a concerted effort to fight corruption in the judiciary. The chapter illustrates that the judiciary is not a monolith, and much of the quality of the rule of law stands and falls with its leading administrators and professionals.

The quality of rule of law has been anything but static in the Islamic Republic: It has varied from area to area of law and across time, with improvements in some years and regressions in others. Established accounts tend to either discount the dramatic erosion of the rule of law in light of the revolution’s other perceived or real achievements (e.g., in terms of education or the Human Development Index [HDI], for example), or paint an entirely bleak picture with gross human rights violations. Discussions seldom differentiate between different areas of law, or acknowledge fluctuations of the rule of law across time. This chapter reviews some of the key areas covered in the volume such as criminal justice, minority rights, property rights, family law, labor rights, freedom of artistic expression and others, mapping progressions and regressions of the rule of law in these spheres and concludes with reflections on prospects for rule-of-law reform.

The relevant international treaty-based law on corruption, human rights and the environment, with a focus on the convergence of these areas of law. Anti-corruption treaties, especially UNCAC, and human rights treaties are both moving towards recognition of the commonalities. Traces 3 approaches to convergence: corruption as background/context, a human-rights based approach, and a human right to be free of corruption.

This chapter forms the context for the discussion in the following chapters analyzing various legal grounds for challenging automated government decision-making. It outlines the constitutional, human rights, and administrative law frameworks in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.

Genocide is sometimes called the ’crime of crimes’. The word was coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944, then declared an international crime by the United Nations General Assembly. In 1948, the Genocide Convention was adopted. As the first human rights treaty of modern times, it constituted a significant intrusion into what had previously been a matter exclusively of domestic concern. This explains the narrow definition of the crime of genocide. It requires proof of an intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Only a half century after its adoption did the Genocide Convention take on real significance with inter-State cases being filed at the International Court of Justice and many prosecutions at the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Convention requires that States Parties punish genocide but they are also required to prevent it, even when it takes place outside their own territory. More than 150 States have ratified the Genocide Convention. Genocide is also prohibited under customary international law. It is generally agreed that the duty to punish genocide is a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).