This chapter touches upon the very large topic of how individual rights interact with the police power. In what sense and to what degree do rights contravene state and local exercises of the police power? It is a shibboleth that regulatory power is constrained by rights. But this chapter interrogates these issues in more depth and detail, by discussing how rights claims are framed in connection with the police power and how the government’s assertions of power are circumscribed by particular doctrines and arguments in courts. Further, the chapter considers how the debate over the nature and content of so-called positive rights implicates the police power questions, questions concerning authority and content.

This volume, part of the Feminist Judgment Series, shows how feminist legal theory along with critical race theory and intersectional modes of critique might transform immigration law. Here, a diverse collection of scholars and lawyers bring critical feminist, race and intersectional insights to Supreme Court opinions that deal with the source of the power to regulate immigration, state and local regulation of immigration, citizenship law, racial discrimination, employment law, access to public education, the rights of criminal defendants, the detention of noncitizens, and more. Feminist reasoning values the perspectives of outsiders, exposes the deep-rooted bias in the legal opinions of courts, and illuminates the effects of ostensibly neutral policies that create and maintain oppression and hierarchy. One by one, the chapters in this book reimagine the norms that drive immigration policies and practices. In place of discrimination and subordination, the authors here demand welcome and equality. Where current law omits the voice and stories of noncitizens, the authors here center their lives and experiences. Collectively, they reveal how a feminist vision of immigration law could center a commitment to equality and justice and foster a country where diverse newcomers readily flourish with dignity.

This volume, part of the Feminist Judgment Series, shows how feminist legal theory along with critical race theory and intersectional modes of critique might transform immigration law. Here, a diverse collection of scholars and lawyers bring critical feminist, race and intersectional insights to Supreme Court opinions that deal with the source of the power to regulate immigration, state and local regulation of immigration, citizenship law, racial discrimination, employment law, access to public education, the rights of criminal defendants, the detention of noncitizens, and more. Feminist reasoning values the perspectives of outsiders, exposes the deep-rooted bias in the legal opinions of courts, and illuminates the effects of ostensibly neutral policies that create and maintain oppression and hierarchy. One by one, the chapters in this book reimagine the norms that drive immigration policies and practices. In place of discrimination and subordination, the authors here demand welcome and equality. Where current law omits the voice and stories of noncitizens, the authors here center their lives and experiences. Collectively, they reveal how a feminist vision of immigration law could center a commitment to equality and justice and foster a country where diverse newcomers readily flourish with dignity.

This volume, part of the Feminist Judgment Series, shows how feminist legal theory along with critical race theory and intersectional modes of critique might transform immigration law. Here, a diverse collection of scholars and lawyers bring critical feminist, race and intersectional insights to Supreme Court opinions that deal with the source of the power to regulate immigration, state and local regulation of immigration, citizenship law, racial discrimination, employment law, access to public education, the rights of criminal defendants, the detention of noncitizens, and more. Feminist reasoning values the perspectives of outsiders, exposes the deep-rooted bias in the legal opinions of courts, and illuminates the effects of ostensibly neutral policies that create and maintain oppression and hierarchy. One by one, the chapters in this book reimagine the norms that drive immigration policies and practices. In place of discrimination and subordination, the authors here demand welcome and equality. Where current law omits the voice and stories of noncitizens, the authors here center their lives and experiences. Collectively, they reveal how a feminist vision of immigration law could center a commitment to equality and justice and foster a country where diverse newcomers readily flourish with dignity.

Given America’s history of racial oppression, addressing racial discrimination has been the Court’s most transformative engagement with democracy. The Reconstruction Amendments’ prohibition of racial discrimination explicitly legitimizes judicial advancement of racial equity in elections. Relying on this mandate during the Civil Rights era, the Court struck down explicitly discriminatory laws (and permitted robust congressional action) with little controversy. However, in recent decades the Court has been fiercely divided over the substance of racial equity. Conservatives have argued that racial equity requires only ensuring formal equality in terms of race. Progressives have argued for a substantive constitutional conception of racial equity that would permit laws and rulings that benefit disadvantaged minorities and afford them substantive political power. The chapter first observes the unity of this debate across applying Equal Protection Clause to districting, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act. It then analogizes the struggle on the bench to Rawls’s and Nozick’s famous debate over the fair allocation of resources.

This case is the first tribal appellate court case included in any of the Feminist Judgments volumes. The case deals with equal protection and gender discrimination, with facts somewhat analogous to Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). Three male juvenile defendants were charged with second-degree sexual assault (a gender-neutral statute), whereas their purported female sex partners were not charged. The Supreme Court of the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska concluded that gender discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny under Winnebago law, and that the government had a compelling interest in charging only the male juveniles.

Counters arguments that properly validated risk algorithms violate egalitarian, retributive or procedural norms when used in pretrial or post-conviction settings

Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio involved a state constitutional challenge to Ohio’s law limiting damages for emotional harm, brought by a teenager who was raped by her pastor. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected her argument that the law as applied to minor sexual assault victims violated equal protection and the right to jury trial. The rewritten feminist opinion uses feminist scholarship demonstrating the disparate impact of damage caps on sexual assault victims to conclude that the law deprives minor sexual assault victims of such a substantial portion of their damages compared to other injury victims that it does violate equal protection and the right to jury trial. The accompanying commentary surveys tort reform damage cap laws and notes how feminist scholarship and the growing awareness of the institutional cover-up of sexual abuse can influence legislatures and courts to ameliorate the effect of these laws.

This chapter surveys the legal history of the term the "protection of the laws," from the writings of the early natural rights thinkers, the American Founders, and Blackstone to Andrew Jackson and antebellum state-level court cases. It argues that the concept of the "protection of the laws," including the "equal protection of the laws," was narrower thanmodern-day courts maintain: it was about the remedial and protective services supplied by the government and the laws aiming to protect individuals in the exercise of their rights against private interference and private violence.

The Introduction outlines the argument of the book and its methodology, distinguishing the more reliable "language of the law" originalism fromless reliable versions that rely too much on legislative history or antislavery constitutional thinkers. Using this methodology, the book will show that the key provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment's first section had well-established antebellum legal meanings that chart a satisfactory middle course between interpretations that rely on what people thought in 1868 and those that allow judges to pour into the text their own extratextual values.

If a right exists, bedrock principles of American law generally demand that the right be equally available to all. So unassailable is this tenet that the US Supreme Court etched the phrase, “Equal Justice Under Law,” on the front of the court building in the 1930s. A plaintiff who is black should have the same substantive law applied to their claim as a plaintiff who is white, with similar results for similar claims.1 And although concrete evidence of systematic, unequal judicial results is sometimes hard to uncover, it is widely acknowledged that in many contexts the law does not, in fact, operate with an even hand.2 The white plaintiff prevails where the black plaintiff fails. Can equality, as a principle of American law, become more than hortatory? How can the law be adjusted to operate more equally, and how can those adjustments be doctrinally justified and grounded? This chapter seeks to answer these questions in a particular legal context – the tort of public disclosure of private facts – and to draw lessons from those results for privacy tort reform and the constitutionalization of tort law more broadly.

focuses on the particular case of the United States and the development of national citizenship and state citizenship over time. Following the lead of other works in American history and American Political Development, the authors lay out three major periods in federated citizenship that follow significant developments in the US Constitution and federal law: the Framers’ period, stretching from the Articles of Confederation and the founding Constitution through the Civil War; the Reconstruction period’s establishment and subsequent collapse of national control ensuring the provision of those citizenship rights under Jim Crow; and the Civil Rights period, starting with the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, and subsequent extensions and contractions in citizenship rights provided at the national and state levels along lines of race, gender, immigrant status, and sexual orientation.

Chapter 6 concludes that discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression is sex discrimination under Title VII. In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, the Tenth Circuit held that a bus company did not violate Title VII when it fired a transgender driver for using women’s restrooms along her route. The court concluded that discrimination based on transgender status does not violate Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “because of sex,” and that the plaintiff was fired because of bathroom use, not discrimination. The rewritten opinion reverses course: the employer’s behavior violated both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College held that discrimination based on sexual orientation is illegal sex discrimination. The rewritten opinion arrives at the same conclusion, but offers a more humanistic lens through which to view the legal question posed. The rewritten opinion relies on several legal theories to support its conclusion, including but-for causation, sex stereotyping, sex-plus, associational (or relationship) discrimination, and a unique use of the motivating factor provision in Title VII.

In mainstream culture, the marginalization of African Americans and Roma is reinforced through sign systems, or associations between images and ideas. Stereotypes of both groups serve as signposts for an inability to become fully incorporated into the nation. This is hardly surprising: the prior Chapters of this book reveal how both groups have been excluded and marginalized for centuries, with weak recourse under law.

When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13-14, and 18-21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18-19, 21-22, and 25-27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (category II).1