Per Research Letter article type, we are not including an abstract.

In 2022, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus clade 2.3.4.4b became enzootic and caused mass mortality in Sandwich Tern Thalasseus sandvicensis and other seabird species across north-western Europe. We present data on the characteristics of the spread of the virus between and within breeding colonies and the number of dead adult Sandwich Terns recorded at breeding sites throughout north-western Europe. Within two months of the first reported mortalities, 20,531 adult Sandwich Terns were found dead, which is >17% of the total north-western European breeding population. This is probably an under-representation of total mortality, as many carcasses are likely to have gone unnoticed and unreported. Within affected colonies, almost all chicks died. After the peak of the outbreak, in a colony established by late breeders, 25.7% of tested adults showed immunity to HPAI subtype H5. Removal of carcasses was associated with lower levels of mortality at affected colonies. More research on the sources and modes of transmission, incubation times, effective containment, and immunity is urgently needed to combat this major threat for colonial seabirds.

The epidemiology of H5N1 and H7N9 avian viruses of humans infected in China differs despite both viruses being avian reassortants that have inherited six internal genes from a common ancestor, H9N2. The median age of infected populations is substantially younger for H5N1 virus (26 years) compared with H7N9 virus (63 years). Population susceptibility to infection with seasonal influenza is understood to be influenced by cross-reactive CD8+ T cells directed towards immunogenic peptides derived from internal viral proteins which may provide some level of protection against further influenza infection. Prior exposure to seasonal influenza peptides may influence the age-related infection patterns observed for H5N1 and H7N9 viruses. A comparison of relatedness of immunogenic peptides between historical human strains and the two avian emerged viruses was undertaken for a possible explanation in the differences in age incidence observed. There appeared to be some relationship between past exposure to related peptides and the lower number of H5N1 virus cases in older populations, however the relationship between prior exposure and older populations among H7N9 virus patients was less clear.

This article advances a new account of security as an intensely relational and ontologically entangled phenomenon that does not exist prior to, nor independently of, its intra-action with other phenomena and agencies. Security's ‘entanglement’ is demonstrated through an analysis of the protracted security concerns engendered by ‘dangerous’ scientific experiments performed with lethal H5N1 flu viruses. Utilising methodological approaches recently developed in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), the article explicates the intensely ‘co-productive’ dynamics at play between security and science in those experiments, and which ultimately reveal security to be a deeply relational phenomenon continuously emerging out of its engagement with other agencies. Recovering this deeper ontological entanglement, the article argues, necessitates a different approach to the study of security that does not commence by fixing the meaning and boundaries of security in advance. Rather, such an approach needs to analyse the diverse sites, dynamics, and processes through which security and insecurity come to intra-actively materialise in international relations. It also demands a fundamental reconsideration of many of the discipline's most prominent security theories. They are not merely conceptual tools for studying security, but crucial participants in its intra-active materialisation.

Almost the full range of 16 haemagglutinin (HA) and nine neuraminidase subtypes of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) has been detected either in waterfowl, land-based poultry or in the environment in Bangladesh. AIV infections in Bangladesh affected a wide range of host species of terrestrial poultry. The highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) H5N1 and low pathogenic AI H9N2 were found to co-circulate and be well entrenched in the poultry population, which has caused serious damage to the poultry industry since 2007. By reviewing the available scientific literature, the overall situation of AIVs in Bangladesh is discussed. All Bangladeshi (BD) H5N1 and H9N2 AIV sequences available at GenBank were downloaded along with other representative sequences to analyse the genetic diversity among the circulating AIVs in Bangladesh and to compare with the global situation. Three different H5N1 clades, 2.2.2, 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.4.2, have been detected in Bangladesh. Only 2.3.2.1a is still present. The BD LP H9N2 viruses mostly belonged to the H9 G1 lineage but segregated into many branches, and some of these shared internal genes with HP viruses of subtypes H7N3 and H5N1. However, these reassortment events might have taken place before introduction to Bangladesh. Currently, H9N2 viruses continue to evolve their HA cleavage, receptor binding and glycosylation sites. Multiple mutations in the HA gene associated with adaptation to mammalian hosts were also observed. Strict biosecurity at farms and gradual phasing out of live-bird markets could be the key measures to better control AIVs, whereas stamping out is not a practicable option in Bangladesh. Vaccination also could be an additional tool, which however, requires careful planning. Continuous monitoring of AIVs through systematic surveillance and genetic characterisation of the viruses remains a hallmark of AI control.

Preliminary evidence suggests that direct poultry contact may play a lesser role in transmission of avian influenza A(H7N9) than A(H5N1) to humans. To better understand differences in risk factors, we quantified the degree of poultry contact reported by H5N1 and H7N9 World Health Organization-confirmed cases. We used publicly available data to classify cases by their degree of poultry contact, including direct and indirect. To account for potential data limitations, we used two methods: (1) case population method in which all cases were classified using a range of sources; and (2) case subset method in which only cases with detailed contact information from published research literature were classified. In the case population, detailed exposure information was unavailable for a large proportion of cases (H5N1, 54%; H7N9, 86%). In the case subset, direct contact proportions were higher in H5N1 cases (70·3%) than H7N9 cases (40·0%) (χ2 = 18·5, P < 0·001), and indirect contact proportions were higher in H7N9 cases (44·6%) than H5N1 cases (19·4%) (χ2 = 15·5, P < 0·001). Together with emerging evidence, our descriptive analysis suggests direct poultry contact is a clearer risk factor for H5N1 than for H7N9, and that other risk factors should also be considered for H7N9.

In the wake of avian flu outbreaks in 2004, Cambodia received $45 million in commitments from international donors to help combat the spread of animal and human influenza, particularly avian influenza (H5N1). How countries leverage foreign aid to address the specific needs of donors and the endemic needs of the nation is a complex and nuanced issue throughout the developing world. Cambodia is a particularly compelling study in pandemic preparedness and the management of avian influenza because of its multilayered network of competing local, national, and global needs, and because the level of aid in Cambodia represents approximately $2.65 million per human case—a disproportionately high number when compared with neighbors Vietnam and Indonesia. This paper examines how the Cambodian government has made use of animal and human influenza funds to protect (or fail to protect) its citizens and the global community. It asks how effective donor and government responses were to combating avian influenza in Cambodia, and what improvements could be made at the local and international level to help prepare for and respond to future outbreaks. Based on original interviews, a field survey of policy stakeholders, and detailed examination of Cambodia's health infrastructure and policies, the findings illustrate that while pandemic preparedness has shown improvements since 2004, new outbreaks and human fatalities accelerated in 2011, and more work needs to be done to align the specific goals of funders with the endemic needs of developing nations.

Simulation results showed that simultaneous outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in Asia, the United States, Brazil, and selected European countries will have significant impacts on world poultry trade. Assuming demand for chicken meat is constant, the global export price is simulated to increase by 9.63%. HPAI outbreaks in the United States, Economic Union, and Brazil will have a greater impact on export price than in any other possible three-region case. Outbreaks in the United States and Brazil would still lead to major impacts on world poultry trade, confirming large country effects.

This research is focused on the epidemiological analysis of the transmission of the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus outbreak in Nigeria. The data included 145 outbreaks together with the locations of the infected farms and the date of confirmation of infection. In order to investigate the environmental conditions that favoured the transmission and spread of the virus, weather stations were realigned with the locations of the infected farms. The spatial Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for complete spatial randomness rejects the null hypothesis of constant intensity (P < 0·0001). Preliminary exploratory analysis showed an increase in the incidence of H5N1 virus at farms located at high altitude. Results from the Poisson log-linear conditional intensity function identified temperature (−0·9601) and wind speed (0·6239) as the ecological factors that influence the intensity of transmission of the H5N1 virus. The model also includes distance from the first outbreak (−0·9175) with an Akaike's Information Criterion of −103·87. Our analysis using a point process model showed that geographical heterogeneity, seasonal effects, temperature, wind as well as proximity to the first outbreak are very important components of spread and transmission of HPAI H5N1.

Emergence of the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus in Egypt in mid-February 2006 caused significant losses for the poultry industry and constituted a potential threat to public health. Since late 2007, there has been increasing evidence that stable lineages of H5N1 viruses are being established in chickens and humans in Egypt. The virus has been detected in wild, feral and zoo birds and recently was found in donkeys and pigs. Most of the outbreaks in poultry and humans occurred in the highly populated Nile delta. The temporal pattern of the virus has changed since 2009 with outbreaks now occurring in the warmer months of the year. Challenges to control of endemic disease in Egypt are discussed. For the foreseeable future, unless a global collaboration exists, HPAI H5N1 virus in Egypt will continue to compromise the poultry industry, endanger public health and pose a serious pandemic threat.

Avian influenza (AI) virus is one of the most important diseases of the poultry industry around the world. The virus has a broad host range in birds and mammals, although the natural reservoir is wild birds where it typically causes an asymptomatic to mild infection. The virus in poultry can cause a range of clinical diseases and is defined either as low pathogenic AI (LPAI) or highly pathogenic AI (HPAI) depending on the type of disease it causes in chickens. Viruses that replicate primarily on mucosal surfaces and cause mild disease with low mortality are termed LPAI. Viruses that replicate on mucosal surfaces and systemically and cause severe disease with a mortality rate of 75% or greater in experimentally infected chickens are referred to as HPAI. A virus that is highly pathogenic in chickens may infect but result in a completely different disease and replication pattern in other host species. Outbreaks of HPAI have been relatively uncommon around the world in the last 50 years and have had limited spread within a country or region with one major exception, Asian lineage H5N1 that was first identified in 1996. This lineage of virus has spread to over 60 countries and has become endemic in poultry in at least four countries. AI virus also represents a public health threat, with some infected humans having severe disease and with a high case fatality rate. AI remains a difficult disease to control because of the highly infectious nature of the virus and the interface of domestic and wild animals. A better understanding of the disease and its transmission is important for control.

Medical care systems will be overwhelmed if a human H5N1 pandemic should occur. Several national disaster plans, including that of Belgium, focus on maximal treatment at home with senior medical students supporting frontline care. To evaluate the knowledge and preparedness of Belgian senior medical students, an e-mail survey of senior medical students (last two years of education) attending Flemish universities was conducted.

A total of 243 students (30%) replied. Only 21.8% of them were aware of the possibility of being involved in this planning. A total of 77.4% estimated H5N1 to be a possible threat to national health. Seventy percent of respon-dents reacted positively towards the idea of being involved in implementing primary care, and only 9.5% were absolutely opposed to the idea. A total of 82.3% would care for pandemic patients if necessary, but only 41.2% would do so if these patients were children. Only 18.9% estimated themselves to be suf-ficiently educated regarding H5N1. Ninety-one percent were convinced that care for H5N1-influenza patients should be incorporated into their regular curriculum. Several antiviral products were reported by the students to be effi-cient for treating H5N1, but only 34.6% correctly chose oseltamavir and/or zanamavir and 35.4% replied “I don't know”. A total of 95.5% correctly answered that the regular influenza vaccination doesn't protect against H5N1. The risk for human-to-human transmission was rated to be small by 50.6% (none 21%, high 27.6%). The human infection risk was rated to be small by 74.1% (none 1.6%, high 23%).

There is a high level of willingness to participate among senior medical students. However, in the case of pediatric patients they're more reserved. It would be useful to incorporate a focused session on preparedness in the regular teaching program. A legal base for their actions should also be provided. Ethical guidelines on rights and duties in case of a pandemic should be prepared by an international, multidisciplinary group of experts.

Mechanisms contributing to the spread of avian influenza seem to be well identified, buthow their interplay led to the current worldwide spread pattern of H5N1 influenza is still unknowndue to the lack of effective global surveillance and relevant data. Here we develop some deterministicmodels based on the transmission cycle and modes of H5N1 and focusing on the interactionamong poultry, wild birds and environment. Some of the model parameters are obtained fromexisting literatures, and others are allowed to vary in order to assess the effectiveness of variouscontrol strategies involving bird migration, agro-ecological environments, live and dead poultrytrading, smuggling of wild birds, mechanical movement of infected materials and specific farmingpractices. Our simulations are carried out for a set of parameters that leads to the basic reproductionnumber 3.3. We show that by reducing 95% of the initial susceptible poultry population or bykilling all infected poultry birds within one day, one may control the disease outbreak in a localsetting. Our simulation shows that cleaning the environment is also a feasible and useful controlmeasure, but culling wild birds and destroying their habitat are ineffective control measures. Weuse a one dimensional PDE model to examine the contribution to the spatial spread rate by thesize of the susceptible poultry birds, the diffusion rates of the wild birds and the virus. We noticethe diffusion rate of the wild birds with high mortality has very little impact on the spread speed.But for the wild birds who can survive the infection, depending on the direction of convection,their diffusion rate can substantially increase the spread rate, indicating a significant role of themigration of these type of wild birds in the spread of the disease.

The haemagglutinin (HA) gene of H5N1 Avian influenza virus (AIV) was amplified from the plasmid pGEM-HA and cloned into the baculovirus transfer plasmid pFastBacHT to construct the recombinant transfer vector pFastBacHT-HA. The pFastBacHT-HA was transformed into DH10Bac competent cells, transposed with a shuttle vector (Bacmid) and the transposition rBacmid-HA was constructed. The recombinant baculovirus was harvested from sf9 cells transfected with rBacmid-HA. The expressed HA protein was identified and analysed by SDS–PAGE, Western blot and haemadsorption assay. The 66 kDa protein could only react with chicken serum positive to H5 subtype AIV. The haemadsorption assay showed that the sf9 cells infected with rBacmid-HA baculovirus could absorb chicken red blood cells. These results indicated that the HA protein was successfully expressed in sf9 cells, with reaction specificity to H5 subtype antiserum.

Avian influenza virus is acquiring the ability to cross the species barrier between birds and mammals. However, the genetic mechanism of this ability is not well known. We successfully rescued an influenza A virus A/Chicken/Guangdong/03 (H5N1), which is highly pathogenic to both SPF chickens and BALB/c mice, by plasmid-based reverse genetics. The rescued virus, R-A/Chicken/Guangdong/03 (R-CG), and the wild-type A/Chicken/Guangdong/03 (W-CG) were found to share similar biological properties, such as in titres of 50% egg infectious dose (EID50), 50% tissue culture infectious dose (TCID50) and intravenous pathogenicity index (IPVI). R-CG, like W-CG, is highly pathogenic in mice following natural route infection. Both R-CG and W-CG viruses can be isolated from many organs of mice such as brain, lung, kidney and spleen. As a result, the constructed R-CG reverse genetic system can be used as a tool in the investigation of the molecular mechanism of infection of the mammalian host by avian influenza virus.