Both democratic education and moral education have significant formative components. That is to say, educators in both domains are concerned not only with imparting knowledge and understanding and equipping pupils with skills and competences, but also with cultivating dispositions and attitudes. A central aim of democratic education is to dispose children toward democracy and a central aim of moral education is to make children moral. My particular interest in this chapter is in how we should understand the relationship between these two formative projects. Is the cultivation of democratic dispositions and attitudes an exercise in moral formation? Are democratic educators, to that extent at least, also moral educators?

Whether patriotism has a valuable part to play in the educational system of a democratic society is now a highly contentious matter. This chapter argues that it does, principally because such a society is a kind of cooperative practice that requires its members to enact, enforce, and – in most cases – obey the laws that govern their self-governing polity. Democracies rely on rules, and especially the rule of law, to provide the reasonably clear expectations necessary to coordinate public activities and to overcome collective-action problems. By encouraging citizens to set aside personal advantage and play a cooperative part in democratic life, patriotism contributes to the public spirit essential to democracy. For that reason, promoting patriotic attitudes is a worthy aim of democratic education.

Eleanor Roosevelt has long been seen as the conscience of the nation, but too little attention has focused on her support of the Japanese-American internment. Caught in the impossible position of opposing internment yet needing to support her husband’s policy, Mrs. Roosevelt publicly backed the plan. When we listen back to her speeches and read her writings at the time, we find a person trying her best to ameliorate the worst aspects of the government’s actions, but simultaneously revealing far less public concern for the victims than we might have imagined.Mrs. Roosevelt’s morally muddled actions contrasted with those of Assistant War Secretary John McCloy. The chapter examines McCloy’s extensive knowledge of German sabotage and how this effected his perception of the Japanese-American threat.

This chapter examines the legitimacy of international law.It begins with an analysis of the concept of legitimacy, or perhaps more precisely, of legitimate authority.It then considers four possible grounds for international law’s legitimacy: enhancing its subjects’ ability to act as they have most reason to act, the consent of those it claims as subjects, considerations of fair play, and international law’s democratic credentials.The chapter concludes with an examination of reasons why we should care about international law’s legitimacy; indeed, why from a moral point of view increasing the international legal order’s legitimacy might even take priority over making it more just.

A lack of regard for truth is a feature not only of problematic grading practices but also of aggressive advocacy as some people understand it. Liberals favor adversarial advocacy, in the courtroom and elsewhere. And a natural law concern with fairness prompts us to see adversarial practices as frequently valuable. But while the practice of aggressive advocacy by attorneys might yield positive results, attorneys themselves might still sometimes act unreasonably in engaging adversarially. The same may be true of professional adversaries of other sorts. Chapter 4 evalutes one positive proposal regarding adversaries’ ethics, seeking to show how natural law theory might help to clarify the moral status of some adversarial practices.