Virtually all philosophical discussions of the rule of law’s meaning assume that the proper horizon of the concept is the national legal system, or what I call “the rule of law writ small.”  But governments are bound by a web of transnational legal obligations that should also be considered part of the rule of law’s scope. Analyzing whether the rule of law is honored against the backdrop of both national and transnational law gives us “the rule of law writ large.”  This concept has particular force in the context of backsliding (and democracy-restoring) governments when autocrats first pull their governments away from transnational norms before newly elected democrats seek to restore compliance with those norms. While both sorts of governments may change domestic law, and pack political institutions with those who share their values and fire those who get in their way, only the democracy restorers can be said to be honoring the rule of law writ large.

This chapter examines if the systems of evidence in annulment, failure to act proceedings, and actions for damages, are designed to support private parties’ access to and participation in actions brought directly before the EU courts. Against the backdrop of evidence theory and the so-called procedural abilities doctrine, this chapter argues that, in the context of direct actions, the principle of effective judicial protection receives a restrictive reading. As a result, the requirements that private parties must meet to launch those actions do not, in practice, give way to broad procedural abilities and an unhindered access to the Union courts. These requirements thus seem designed to uphold a (strong) presumption of lawfulness of the EU legislature’s normative action, seeking to preserve the stability and coherence of EU law, rather than to ensure an effective access to, and exercise of the legal remedies included in the EU Treaties’ system of procedures.

This chapter examines Sweden’s emissions trends and the evolution of climate policy in an international perspective by focusing on its role and interdependent relationship with climate action in the EU and with international climate coalitions. The chapter examines the assumption that Sweden is a front-runner and role model in setting and implementing ambitious climate policy. The emission trends across sectors suggest that Sweden has been able to swiftly reduce its emissions, in particular from industry and energy conversion, but that current reduction rates are insufficient to reach its decarbonization target. Reducing emissions in agriculture and transport poses perhaps the greatest challenges for the Swedish state. The chapter also discusses the limits and possibilities for the State to implement its decarbonization target while being dependent on the climate policies in the EU, notably the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). It also looks at Sweden’s role in international climate governance by zooming in on its role in international climate collaborations and clubs. Finally, the chapter provides three reasons for caution when it comes to Sweden’s reputation as a role model. First, that the rate of GHG reduction has declined significantly. Second, that consumption-based approaches to counting GHG emissions demonstrates that Sweden remains a high-emitting country. Third, that Sweden’s consumption-levels are far above the global average and its current consumption patterns should not be emulated by other countries.

From Brexit to the rise of China, the deterioration of the special relationship with the United States and the return of war to Europe in Ukraine, this chapter will explore how the UK’s position in the world has faced both challenges and opportunities over the last fourteen years. The analysis will focus on how different Conservative premierships used or wasted these global changes, and how it has affected UK foreign policy and Britain as a whole (particularly Brexit’s influence on domestic policy and politics).

The chapter examines how the radical Right’s counter-hegemonic struggle relates to other struggles for power in contemporary world politics and attacks on the so-called liberal international order (LIO). Drawing on recent literature on struggles for recognition, we show how the radical Right has built powerful transversal, global alliances based on a logic and discourse of difference and diversity rather than claims to Western superiority. We illustrate this through an analysis of an emerging global alliance in defence of the ‘natural family’. The radical Right’s civilisationalism and calls for multipolarity also enable complex, strategic convergences with illiberal states such as China and Russia, as well as states and people in the Global South. The multi-polar, civilisational world order envisioned by the radical Right is not anti-hierarchical and inclusive, but legitimises new differences and new forms of exclusion through its claims to cultural diversity. It is a more sovereigntist vision of the world in which exclusionary illiberal forces would be able to operate with fewer international constraints.

Within this chapter the book goes beyond the discussion on the region and EU and provides an examination of how specific positions of CEE countries towards energy and climate policy fit within global energy transitions. It highlights the ability of regional experience to provide insights into global energy transition challenges, and the lessons the region can offer for discussions about how to approach the pathways towards carbon-neutral economies; many challenges of CEE countries are shared internationally. As the region has to adapt to EU climate and energy policies, but is at the same time able to shape these, it provides insights into the process of developing and implementing decarbonisation policy. Our analysis of how EU enlargement has shaped mid- and long-term EU climate and energy policy is a contribution to understanding the EU’s role as an international actor.

This chapter focuses on the impact of CEE countries on the development of climate and energy policies at the EU level. It is argued that states in the region demonstrate some shared preferences and utilise regional groupings to promote these at the EU level. The chapter discusses the contribution of CEE countries to the development of EU policy – such as Polish efforts to create an ‘Energy NATO’, CEE countries’ efforts to improve energy security following the 2006 and 2009 gas crises, the 2014 Energy Union, and the reaction to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The chapter argues that the security dimension was given priority by CEE countries at the EU level. They contributed to placing energy security on the EU’s agenda during accession negotiations and the immediate post-accession period; however, their preferences were often not shared by older members. It was the 2006 and 2009 gas supply disruptions that shifted the focus towards energy security in the region, and at the EU level. In 2022 the EU’s dependency on and vulnerability to high levels of energy imports from Russia were brought into sharp focus.

Increasingly, illiberal and authoritarian governments are seizing upon the concept of constitutional identity in order to justify and vindicate their political projects in the face of external criticism. This contribution raises questions about what these invocations tell us about the normative value of constitutional identity. The authors argue that, in the European context of supranational legal integration, constitutional identity should not be seen as an unconditional source of value. Invocations of constitutional identity only deserve recognition to the extent that they serve the ideals of constitutionalism. Where constitutional identity is invoked as a normative argument, the normative expectation of constitutionalism is implied – claims from constitutional identity that stand at odds with the ideals of constitutionalism, in fact, invoke the former ironically and frivolously. Exemplary cases in which constitutional identity is invoked to justify forms of ‘illiberal’ constitutionalism – notably the Polish and Hungarian cases – should be considered abuses of the concept as they do not live up to the normative expectations which they evoke.

This chapter examines sub-systemic actor’s duties. It treats NATO as indicative of a collective defence organization and the European Union (before the Lisbon treaty that contains two collective defence clauses) as indicative of a collective security organization. This chapter argues that NATO has, if requested to help by a member country, a contractual (Article 5) – and thus overriding – duty to protect a member state, and when must cause is satisfied, with securitization. It is argued that Article 5 is now somewhat outdated and that – going forward – just reason (i.e., the existence of an objective existential threat) + macro-proportionality, and not armed attack, should be the threshold for collective political action. The obligation to use securitizing measures, however, rests with the satisfaction of must cause. This chapter also argues that in collective security organizations, the obligation to securitize insiders, rests with remedial responsibility triggered by ties of community/friendship, this means that unlike in collective defence organizations, the obligation to securitize insiders can be overridden.

This chapter provides the volumes general conceptual framework. It begins by addressing why new approaches to accountability are needed, arguing that accountability literature has reached a stalemate as a result of an impasse between deductive and inductive approaches to accountability in the EU. It then argues that overcoming the stalemate requires developing a generalised framework of what accountability is for, deriving four accountability goods to be used in subsequent chapters. The chapter argues that each of the goods can be delivered in procedural or substantive ways, focusing either on the process by which decisions are made or the substantive worth of decisions themselves. The chapter concludes by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of both varieties of accountability before mapping out how the concepts will be applied across policy fields and institutions in subsequent chapters.

Europe’s path to digitisation and datafication in finance has rested upon four apparently unrelated pillars: (1) extensive reporting requirements imposed after the Global Financial Crisis to control systemic risk and change financial sector behaviour; (2) strict data protection rules; (3) the facilitation of open banking to enhance competition in banking and particularly payments; and (4) a legislative framework for digital identification imposed to further the European Single Market. This chapter suggests that together these seemingly unrelated pillars have driven a transition to data-driven finance. The emerging ecosystem based on these pillars aims to promote a balance among a range of sometimes conflicting objectives, including systemic risk, data security and privacy, efficiency, and customer protection. Furthermore, we argue that Europe’s financial services and data protection regulatory reforms have unintentionally driven the use of regulatory technologies (RegTech), thereby laying the foundations for the digital transformation of European Union (‘EU’) financial services and financial regulation. The EU experiences provide insights for other countries in developing regulatory approaches to the intersection of data, finance, and technology.

The 1980s and 1990s saw a phase of increasing intergovernmental cooperation between European countries, culminating in Schengen and EU cooperation on immigration. This sharply exposed the divergence of migration control across European countries, triggering both ‘learning effects’ as countries adapted domestic legislation on asylum and borders, and ‘compensatory effects’ to mitigate the loss of internal Schengen border controls. Yet rather than leading to convergence, national systems of internal migration control remained surprisingly enduring. The chapter shows how the persistence of these divergences made arrangements on Schengen and free movement vulnerable to political shocks such as the 2015 refugee crisis and Brexit.

Since 2008, G20 leaders have repeatedly committed themselves to conclude WTO negotiations expeditiously and refrain from resorting to protectionism. They have not, however, lived up to these commitments. Trade growth has been anaemic for much of the intervening period, with deadlock in the WTO and reversion to aggressive unilateralism by the United States undermining global trade governance. Current trade tensions primarily involve the major trading powers. Resolving these tensions requires agreement between the main actors and greater focus on addressing the concerns of all WTO members regarding the operation of the organization. The major actors are all members of the G20. The G20 constitutes an important forum for the EU to provide leadership and to use its soft power to address geo-economic conflicts and bolster global trade governance. The chapter reviews the prospects for resolving current trade tensions and revitalizing the multilateral system through a discussion of the measures that could constitute EU trade leadership in the G20.