This article outlines and tackles two inter-related puzzles regarding the comparatively much less robust human rights impact that the ECOWAS Court (in effect, West Africa’s international human rights court) has had on the generally more democratic legislative/judicial branch of decision-making and action in Nigeria vis-à-vis the generally more authoritarian executive branch within Nigeria, the country that is the source of most of the cases filed before the court. The article then discusses and analyzes the examples and extent of the court’s human rights impact on legislative/judicial branch decision-making and action in that key country. This is followed by the development of a set of analytical, multi-factorial, explanations for the two inter-connected puzzles that animate the enquiry in this article. In the end, the article argues that several factors have combined to produce the comparatively much less robust human rights impact that the ECOWAS Court has had on domestic legislative and judicial decision-making, process, and action in Nigeria, through restricting the extent to which the latter could mobilize more robustly the court’s human rights-relevant processes and rulings.

This article examines the rejection of the International Investor–State dispute (ISDS) system across the African continent and its replacement with a range of domestic and regional alternatives. It assesses the advantages of the two principal options for African countries: retaining the current ISDS system, or using local courts and regional tribunals. To this end, the dispute resolution mechanisms proposed in the Pan-African Investment Code, the 2016 Southern African Development Community Finance and Investment Protocol, the SADC model BIT, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Economic Community of West African States and East African Community investment agreements and domestic approaches are critically examined. The argument is then advanced that African countries should not abandon ISDS because replacing it with isolated domestic or regional mechanisms does not reduce any of the risks. In particular, for foreign investors, the risk associated with the adjudication of investment disputes in potentially biased, politically influenced domestic courts may prove too high. African host nations, in turn, risk sending out the wrong message concerning their commitment to the protection of foreign investments. Instead of veering off course, perhaps the time has come for African States to display the political will to remain within the ISDS system and contribute to its reform from within.

This article examines the evolution of military operations by the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) over the last three decades. By looking at constitutional (treaty) developments and organizational practice, it questions whether these sub-regional organizations have displaced the primacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in matters pertaining to international peace and security, as foreseen in Articles 24(1) and 103 of the United Nations Charter (the UN Charter). The relevance of this question is underscored by the fact that ECOWAS and SADC have engaged in various peace operations since the 1990s. The article concludes that, since all the interventions under discussion were underpinned by the consent of the recognized government, it would be premature to suggest that the practice of African sub-regional organizations amounts to the emergence of a new customary right to engage in ‘first-instance enforcement action’.

Second pillar v. first pillar – From Union to Community powers and vice versa – Court's jurisdiction under different headings – Jurisdiction after Lisbon – Choice of legal bases in cross-pillar situations – Dual competence? – Different combinations