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3 results

  • Introduction

  • Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, University of Washington
  • Translated by Katy Masuga
  • Book:
    Freud's Thinking
    Published online:
    21 September 2023
    Print publication:
    05 October 2023, pp 1-8

  • Summary

    What kind of discourse was Freud’s psychoanalysis? A typical late-nineteenth-century positivist, Freud claimed that it is was a scientific, empirical psychology based on the always revisable observation of clinical data and distinguished it sharply from the a priori, meta-physical “speculations” of philosophy. Except that the ultimate object of psychoanalysis, the unconscious, is by definition beyond consciousness and therefore also beyond observation. So what distinguishes Freud’s psychoanalytic interpretations and “constructions” from philosophical speculations? In the end, what distinguishes his “metapsychology that leads behind consciousness” from a metaphysics? This is the question that this book attempts to answer by following Freud’s way of thinking, step by step and as closely as possible to the texts.

  • Lotze on Comparison and the Unity of Consciousness

  • Mark Textor
  • Journal:
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy / Volume 52 / Issue 5 / July 2022
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 February 2023, pp. 556-572
    • Article
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  • Hermann Lotze argued that the fact that consciousness simultaneously “holds objects together as well as apart” such that they can be compared implies (a) that there is a simple thinker and (b) that consciousness is an ‘indivisible unity.’ I offer a reconstruction and evaluation of Lotze’s Argument from Comparison. I contend that it does not deliver (a) but makes a good case for (b). I will relate Lotze’s argument to the contemporary debate between “top-down” and “bottom-up” views of the unity of consciousness and locate it in its historical context. (Kant and Herbart figure prominently here.)