This paper presents the first meta-analysis of the ‘Taking Game,’ a variant of the Dictator Game where participants take money from recipients instead of giving. Upon analyzing data from 39 experiments, which include 123 effect sizes and 7262 offers made by dictators, we discovered a significant framing effect: dictators are more generous in the Taking Game than in the Dictator Game (Cohen's d = 0.26, p < 0.0001), leaving approximately 35.5 percent of the stakes to recipients in the former as opposed to 27.5 percent in the latter. The difference is higher when the participants have earned their endowment before sharing or when the recipient is a charity. Consistent with the standard literature on giving, we also find that participants take less from a charity than from a standard recipient, take less when payoffs are hypothetical, or when recipients have previously earned their endowment. We also find that women (non-students) take less than men (students). Finally, it appears that participants from non-OECD countries leave more money to recipients than participants from OECD countries.

New breeding methods have provided scientists with opportunities to improve traits in a wide range of crops, however, there remains resistance to foods that are produced from these crops, and mandates on labels used to describe such processes continue to be a source of policy debate. Here we focus on gene editing and examine (i) whether consumer acceptance varies when the technology is applied to different ingredients (unrefined versus highly refined ingredients) and (ii) the impact of two different claims related to gene editing (health-focused claim versus an environment-focused claim). Our results show that consumers are less likely to purchase a food product that includes gene-edited ingredients, yet the ingredient that is gene-edited is not important. We also find evidence that both of our selected claims about foods produced using gene-edited ingredients would increase consumers’ likelihood to purchase relative to the case with no claims.

This article compares risk tolerance of native Arabic speakers under two language contexts: their first language (L1 Arabic) and their foreign language (L2 English). We aim to evaluate whether thinking in a foreign language actually reduces the negative effects of cognitive biases, such as loss aversion and mental accounting, on financial decision-making. Toward this aim, we conducted two experiments in which the risk tolerance levels of 144 participants were evaluated across four different types of decision-making problems: the Asian disease problem, the financial crisis problem, the discount problem, and the ticket/money lost problem. In study 1, we adopted Keysar et al.’s (2012, Psychological Science, 23, 661–668) experiment to test the effect of L2 on framing effects associated with loss aversion, and in Study 2, we adopted Costa et al.’s (2014, Cognition, 130, 236–254) experiment to test the effect of L2 on framing effects associated with mental accounting biases. We found that individuals were risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses when presented with choices in their L1, but were almost unaffected by framing manipulation under the L2 condition. When it came to mental accounting, however, framing effects were nearly absent in both L1 and L2 conditions. In our investigation, we examined various potential factors that could explain the foreign language effect on decision-making. The primary factor that appears to account for this linguistic phenomenon is the heightened cognitive and emotional distance experienced when using an L2.

This article refines a foundational tenet of rational choice theory known as the principle of description invariance. Attempts to apply this principle to human agents with imperfect knowledge have paid insufficient attention to two aspects: first, agents’ epistemic situations, i.e. whether and when they recognize alternative descriptions of an object to be equivalent; and second, the individuation of objects of description, i.e. whether and when objects count as the same or different. An important consequence is that many apparent ‘framing effects’ may not violate the principle of description invariance, and the subjects of these effects may not be irrational.

The “problem of points”, introduced by Paccioli in 1494 and solved by Pascal and Fermat 160 years later, inspired the modern concept of probability. Incidentally, the problem also shows that rational decision-making requires the consideration of future events. We show that naïve responses to the problem of points are more future oriented and thus more rational in this sense when the problem itself is presented in a future frame instead of the canonical past frame. A simple nudge is sufficient to make decisions more rational. We consider the implications of this finding for hypothesis testing and predictions of replicability.

In two studies, people were reluctant to trade items they own, but glad to accept upgrades with identical end states. The framing of the transaction makes a difference. A mediational analysis suggests that the relationship between the frame of the transaction and measures of value (willingness to accept, WTA) depends on perceived losses. Losses are perceived as greater when the transaction is a trade than as an upgrade. We manipulated perceptions of loss across descriptions of transactions and found that, when the difference in perceptions of losses with trades versus upgrades was large, framing effects were strong. But when the difference was small, framing effects disappeared. These framing effects with identical end states influence WTA because trades are associated with perceived losses, while upgrades are associated with perceived costs.

Research has shown that risk tolerance increases when multiple decisions and associated outcomes are presented together in a broader “bracket” rather than one at a time. The present studies disentangle the influence of problem bracketing (presenting multiple investment options together) from that of outcome bracketing (presenting the aggregated outcomes of multiple decisions), factors which have been deliberately confounded in previous research. In the standard version of the bracketing task, in which participants decide how much of an initial endowment to invest into each in a series of repeated, identical gambles, we find a problem bracketing effect but not an outcome bracketing effect. However, this pattern of results does not generalize to the cases of non-identical gambles nor discrete choice, where we fail to find the standard bracketing effect.

Studying group decision-making is challenging for multiple reasons. An important logistic difficulty is studying a sufficiently large number of groups, each with multiple participants. Assembling groups online could make this process easier and also provide access to group members more representative of real-world work groups than the sample of college students that typically comprise lab Face-to-Face (FtF) groups. The main goal of this paper is to compare the decisions of online groups to those of FtF groups. We did so in a study that manipulated gain/loss framing of a risky decision between groups and examined the decisions of both individual group members and groups. All of these dependent measures are compared for an online and an FtF sample. Our results suggest that web-conferencing can be a substitute for FtF interaction in group decision-making research, as we found no moderation effects of communication medium on individual or group decision outcome variables. The effects of medium that were found suggest that the use of online groups may be the preferred method for group research. To wit, discussions among the online groups were shorter, but generated a greater number of thought units, i.e., they made more efficient use of time.

Do citizens care whether their government breaches international law, or are other imperatives more influential? We consider this question in the human rights arena, asking whether and how it matters how abuses are framed. In a novel survey experiment, we ask Australians about their attitudes toward restrictive immigration policy, holding the underlying breaches constant but varying how they are framed. We find that people most strongly oppose policy that violates international law. Emphasizing moral considerations has smaller but still notable impacts on attitudes, whereas reputational frames have the weakest effects. We also find that translating attitudes into political action is challenging: most who learn of current policy's legal, moral, or reputational dimensions and in turn become more critical do not subsequently express greater interest in trying to do something about it. Nonetheless, there are interesting differences across frames. Appealing to international law or moral considerations is more effective at spurring mobilization than emphasizing reputational harm, though via different mechanisms. Framing this debate in international reputational terms consistently has the weakest impacts on interest in political action, and may be worse than saying nothing at all.

Supply management is a long-standing agricultural policy in Canada that applies to dairy, poultry and eggs. To date, there exists no academic research on the correlates or dynamics of public support for supply management. We use data collected from the Digital Democracy Project's study of the 2019 Canadian election, including results from a between-subjects framing experiment, to show that support for supply management is most opposed by economic conservatives. However, we find support to be highly malleable by framing: it increases when respondents are primed to think of the policy as a way of protecting farmers and decreases when they are primed to think of its costs to consumers. Contrary to expectations, framing effects are not stronger when messages are ideologically congenial or among those with high levels of policy knowledge. If anything, effects are stronger among those with lower levels of knowledge.

In the past three decades, scholars have frequently used the concept of framing effects to assess the competence of citizens' political judgments and how susceptible they are to elite influence. Yet prior framing studies have reached mixed conclusions, and few have provided systematic cumulative evidence. This study evaluates the overall efficacy of different types of framing effects in the political domain by systematically meta-analyzing this large and diverse literature. A combined analysis of 138 experiments reveals that when examined across contexts, framing exerts medium-sized effects on citizens' political attitudes and emotions. However, framing effects on behavior are negligible, and small effects are also found in more realistic studies employing frame competition. These findings suggest that although elites can influence citizens by framing issues, their capacity to do so is constrained. Overall, citizens appear to be more competent than some scholars envision them to be.

Given extensive research underscoring the deleterious effects of bullying on youth adjustment, anti-bullying policies and programming are critical public health priorities. However, strategies that increase public support for anti-bullying causes are not well understood. This experiment assessed the influence of “bullying messaging” on support for anti-bullying policies. Specifically, I investigated whether learning about the health consequences of bullying, as opposed to its prevalence or educational impact, increased individuals’ support of anti-bullying policies. Participants (n = 329) were randomly assigned to one of four conditions where they read a brief summary about bullying research; conditions varied by whether the research documented the: a) prevalence of bullying b) mental health consequences of bullying c) physical health consequences of bullying or d) academic consequences of bullying. Results indicated that participants endorsed high levels of support for anti-bullying policies, regardless of experimental condition, and that policies aimed at increasing K-12 mental health resources were most supported.

One of the most important activities of the European Union (EU) has been widening the Union, that is, enlargement. Tapping to what extent and why EU citizens support future enlargement rounds has become a popular endeavour among researchers and EU officials. During recent years, a number of studies have indicated that public support for EU integration is likely to also depend on how the national news media portray the EU. Based on an experimental survey design, we test the effects of two news frames on support for future Serbian EU candidacy. We find that exposure to news frames has considerable impact on general understanding of Serbian EU candidacy, issue interpretation, and policy support. This effect is moderated by political knowledge. Knowledgeable participants were able to express their thoughts on Serbian EU candidacy more elaborately, whereas low-knowledge individuals were overall more susceptible to framing effects. We discuss the implications of our findings for current debates such as Euroskepticism and decreasing public support for EU integration.

This article addresses the important issue of anchoring in contingent valuation surveys that use the double-bounded elicitation format. Anchoring occurs when responses to the follow-up dichotomous choice valuation question are influenced by the bid presented in the initial dichotomous choice question. Specifically, we adapt a theory from psychology to characterize respondents as those who are likely to anchor and those who are not. Using a model developed by Herriges and Shogren (1996), our method appears successful in discriminating between those who anchor and those who did not. An important result is that when controlling for anchoring – and allowing the degree of anchoring to differ between respondent groups – the efficiency of the double-bounded welfare estimate is greater than for the initial dichotomous choice question. This contrasts with earlier research that finds that the potential efficiency gain from the double-bounded questions is lost when anchoring is controlled for and that we are better off not asking follow-up questions.