The aim of this paper is not to relitigate Qatar’s human rights record but to assess the effectiveness of its labor reforms: the principal concern is dispute resolution and enforceability. While Qatar instituted a broad suite of labor law reforms in the years preceding the World Cup, questions remain about whether they have improved access to justice for migrant workers. More attention needs to be given to the dispute settlement system established by Law No. 13 of 2017 to assess if new legal norms translate into enforceable rights. It is argued that the labor dispute system has largely failed by not taking into account the circumstances that define the employer-employee relationship in Qatar, especially the stark imbalance in power. While reforms might endure at the level of formal law, the dispute system will fail to deliver genuine justice to workers unless it is refashioned.

One year ago, the Qatar World Cup was in full swing, and Qatar was omnipresent in our public and private spheres. For many, the Qatar 2022 World Cup will forever be intimately connected with the plight of migrant workers. This Article dives into the confluence of spectacle, counter-marketing, international—labor and human rights—law, and local reforms, which came together in the long decade which followed FIFA’s fateful decision in December 2010 to give the 2022 World Cup to Qatar. It starts by situating the FIFA World Cup 2022 within Qatar’s drive for soft power and nation branding, before turning to re-counting how the 2022 World Cup was “ambushed” in the name of Qatar’s migrant workers and their rights, putting the issue on the global agenda and triggering the involvement of the ILO. Thereafter, the Article discusses the effects of this ambush counter-marketing by engaging with the labor reforms introduced by the Qatari government, while highlighting their limits in terms of scope and implementation. The Article concludes with a general discussion on the blind spots and shortcomings of the turn to counter-marketing as a strategy to vindicate international human rights or labor rights.

Among the many human rights and corruption concerns surrounding the Qatar 2022 FIFA Men’s World Cup, two ultimately rose to the fore: labor and LGBTQ+ rights. A careful look at Qatar’s response to these issues reveals a sharp and provocative contrast. Though the World Cup organizers and the Qatari Government generally resisted Western criticism of its LGBTQ+ laws and practices, both bodies adopted systemic labor reforms. To the extent these reforms remain in place several years after the event, they can be said to constitute a human rights legacy. This Article explores one angle from which to understand this contrast. It distinguishes between principles, which are deeply rooted in a country’s political, cultural, or religious belief system, and practices, which find their support in convenience, profit, and the self-interest of entrenched powers but which lack a deeper cultural, philosophical, or religious grounding. It further argues that sexual morality is best understood in the context of Qatari law and culture as a principle, while the labor abuses are mere practices. This distinction helps explain the disparate levels of reform and legacy: to the extent human rights violations are rooted in principles, the likelihood of reform and therefore of legacy is relatively low; where these violations are rooted merely in practices, the likelihood may be substantially higher. This distinction can also help to predict how future host countries/cities will respond to the human rights standards that megasport governing bodies increasingly enforce.

Since 2017, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) has incorporated human rights risk assessments into its bidding requirements for major events, beginning with the competition to host the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup.1 This process began at a time of increased scrutiny on the impact of major events and greater focus on the applicability of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) to sport. In 2014, the Centre for Sport and Human Rights’ founding Chair Mary Robinson, together with John Ruggie (author of the UNGPs), wrote to FIFA in their respective capacities as Patron and Chair of the Institute for Human Rights and Business (IHRB) to stress the need for ‘sustained due diligence […] with respect to decisions about host nations and how major sporting events are planned and implemented’.2 Following recommendations set forth in the letter, expanded upon in Ruggie’s 2016 report ‘For the Game, For the World’, FIFA introduced robust bidding requirements that any country or region wishing to bid to host a World Cup will have to conduct a human rights risk assessment and outline how they intend to mitigate each of the risks identified.3 These requirements are designed to align the World Cup bidding process with the UNGPs.

The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) played a major role in the transformation of association football into a global game. Between 1912 and 1974, before the era of rapid economic sports globalization, FIFA officials attempted to extend the boundaries of the football empire by creating the World Cup and trying to convert new parts of the world to the people's game. It was not an easy task since they met with resistance, obstruction, and contestation. They had to revise their Eurocentric way of thinking and be willing to negotiate. Far from being a mere imperialist process, the path to world football consisted of a series of exacting exchanges and mutual misunderstandings, especially with the South American associations. It is not clear that FIFA officials always understood the demands of the developing football world but they were often able to negotiate and adapt their discourses towards non-European national associations and continental confederations. By doing so, they helped to create, if not an equal football world, at least an international world space.

This report details the background, planning, and establishment of a mass-casualty management area for the Durban Moses Mabhida Stadium at the Natal Mounted Rifles base, by the Department of Health and the eThekwini Fire and Rescue Service, for the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 2010 Soccer World Cup. The report discusses the use of the site during the seven matches played at that stadium, and details the aspects of mass-gathering major incident site planning for football (soccer).

The area also was used as a treatment area for other single patient incidents outside of the stadium, but within the exclusion perimeter, and the 22 patients treated by the Casualty Clearing Station (CCS) team are described and briefly discussed. A site-specific patient presentation rate of 0.48 per 10,000 and transport-to-hospital rate (TTHR) of 0.09/10,000 are reported. Lessons learned and implications for future event planning are discussed in the light of the existing literature.

Hardcastle TC, Samlal S, Naidoo R, Hendrikse S, Gloster A, Ramlal M, Ngema S, Rowe M. A Redundant Resource: A Pre-Planned Casualty Clearing Station for a FIFA 2010 Stadium in Durban. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2012;27(2):1-7 .

Mass gatherings have a higher patient presentation rate than is found within the general population. Despite this fact, many mass gatherings are occurring without suitable medical coverage. South Africa has had no standard approach or model to determine the number of medical personnel needed to deploy to an event. The awarding of the FIFA (Federation International de Football Association) 2010 World Cup to South Africa has provided the impetus for the development of such a model. The model presented in this paper is based on existing recommendations that originate from the United Kingdom.

This paper outlines the modifications that have been made to this model to ensure that adequate medical resources still are provided, albeit in a developing country where medical resources may not be as plentiful.